Iraq War Pre-Surge

Iraq War Pre-Surge: my View

[January 16, 2026]  In a few months, it will be twenty years since I arrived for my second combat tour, part of the Iraq War (2003-2011).  Such a time past gives me time to reflect, and despite some details being lost to old memories, I think I can put the war in a better light.  And with less emotional attachment.  Considering that I also had a third combat tour in 2010-2011 and have read much more about the war, I am now much better at thinking more clearly and cleanly.  Many who I know ask me about the war, and the most common question is whether the war was worth the cost in lives and treasure.  The answer is complex, but yes, I think it was worth it.  I’ll attempt to break that down at some point for better clarity.  One example is that we quickly discovered which nations were willing to commit to and stand with the freedom of the Iraqi people, and which would not.  It is good to know who your friends are and who cannot be counted on when the going gets tough.

Did we win (from America’s perspective)? Regarding the war, I think this is the wrong question. “Winning” the war was never the goal, for good or bad. While there was a mission, and later some mission creep as the war dragged on, we would modify our goals in Iraq. The original goal, as I understood it and as many Americans were told, was to prevent Saddam Hussein from exporting terrorism to the West and to punish him for invading Kuwait. WMD proliferation was a stated goal, but it was part of the fear that Saddam could develop a nuclear or chemical weapon and either use it or give it to Islamic radicals to use as a form of WMD terror against Israel or America. Again, this was terrorism. The WMD rationale was credible. We know Saddam used chemical weapons against the Iranians in that war and against the Kurds in northern Iraq. We also knew that Saddam had an advanced nuclear research program at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center (where the French-built reactor Osirak was destroyed by Israel in 1981). America’s solution to prevent the export of terrorism, including WMD terrorism, was to 1.) get rid of Saddam, 2.) change his government into a democratic one, and 3.) hunt for any WMD and remove or destroy them.

Did we achieve our goals in the Iraq War to rid the world of the Islamic terror threat inspired by Saddam Hussein? That is the right question, the “right” question because that is how the American people were sold on the war. Despite the confusion among the news media and so-called experts about the war and the claim that our goals would change only slightly, we all knew the key to success was preventing the proliferation of terrorism using our military. The Iraq War is an example of what happens when a country tries to export terrorism. Our American military strategy was to show the world that we will destroy you. The problem is that the threat did not work, and it didn’t work because we were using traditional Western logic, in which a country’s citizens’ lives and its economy matter. Islam and tyrannical governments are not based on that logic but on a deeper philosophy of achieving the greatness of that tyrannical government, where individual lives and the economy are subordinate, often just irrelevant, to move their corruption and malfeasance forward.

“Do you miss war?” A few years ago, long after my retirement, I was asked this by a high school student. The question rightly forced me to confront my conflicting ideas about war. My answer was simple. I missed the camaraderie of my unit, our intense shared experiences, and the devotion to one another. That emotion would drive me to go to the aid of a fallen comrade, regardless of the risk to myself. What I do not miss are all the bad parts of war. In my mind, I can still smell the stench of broken sewers, remember the deafening roar of artillery, the deaths of my friends, and the little children without parents. These are not what I miss about war. I believe camaraderie is formed by intense experiences, usually in difficult circumstances. Is the difference something deep in our psyche? Is it primordial? Frankly, I don’t know, and it doesn’t matter, because the emotional connection to comrades is more powerful than anything I’ve ever known. That “connection” is why one soldier will willingly risk his own life to save another. But unless you have the emotional bond of a soldier (or any military experience from intense hardship), it is impossible to fully explain.

Personally, there were some lessons.  I learned early in my first combat tour that I was not a coward; something that is learned only from direct experience in a life-threatening situation.  I was not overly concerned about it, but no one knows how one will react on their first contact with an enemy intent on killing you.  I also learned that I was much more than a competent Army Engineer and could retain my foresight in the tactical and operational employment of American military and civilian Engineer forces.  This was both complex and fraught with challenges that no one could predict in advance, and I didn’t know if I could keep this intellectual machine running without throwing a wrench into the works.  I learned that many major engineering problems often had no solution, or at least no reasonable solution.  Like the ticking time bomb of the Mosul Dam, a monolith in Iraq’s northern desert with the potential to bring death and destruction to millions downstream if it were to catastrophically fail.  And our Coalition headquarters in Baghdad was directly in the path of the floodwaters.  Also, I could work diligently to stay ahead of the Commander’s demands at the MNC-I staff (Corps, 3-star) level and later at the Army (4-star) level, effectively becoming the go-to Engineer for hard issues and answering questions or solving problems that had no answers or solutions.  This required creativity I didn’t know I possessed.  Sometimes all the answers and solutions are wrong, terribly wrong; the trick is choosing the least wrong, being creative, and knowing how to solve the political and military fallout.

Fear.  I had to confront this reality early.  I had already discovered that I was no coward.  But I also knew that I lacked something crucial to be a good Soldier.  I had no fear.  Lacking fear is a dangerous state of mind.  Those without fear can easily be deluded into making unreasonably risky decisions with consequences we would not want.  The danger of complacency from the lack of fear is hard to overcome.  One’s life and that of others you command or work alongside can be put into situations that could easily lead to severe wounds or death.  Fear must be managed as much as the lack of fear must be managed.  I think I succeeded in controlling my lack of fear, at least no one I was associated with died from anything I did or did not do because of it.  I’m also proud of the fact that no contractor (Iraqi or third-nation) was ever killed or severely injured on those projects designed or approved by us, due to the purposeful prevention methods we put into place.  Fear can be debilitating and devastatingly so.  I saw many who were overcome with fear, and how that led them to refusing to carry out their military duties.  On several occasions, I had to intervene, and it would get ugly, fast.  What do you tell a senior officer or mid-grade enlisted Soldier that they are a coward and are being relieved of duty, and sent home with that knowledge?  That is far more difficult than one might think.  You are sending someone home with the red “C” of cowardice symbolically emblazoned on their chest.

How did I overcome the many difficulties of being the senior Construction Engineer for the pre-Surge construction at MNC-I? Part of the answer is easy. I was not doing it alone. My first piece of business upon my arrival in Baghdad was to immediately begin establishing a large network of key players, not to get an update briefing like my team had expected. I visited all the major MNC-I C-staff senior colonels, “customers” (like the Garrison and large unit commanders), KBR, GRD, MNSTC-I, MNF-I, TF-134, etc., to let them know who I was (see my face) and that I was 100 percent available to them for whatever reason. If they asked me for anything, they would get it. I put all my trust and confidence in them; it worked well. I also insisted early on that I would travel to all the major unit locations, including the US Marines out in the West and Coalition partners (South Koreans, British, and Poles) in the North and South (at the ports). Slowly, I was able to build this into an integrated network that made it much easier to find help when I needed it, and there was far less animosity if I inadvertently stepped on some sensitive military toes. I cannot imagine how not doing this networking could work.

I would spend a full year in Iraq without a break. My decision was personal; leaving my family and friends was hard on me, harder on them. Better they didn’t see me for a short two weeks than go through the emotional turmoil of my departure. Another benefit was that I came home much tougher mentally and physically. My mental state is hard to describe, but one way to put it is that I had the opposite of PTSD. I had developed a tough mindset. Resilience, adaptability, and self-awareness. Strong mental health. Disciplined with a purpose. Confidence in my abilities. This is not bravery in combat but something more; it was a way of living that possesses its own inherent good. Combat can have a strengthening effect, and at the time, I gave it no thought. Plus, I was highly respected; my recommendations and opinions were sought after, and that attracted people. In combat, this is what being a good Soldier is all about. I think I can say that I was a good Soldier.

NOTE: This is the last of the Iraq War Pre-Surge articles.

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The Iraq War Pre-Surge: my Last Month

[January 13, 2026] The Iraqi National Soccer Team, competing for the World Cup, defeated the North Korean team on July 6, 2007, with a 1-0 score. We were infected by the pride that had run through the Iraqi people, and we rejoiced alongside them. The Iraqi people had made significant progress over the previous four years in their efforts to reorganize their government and create jobs. Personally, I worked with many Iraqis because they provided the majority of the construction we all needed so badly. The Iraqis were good workers, and they weren’t afraid to get their hands dirty, a trait that would serve them well as they aimed to build a truly first-world nation. While that aim was what we all wanted, many throughout their society still held on to their tribal ways, pulling the country in the wrong direction. Violence was natural when tribal divisions robbed any society of its desire to improve its lot. Iraq would not be the first country to regress due to sectarian conflicts, and years after we left in 2011, these ancient divisions would again tear the country apart.

July began as my last month in country. LTG Odierno pinned a Bronze Star Medal on me in his office. He knew me from this tour and from the previous tour in 2004-05. “I stand here truly honored and humbled.” That’s it. Back to work. We were part of a meeting with GEN Petraeus and learned that he had not yet decided exactly how he would conduct his battle with the Surge. LTG Odierno would have operational control, but it was Petraeus who was finalizing the military strategy we would follow. We were also warned that there were threats of kidnapping for those who traveled inside Indian country, just like I was doing weekly. The idea was, of course, to distract our forces from their offensive operations to look for anyone missing. Getting caught by terrorists was bad. We all knew that no matter what, we would fight to the death because capture meant torture and execution.

The showtime for my UH-60 flight to Anaconda/Balad was midnight. This meant no sleep. Coupled with the heat and stress, I had to push my body hard to avoid appearing weak (I did, in fact, concern myself with that). We flew out later that morning for Q-West (Qayyarah Airfield West), about 190 miles north of Baghdad. But due to extreme dust conditions, the flight was diverted to Kirkuk, where I was treated well by U.S. forces stationed there. June 8th, a Friday, was again hot and clear when we landed. Being a weatherman in Iraq meant having the most accurate forecasts on earth; during the summer, conditions were consistently hot and clear. The next day, I would fly out on a CH-47 Chinook to Summerall, Speicher, and then on to Q-West. The trip was good, but I would discover that Surge forces were ultimately not going there. Visiting with some Kurds and listening to them speak of how they were treated by Saddam Hussein and his military was very sad. They were now trying to break away from Iraq to become their own country with their own democratic government. This would not happen, at least not by the time I’m writing this article in early 2026. A few days after our visit, I got word that the Turkish military was shelling northern Iraqi/Kurdish towns, 90 times over several days.

COL Deb Lewis, the USACE GRC commander of the Baghdad US Engineer Corps, took me out on a reconnaissance mission to observe progress on the $50 million Baghdad Bypass project. The convoy was led by a British firm, Aegis Defence Services, and we traveled in some odd armored vehicles. Looking back, she took me out more as a thank-you for helping USACE during my tour, and she brought along a photographer. Today, I still have one of those photos on my office wall.

We were alerted that offensive operations were about to kick off. The Surge offensive operation had not yet begun because the units were not yet in place. However, the international media was giving it a lot of attention. On July 11, we began the long-planned Engineer Conference. I gave introductory remarks that explained the purpose and need for these conferences, where senior Engineer officers and NCOs come. My remarks are from my notes:

• Welcome to the third Engineer Conference within the last year.
• The intent of this conference is to provide both basic information that will help you get projects through the Corps (MNC-I Engineers, meaning mostly me) and to introduce you to the person (from my office) you will work with over the next four to six months.
• The information we’re briefing today includes C7, SJA, C8, and GRD sources.
• The personnel are those who will be here for you to question directly, either during their presentations or offline (C7 will be here all day).

Due to the extreme sectarianism in Iraq, violence was not going away anytime soon. On June 13, we were informed that the Golden Mosque minarets had been destroyed. This was a major development and a dangerous one. Throughout Samarra, where the major Shia mosque was located, black flags flew. I was told these were flags of mourning. The mosque was commissioned in 848 CE and completed in 851 by the Abbasid caliph Al-Mutawakkil. At the time of construction, it was the world’s largest mosque. It is known for its 52-meter-high (171 feet) minaret, encircled by a spiral ramp. The mosque is a UNESCO World Heritage Site. For us, this meant at least that a major increase in violence was coming our way; travel would be more dangerous, working with different tribes would be riskier and generate more animosity, and the threat of kidnapping would increase. We would not be disappointed.

I was now only a few weeks out from the end of my tour. This would mean a major increase in paperwork, including drafting OERs & NCOERs, preparing a transition package for my replacement, visiting friends (those I had worked with), and giving briefs to several General Officers (like GEN Petraeus, LTG Odierno, MG Snyder), KBR senior staff, USACE HQ, etc. This also meant an uptick in travel, mostly via convoy. I also got a surprise visit from Fatin, who was now employed as a translator. She was in Iraq the entire time our forces were there, from 2003 through 2011 (an amazing feat). Jun 17 (Sunday) was Father’s Day, and I called my dad and spoke with him and my mom. They were surprised and happy that I actually made a call. My son Sean sent me an email wishing me a good Father’s Day (there was no way anyone from my family could call me in Iraq).

While waiting for a flight out at 2050 hours, I saw the crescent moon with a planet next to it in the sky. In my notes, I drew it as best I could and noted that there were no other stars out and that I’d never seen anything like it. In pre-modern times, people would say this was some kind of omen. On Tuesday, June 19, 2007, the official Surge offensive began. GEN Petraeus would say that the political line of operations was more important than the military line in this offensive. He was talking about religious differences when he said political, given that the Iraqi senior government was mostly Shia and led by Prime Minister Nouri Kamel al-Maliki, a Shia figurehead. The operation, previously known as the Surge, was officially called “Phantom Thunder.” The term “phantom” was a play on III Corps’ history, having deployed to the European Theater of Operations in World War II, earning the name “Phantom Corps” by striking the enemy when least expected. That same day at TF-134, LTG Russel Honoré visited, and I had the opportunity to speak with him. LTG Honoré had become famous a couple of years earlier in 2005 when he was put in charge of assisting in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina as a blunt, John Wayne-like character.

Now that I was to depart in less than 10 days, I took the time to visit those folks who were the main players in helping get the Pre-Surge effort off the ground and make it successful. The list was long and included folks in TF134, the MNC-I CoS & DCoS, MNF-I R&S, IAG, 411th Engr Brigade, Garrison Command, LOGCAP, KBR, GRC, GRD, JCC-I, and various C-sections of MNC-I, especially C8 and C9. I also purchased small gifts for family members, a task made very challenging by our being in a combat zone. But there were some Turkish “shops” where I could get some trinkets. It was important for them to know that these gifts came from Iraq, not some store in the airport. Monday, June 25, would be the first day with temperatures over 100 degrees F; it reached 111 that day. This would now become normal, making everything we did much harder. Before I left, I ensured that my injuries were documented in my medical records. I had my fair share of elbow, knee, and lower back problems; mostly cartilage tears and arthritis. My replacement finally showed up on the 29th, and I tried to bring him up to speed. Poor guy, he was so jet-lagged and hit by the high temperatures, 113 degrees that day, that he couldn’t retain anything.

And, of course, things always seem to pop up when you’re the busiest. I developed a terrible headache from an infected upper tooth. One of my Warrants called the Liberty Medical Clinic and drove me there. A Special Forces doctor treated me. He had not done any dental work since medical school, but he drilled into the tooth to relieve the pressure. The infection had spread into my sinuses and drained out through the tooth when I sat up. Such fun. The doctor’s name was LTC Beiké. I was lucky to get him.

I was busy to the very end. There were a few meal gatherings instigated by friends. I had the typical out-briefings, including one from our Chaplain. The work I undertook for the Surge was either completed or in progress. Little planning was done for this part of the effort. I didn’t forget those who had worked for me, and I handed out several honors (medals, coins, certificates, flags, etc.). My last day, my Independence Day from Iraq, was Wednesday, July 4, 2007. I was in Kuwait at 2000 hours that evening. I went through US Customs and then hopped on what we called Freedom Flights. We first flew to Hungary, then to McGuire AFB, New Jersey, then to Ft Bliss, TX, for final out-processing. My final note in my notebook, Book 5 of 5, reads “out-processing is disorganized.” Go figure.

NOTE: This is my last article on my involvement in the Iraq War Pre-Surge. Another article is forthcoming that shares my thoughts on the Iraq War as it was in 2007. I’m not sure how difficult it will be to write that article, but it is necessary for me. I would have one more combat tour in Iraq, from 2010 to 2011, during which I would serve as the Chief of Staff for the USF-I C-7 Engineers. However, it was this tour, from 2006 to 2007, that presented the biggest challenge of my 40-year career.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: the IED Hunters

[December 29, 2025]  Daily high temperatures were hot.  On Friday, 1 July, it was 108 degrees F, with dust, wind, and haze.  It was going to be another Groundhog Day in Iraq, but our Engineers were ready.  We started our Fridays with a team sport, and this morning it was volleyball beginning at 0600 hours.  By the time I got cleaned up and ate breakfast, and went to my office in the Engineers’ Boathouse, it was pushing 0800 hours.  We would have our standard C-7 staff huddle.  The main topic was, of course, our status for the upcoming Surge.  I had just over one month to go on this one-year combat tour and so it was time to check off a few things that any good Engineer would want to do, given the circumstances.  For example,  I made arrangements to go along on a mission with an Engineer Squad to observe an IED hunting mission.  The new MRAPs – on this trip, an up-armored and caged Buffalo – were a marvel of technical engineering.  I remembered my early combat tour when we had created the first IED-hunter teams, composed initially with cooks and HMMWVs (the early version with add-on armor).  The mission had not changed since 2004, but after nearly three years, the task was assumed by our Engineers and we had a new MOS for it.  Our Soldiers were training at Fort Leonardwood, MO, home of the U.S. Engineer School.

Part of the MNF-I Surge meeting at the Al Faw Palace, included the 3rd Infantry Division, the unit which would provide C2 for the many BCTs and support elements that would soon be in the fight.  The VTC was classified Secret and included the primary staff from MNC-I and MNF-I.  The discussion ranged from where the 3ID units would possibly go, including out West and North, from Q-West to Mosul.  I had already traveled to these locations to determine whether those many locations could support incoming Surge units.  The short answer is they could, most without much additional infrastructure development.  The 3ID CG’s concern, that affected our Engineers, was the development of proper housing for the inbound troops.  I reminded both the 3ID commander and his ADC for Support – BG Cardone – that we would be ready but that the conditions would be “austere,” just as I had back in early February when we had last spoken.  The commander wanted CMU construction for his 3ID headquarters but I explained how that was not possible, if they were coming to Victory Base Complex, and, yes, they were coming here to Baghdad.  There were simply too many troops in too little space, without much heads-up (initially, we were told there would be no divisional HQ as part of the Surge).

While the inbound units were on an unalterable timeline, we were still playing around with the final estimates on the number of new detainees which the TF-134 would be required to secure.  The final number we agreed upon was 50,000 detained by American forces.  Results reported in 2009, showed that the peak number would be roughly half that figure, at 26,000 in October of 2007.  We had no way of knowing this and planning for the larger number was the correct decision.  MG Stone, at the time, had no idea that the majority of those who we would capture were involved in anti-Coalition actions because they needed the money paid by the real insurgents; few were doing it for ideological or religious reasons; a surprise finding.  Nevertheless, the “long pole in the tent” for comfortable detainee and troop living facilities was electrical power.  Already we had temperatures over 110 degrees F and it was only May; by late July and August the temperatures would exceed 120 degrees.  Without power, people could not live and troops could not fight for long.  We were creating generator farms, and exploring new ways to both purchase more large-capacity generators, and get them to produce at higher rates of efficiency.  We were buying so many large generators on the international market that we began to compete with ourselves, driving up the price and creating an artificial shortage.  At a TF-134 meeting that afternoon, I was informed that GEN Petraeus had approved the MILVAN solution (CONEX containers) in place of the legacy tentage; at least at Bucca.

I was up early at 0330 hours on 3 June for a report time of 0415 hours to “observe” the IED hunters in action on a “ride along.”  A Company, 130th Engineers (Puerto Rico) was the unit to host me.  This was my first and only Route Clearance mission.  Nearly all Coalition Engineers killed or wounded in Iraq are from RC teams.  There was no problem on this mission that took place on the southern side of Baghdad, a “safer area.”  That same day, we worked to finalize proposed barrier priorities (which we observed frequently on the RC mission).  Most of the senior staff thought barriers were mostly for protection against indirect fire, but that was not the case.  The priority was to mobility where we used these barriers to block traffic and channel Iraqi civilian vehicles into areas we could control.  Plus, the barriers would provide some protection against direct fire on convoys moving along MSRs inside Baghdad.  Second priority was protecting Joint Security Sites, then safe Iraqi markets, gated communities, Combat Outposts, LSAs, and then force protection (ASP/ATHP protection).

We spent the next few days insuring that the work to expand the infrastructure was going according to plan.  I couldn’t trust most of the civilian construction and renovation work on U.S. facilities, with the exception of KBR’s O&M.  I was so busy traveling around the country that I just didn’t stop to see how well or not KBR was doing.  I relied on my staff to report any problems.  I found that contractors from the Middle East were generally good workers but the owners and managers tended to grossly exaggerate their progress.  This meant in-person checking and that is what I did.  I could have tasked a junior officer with these duties, and I did but rarely.  In-person inspection meant that the contractors knew I would personally hold them accountable, and it worked.  But we were working on non-Surge infrastructure as well.  The Muthanna Bunkers, IZ to VBC transition (which complicated the Surge build up), a new Fire Assessment (to include bringing in civilian Fire Fighters, updating Master Plans, well-drilling where water was especially scarce, a MNC-I RIP/TOA, WTP and WWTP plant analysis, PX upgrades, incinerators for trash and medical waste, and then we were informed that GEN Petraeus was to kick off his Surge offensive now!  At the briefing to LTG Odierno, MG Stone presented me with a plastic “detainee” challenge coin for my work; yeah.

Destruction of the chemical weapons at the Muthanna Bunkers remained a topic of discussion.  We were trying to come up with a solution that was faster and cheaper than building bunkers to temporarily seal them up (COA 1).  We did not want the bad guys to gain access to them.  Of course, doing nothing (COA 2) was not really an option.  The MNC-I C-3 (COL Murray) wanted a COA 3 which it was proposed that we ask the USAF to use a JDAM or incendiary bomb to destroy them.  At least he was thinking out of the box.  We would have been hunting down these already weaponized as 155mm artillery rounds for years with that solution.  Because my tour was coming to an end very soon, I was consumed by an increase in paperwork.  I made recommendations for various senior staff members to get the coveted U.S. Corps of Engineer Bronze de Fleury medal.  This included several of our Australian colonels who were Engineers in our shop.  Plus, I wrote awards for both officers and enlisted.  I could have farmed out this task, but I was more knowledgeable on what these troops did and I had a track record of getting all my submissions approved.  I would be busy up to the moment I got on a C-130 to fly out to Kuwait in early July.

NOTE: This Pre-Surge article is one of my last.  There will be at least one on what happened in June of 2007, and then maybe a wrap-up article.  Stay tuned.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: KBR & LOGCAP III

[December 27, 2025]  May 22 came and went without much fanfare.  It was indeed my 55th birthday, but little more than a blip on my mind’s radar.  I scribbled “birthday” at the top of my notes.  That was it.  In a way, it was a day to reflect on what Engineers lacked to complete our jobs on time and on budget.  The day began with a trip to R&S at MNF-I to hear a Logistics briefing—the usual information on hazmat, firefighting, CCA projects, and the SOW for road repairs.  The LOGCAP meeting later in the day mattered most.  Specifically, we discussed O&M building repairs and maintenance.  We had 49,000 buildings, 99% of which were level A, and 10,000 O&M workers.  That was nuts.  Why have a classification system when every building was a high priority, and there were insufficient workers to get ‘er done?  The answer was simple.  The loggies didn’t want to piss anybody off, so they allowed every building to be at the “top” of the list for improvements. Major changes were on the way, and we needed to be ready.  LOGCAP IV was coming, and it would have a significant impact on how we conducted business with O&M contractors.  We used KBR as the largest and most capable contractor in LOGCAP III, and for that reason, we established a close working relationship with them.  However, I would remind myself often that they were there primarily to make a profit.  This did color our relationship.  The advantage to using KBR was their ability to rapidly expand, when needed, their experienced workforce at a location of our choosing.

Under the LOGCAP contract, KBR provided a broad range of logistics and support services to U.S. and allied forces during the Iraq War, but notably, not new construction.  LOGCAP III had been competitively awarded to KBR in December 2001.  MNF-I was the lead in creating Working Groups that would gather to discuss how the new LOGCAP IV would continue those services forward, as well as authorizing new construction.  The reason, as I understood it, for migrating to a new LOGCAP contract was that Congress believed KBR had a monopoly-like stranglehold on the government and was charging exorbitant prices.  That was true.  However, I know that Congress also had no clue what it takes to create a flexible, highly responsive company that can change direction quickly and without failure.  KBR was the proper organization.  Under the new LOGCAP, the directive was that three major contractors would compete for different parts of the LOGCAP program.  Eventually, these turned out to be DynCorp International, Fluor Intercontinental Inc. (with which I had already had a minor working relationship), and KBR.  This would come true in April 2008, nine months after I departed the theater.  In the meantime, I was selected as the Engineer representative to provide input, as I was the point person for the use of KBR in O&M services for the U.S. military.  We met in the early evening hours, and I was unhappy about that.  My day was long, and by that time of the day, thinking was difficult.  Heat, stress, and physical activity took a brutal toll on the ability to think clearly.  I asked to be excused from the duty, but the request was denied.

By late May 2007, the top Engineer issues were:

• Lack of responsive construction authority in theater (MILCON thresholds, CCA, ADA violations, OPA).
• Lack of adequate construction Engineers and engineer equipment, senior leadership, and project programming skill sets (made worse by troop Surge).
• Lack of true, specific, across-the-board construction standards and buy-in from leadership up through Congress and the Secretary of Defense. “Temporary” versus “Durable” construction (Tent vs. CMU).
• Lack of money, personnel and equipment, especially on environmental programs.
• The quality and timeliness of the Gulf Region District, which has provided major civil and military infrastructure projects.

Our biggest issue going forward was the planning for future basing, including the Surge basing, as well as additional Coalition basing increases in infrastructure and security protection.  The issue of more and larger bases, or the alternative to closing bases, remained complex, primarily because we did not know our future plans for the war.  Were we staying?  Probably (since the Surge was inbound).  Or, were we leaving?  Unlikely (but Congress’s resistance to the war was increasing).  We were still pushing OHC, a costly solution to indirect fire.  OHC was an indicator of future basing; the more OHC that was funded and built, the more likely we were to stay in Iraq.  In line with our unknown future, III Corps (which made up the core of MNC-I) was planning for a RIP/TOA in August.  I’d be gone by then, but I had to prepare our Facilities section anyway.  This included ongoing concerns about incinerators, the IZ to VBC transition, USACE progress, KBR Task Order concerns, UXOs remaining on bases, crumbling MSRs and ASRs, physical infrastructure for the base perimeter & ECP security, and the perennial issue of working under peacetime rules in a combat environment.  I would brief more CODELs on this number one issue holding us back, and I always got empty promises they would do something about it.

At the end of May, the weather turned from warm (under 90 degrees) to hot (soaring above 110 degrees).  One type of incident I never saw was a heat injury, regardless of the heat.  Thanks to our troops being in great physical shape and the preventative measures taken by our NCOs, these injuries were few – a good news story.  May was also the time that terrorists started to shift their tactics.  Insurgents were already attacking infrastructure.  Terrorists shifted to attacking Iraqi and Coalition infrastructure because this was a visible way of showing their power.  I also think the reason was that the terrorists figured out that the best way to drive us out of the country was to convince the ordinary Iraqi that our efforts were failing to make their lives better.  Killing the citizens was not working.  This new tactic came at a time when we were working on more and more large-scale civilian projects, such as water and sewer plants, electrical generation and distribution, etc.  Part of the problem was that we were using “outside” contractors, meaning either foreign nationals (typically Middle Eastern) or those from northern or western Iraq.  The first solution of these outside contractors was classic; just bribe the terrorists to leave us alone.  Bribes only made the terrorists stronger.  The solution was to use local contractors, who were from the area.  The Government of Iraq supported this latter solution, and of course, they would, as they were on the receiving end of many bribes.

NOTE: I know I’m writing in some detail about what went on in MNC-I infrastructure development, and that many readers may have little interest. However, I suggest that they look for specifics on how we operated and the intelligence we gathered.  For example, the changing tactics of terrorists was a game-changer.  Thanks for reading this series.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: the Army C-12

[December 26, 2025]  I had been frustrated to no end by the progress of our preparation for the Surge. The pre-Surge construction planning, design, funding, contracting process, and eventual construction weren’t meeting what I thought was sufficient to accommodate the incoming personnel or equipment. Plus, we were late on the timelines. One of the areas I detested was TF-134, commanded by MG Garner, who rejected all my recommendations. I think he was most upset when I said he had insufficient details to explain any large increase in the projected number of detainees that would result from the Surge. He departed the theater shortly after we spoke. It was May when U.S. Marine MG Doug Stone took command of Detainee Operations, TF-134. MG Garner had gone to his next assignment, although that was not my interest. I was glad he had been replaced. That’s just what I needed. One of the first people MG Stone spoke to was me. I can only assume his staff told him what was going on, and they did not have the expertise to expand detainee facilities without my assistance. Money wasn’t the problem. Their lack of oversight and expertise in detainee facility design was the issue. Additionally, they could not figure out how the contracting process in Iraq worked; mostly because they had zero experience with Foreign National civilians who would ultimately be doing the work. Expanding any facility, by this time, was a fairly easy effort, but only if a small group of military engineers had the experience, motivation, and means to fulfill the expectations of the MNC-I Commander. The solution to the tentage problem for detainees was decided by using 667 forty-foot shipping containers.

I had a number of discussions with MG Stone about detainee operations and design concepts, and the obstacles to both.  Right away, he did something surprising.  He admitted that the Bucca Model of detainee operations did not work and was able to verbalize why.  For example, the tents where detainees lived were being destroyed by fire and other physical damage, and ECUs were also being sabotaged, along with items needed to operate a tent.  He said there needed to be some kind of internal structure.  The Bucca model has no cages within the tents, and the detainees, for the most part, are allowed to roam freely within their compound.  Further, what ignited the detainee riots that had plagued MG Garner was complex but surely included the hopelessness of most detainees, with no hope of being released and broken promises by the U.S. via TF-134.  Apparently, under the previous command structure of the TF, many promises made to the detainees, or to their spokesmen, were broken.  This included fresh pita bread, sliced cucumber, legal representation, and the mandatory release of the young, old, and infirm, and at least one male member of a household.  Obviously, not all these promises could be kept, such as providing cigarettes and matches.  He told me that he didn’t want the detainees to think they were dictating terms to him; MG Stone dictates the terms.  We agreed that some form of CMU construction was needed, fast and strong.  Camp Taji had many examples.  I told him that I could make this happen, but I was limited by other duties in the pre-surge effort, slow helicopter movement, and long request times.  That’s when he said that I could have full access to his U.S. Army C-12 aircraft to travel anywhere in Iraq.  Now, that would make anyone in my position sit up and take notice.

While waiting for MG Stone to make decisions about the way ahead for TF-134, I was busy with a long list of complex issues we had to resolve. This included the normal turnover in staff across all the organizations I worked with so closely. There were also issues related to maintaining the organization and correcting problems from the past. In one case, I was contacted by SFC Jimmie Stewart, who had been one of my enlisted Engineers during my first tour with the 353rd Engineer Group. He had been denied the newly created Combat Action Badge. I pulled out my green notebooks from those times (good thing I brought them with me on this combat tour) and wrote a Memorandum for the unit stating exactly when and where SFC Stewart and another dozen or so 353rd members had come under enemy fire (a requirement for the CAB). As a side note, a few days later, he and these Soldiers were officially awarded the CAB at a special ceremony in the states. Although I was busy, working around 90 to 100 hours per week, I still made time to do a few things for myself. I gained permission to visit one of Saddam’s palaces at Camp Slayer, within the Victory Base Complex. I had heard that this was the building attacked at the start of the war, labeled a leadership decapitation strike. American Intelligence had determined that a large contingent of senior Iraqi military leaders and politicians was meeting there when a JDAM destroyed the meeting room. The JDAM didn’t miss, but the Iraqis were not present.

One of our major projects was what we called the Anaconda Hospital project.  This hospital was located at Balad Air Base, Iraq, approximately 40 miles north of Baghdad, in the Sunni Triangle.  We originally called it Camp Anaconda, then LSA Anaconda because its location was crucial for resupply of Divisional AOs north of Baghdad.  It was also the largest base in Iraq, second only to Victory Base Complex in Baghdad.  At the time, Balad was one of the busiest airports in the world, with more than 27,000 takeoffs and landings per month.  The original Army Combat Support hospital was a tent structure on concrete slabs, much like most of our hastily established medical facilities; a few had only hard-packed dirt floors.  The op tempo was so high, with casualties, that the decision was made to build a CMU structure.  We estimated the new hospital would cost $32 million with OHC.  The actual award cost was $21-22 million.  I later learned, well after the Surge, that the tent hospital drew the attention of some members of Congress because it was where the most lives were lost and saved in the Iraq theater of operations.  ER Bay II was preserved for historical purposes and, in April 2008, was shipped back to the National Museum of Health and Medicine in Washington, D.C., where it was open for exhibition.  More American blood was spilled here since the Vietnam War.

U.S. Army LTC Andy Knights from ARCENT Engineers had been helping us navigate the bureaucracy and secure project approvals at the CENTCOM and Congressional levels. He also encouraged us to use Contingency Construction Designs, particularly the hospital package they contained. We could access these plans on the TCMS website. I was hesitant because our design engineers could now work darn fast with their own new designs. We continued to fight to raise the MILCON thresholds in the warzone “contingency environment.” Why we should have to hold to Congressional peacetime limits in an active warzone was something that gave me problems during my time in Iraq. I’d advocated for eliminating the upper limits, but was told that Congress would never allow it. This is how Congress kept some control over a wartime President, by limiting his spending power. This is why we study American history. In 1907, President Teddy Roosevelt sent our Great White Fleet on a global voyage without Congressional approval, a bold move that showcased American naval power and demonstrated the political strength of the president. We had unintentionally intruded on the limits of the War Powers Act.

Two days before my 55th birthday, on 20 May 2007, I began my countdown to departure from Iraq. Seven weeks to go. The countdown wasn’t to turn me into a “short timer” looking forward to leaving a combat zone, for whatever reason, but to help me stay focused and work on construction so there would be little for my replacement to do. He would be new, and it would take months to come up to speed because of the job’s overwhelming complexity, and it would be nearly impossible to make any difference before the Surge arrived. That meant all the plans, funding, and contracts had to be in place before I was to leave in early July.

NOTE: Over the next few weeks, I’ll be pushing to finish my series on the Iraq War Pre-Surge.  I’ll compile it all into a book of pictures, my testimony, and a written/photographic record of this second of three combat tours in Iraq.  With some luck, I’ll finish this project before mid-February, then send it to the publishers.  As a reminder, I will not be putting this into book form for public consumption.  The only place to find it will be here on my website.  I have considered making it available for download in PDF format.  I haven’t made that decision yet.  If readers would like to provide input, please do so.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Chemical Weapons & WMD

[December 19, 2025] My friends and I had long conversations about Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein and his role in the Iran-Iraq War. The debate over whether he was an evil dictator or a grandfatherly figure protecting his country raged on and off, even after he used chemical weapons to attack Kurdish civilians in 1988. Known as the Halabja Massacre, the attack on 16 March of that year killed thousands of Kurds in a large-scale Iraqi Army chemical attack. Following the massacre, the United Nations investigated the attack and concluded that mustard gas, along with unidentified nerve agents, had been used against civilians. This is, of course, well documented, and 15 years before we rolled into Baghdad in the Iraq War to once-and-for-all topple Saddam and his government. What we did not expect was that Coalition Forces would once again come into contact with even more weaponized and stored CWs (Weapons of Mass Destruction). Many well-meaning “experts” say that Saddam never possessed, researched, or used WMDs during his reign. This fantasy continues to this day, mostly spread through blatant lies – or just voluntary stupidity (I don’t know which) – in the mass media, and fueled by those who still love Saddam and totalitarian governments.

Back in OIF2, during my first combat tour on 4 May 2004, we received word that several of our Soldiers had suffered “chemical burns” from what was probably Sarin (a nerve agent) or Mustard Gas.  There is no secret to anybody with a brain cell that Saddam Hussein used CWs on both Iranian soldiers and his own civilians in northern Iraq, along the border with Iran.  We asked ourselves whether these weapons were still hidden somewhere after all these years; hint, they were still there.  It had long been known to us that Saddam and his senior military leaders had no idea where all their weapons were located, or even if they possessed certain types of weapons.  I had the good fortune to still be in contact with many senior Iraqi military officers who had served under Saddam, and our conversations were invaluable.  That network of insiders, many of whom had immigrated out of the country, gave me invaluable insights into Middle Eastern culture and Iraqi military capabilities.  What I learned was that authoritarian-run countries place their militaries at the disposal of the dumbest elements of their populations.  This explains, in part, their quick collapse during our initial OIF1 attacks in April of 2003.  We simply walked over them, destroying everything in sight, gutting a military that had taken decades to train, arm, and maintain.  It seemed to many of us that Saddam possessed CWs to both deter unfriendly regional adversaries like Kuwait, Israel, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, and to keep his own Kurdish and Shia populations in line.

During this part of the war, OIF 06-08, we were about to re-engage with these CWs, the largest of which were located mostly north of Baghdad.  That is why, in May, I was in contact with U.S. Army Engineer LTC Jeff Eckstein, who was working in the northern part of the country.  Somehow, he had been given responsibility for overseeing the containment of these chemical weapons.  Jeff was an exceptional engineer who would later become the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer Research and Development Center (ERDC) in Vicksburg, Mississippi, retiring as a Colonel.  I had limited contact with our green-suited Engineers as part of MND-N, but fortunately, Jeff was a highly motivated go-getter who required little guidance or technical assistance.  Our relationship was primarily him keeping me informed about the “Muthanna Bunkers.”  These bunkers were not a single location but many scattered throughout a large part of the country.  One piece of information I was able to provide to him was that there was a CW training facility outside his area and in MND-B at Camp Taji.  His task of containing these weapons was daunting.  I believe he might have been involved later in the incineration of these chemical weapons, or at least in the planning for it.

Iraq was one of the most prolific manufacturers in the developing world. The Iraqi-designated name of the large Samarra CW production facility is al-Muthanna State Establishment. The Muthanna State Establishment was Iraq’s primary facility for CW research, development, and production. This 5 km by 5 km facility operated continuously from 1983 to 1991, producing thousands of tons of precursors, nerve agents, and mustard gas. Chemical agents included mustard gas, Sarin, Tabun, and VX. Iraqis refer to the Samarra facility as the al-Muthanna facility, the State Enterprise for Pesticide Production, and the Samarra Drying Industries Plant. The Iraqi CW infrastructure consisted of ten CW agent production plants with a combined production capacity of 2,500 to 3,000 metric tons per year. Additionally, there were three munitions filling lines at Samarra, three precursor plants at Habbaniyah, and thirty storage bunkers scattered throughout the country. In about 1975, construction of two CW facilities began near Samarra and Salmon Pak. The Salman Pak facility (located 35 km southeast of Baghdad) was a pilot-plant operation, whereas Samarra was an extensive, integrated chemical weapons production facility. The Samarra facility was Iraq’s primary CW agent production facility and probably the largest Iraqi rear-area storage facility for CW agent munitions. As a result of Operation Desert Storm, most of the production buildings in this facility were damaged or destroyed, yet they still stood. The CIA investigated these facilities after our invasion and determined that our bombings released many dangerous chemicals, but fortunately, they were many miles from any Coalition base. Additionally, the hot and arid environment of Iraq contributed to the degradation of the chemicals.

The Iraq War was a highly complex environment, marked by unexpected problems, a host of Coalition restrictions on use of their troops (none could help us with the CW finds), major issues that went wrong or were going wrong (such as erosion of the Mosul Dam foundation), and attacks on us using large Russian-made mortars (the PM-43 120mm mortar) and small tactical battlefield rockets launched in salvos.  And of course, the discovery of live CWs, often improperly stored and highly unstable.  Many of these bunker sites had been looted, so we were never able to determine the fate of many of the CW rounds.  Some made it into IEDs, and that is how we became aware of them in 2004.  But most simply disappeared, perhaps to be discovered many years from now when they are used to attack Western nations or unexpectedly turn up in the basement of someone’s home.  Wherever they are, these weapons will be found for many decades to come, perhaps for centuries, like the artillery shells from World War I and II.  They lie in wait, hidden to maim and kill at an unknown future date.

NOTE: I still plan to continue this short series of articles on the Iraq War, mainly in late 2006 through mid-2007.  Perhaps this is an exercise in remembering what I did and why, or maybe it’s just my way of coming to grips with my time in Iraq as we prepared for the Surge.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Radio Dijla & Ziggurat

[December 12, 2025]  By May of 2007, the preparation for the Surge was fully underway.  Everyday, we brought more resources into play as we readied the Coalition to expand both in personnel and combat capability.  This was a critical phase as we prepared the battlefield for GEN Petraeus’ new military strategy.  Our job as Engineers was to ensure that the infrastructure was available to accommodate these new American and Coalition forces.  As part of getting ready for the Surge, he told us that one of his many priorities was Radio Dijla.  Several of us were in the IZ to hear him talk about radio Dijla; given to key Coalition and Iraqi Government officials.  The idea for the radio station was to create a platform for free expression, giving the Baghdad area a hard-hitting news show that also allowed ordinary Iraqis to call in and express their thoughts without any filter.  This radio programming would give the good guys a way of hearing about problems before they rose up to the government level.  It was also a great Intelligence asset; although I don’t think anyone said that out loud in front of Iraqis.  Being able to discuss the realities of the war on radio was the original intent of the radio station’s founder, Ahmed Rikaby.  His desire was to have on-air debates about the effectiveness of the Petraeus-led Surge strategy.  What we were to discover was that the view of the Iraqis contrasted sharply with the official American military assessment of progress. This platform gave callers a way to vent frustrations about their daily struggles, like power outages, sewage problems, and security concerns.  The radio was a major method of determining if the pre-Surge efforts and later, the Surge effort, was effective for those living in the city of Baghdad and outlying areas.

Also in May, I visited IRMO where we discussed how to manage Reconstruction Funds and to make the Iraqi government transition to an independent entity, where they didn’t have to rely on American troops to keep the violence down to a manageable level.  This is also the time that the mission shifted from Reconstruction to Stabilization and Long-Term Development.  Radio Dijla was one of the inputs that helped underpin the transition.  The American leader of IRMO was MG Jim Snyder; a previous commander of the garrison at Fort Dix, NJ where I first met him.  My visit was personal but I would always pick up valuable information and make contacts that I could later use.  After the meeting with MG Snyder, I walked over to the GRD headquarters compound to talk with some of their key Engineers, both military and civilian.  I now learned that CENTCOM was not supporting our Contingency Construction Authority list and we talked about what we were planning to do about it.  We also talked about the progress of major projects underway in theater and how the US Army Corps of Engineers was managing them.  The most discussed were the Al Assad Detainee Facility, the Anaconda Hospital OHC project, and the GRD Mosul relocation.  Also, while in the IZ that day, I attended a session of the JPC, led by MG Gerald Berragan (British Army KBE, CB), the DCG of MNC-I.  At this particular meeting we had MG Walsh (USACE), USAF MG Darryl Scott (JCCI), Mr. Rick Olsen (DOS Chief of Mission), and other “experts” there to ensure we all had an understanding of what we were up against.  The major topic of the day was to concentrate on what would do the most good for Iraq prior to the actual Surge start.  It was agreed that solving the sewage problem in Baghdad would give us the most bang for the buck.  And it was obvious this was the most visible, as sewage often backed up into the streets in the lower elevated districts in the city. Seeing kids playing in the “street water” didn’t give us a good feeling.  While this discussion was typical of the JPC, I thought they were too far into the weeds.  We could have tackled strategic or operational-level issues first and then get to the sewage (or power, water, trash) problems.  I thought back to my days as a little kid in school, I hated being there, wishing I was not in school, and me staring out the window watching for my dog so we could run and play.

The following day, I would travel to Tallil/Adder, a southern Coalition logistics hub notable for its location near to the ancient Mesopotamian sites like the Ziggurat of Ur.  The base was located about 180 miles southeast of Baghdad.  It sat on MSR Tampa South.  We were fortunate to have this base, as it also had intact runways that the USAF used daily.  The base also provided protection for the MSR and thus was responsible for the protected resupply of Baghdad.  I was interested in the history of Mesopotamia and the historical structures gave me an opportunity to visit some of the sites that I’d only read about in school.  The massive temple, the Great Ziggurat of Ur, is estimated to be four thousand years old, predating even the great pyramids of Egypt.  I learned that the Ziggurat was built by King Ur-Namur for the moon god Nanna (now that’s a weird detail).  The structure was built with what appeared to be crude mud bricks; and an interest to our Engineers.  We were told that Abraham of the Bible was born there and is said to have had one of his homes located nearby.  Later, we visited an Oasis linked to Abraham.  While there, the Iraqi Army had planned to relocate some of their combat power to the oasis, for reasons unknown to any of us.  I thought it unnecessary but I was not keeping up with the Intell C-2 products.  As I was walking through the ancient ruins at the oasis, the Iraqi military began destroying many of these structures (age unknown), presumably to replace them with modern military barracks.  I stopped their Engineers to ask why they were destroying the old one-story mud brick buildings.  I was told that they were just “old stuff.”  The implication was that the buildings were worthless, at least in the view of the Iraqi army.  This is a typical view of history by many from the Middle East where there is no appreciation of ancient architecture.  I will note that much of the Ziggurat had been rebuilt sometime in the recent past, an exception to this idea.  I could not confirm it, but those living nearby said it was Saddam Hussein who had much of the structure rebuilt so that foreign tourists could visit (and spend money to help his economy).  In the area near the Ziggurat, there were the basements of old dwellings with heaps of shards of ancient pottery and construction materials scattered out in the open.  I felt pretty bad for Iraq because they were losing their history, one destroyed building at a time.

By May, the Engineering effort for the Surge required me to see ongoing projects.  I traveled often, mostly in Army Blackhawks because they were much faster than ground convoys, and safer.  I still remembered the incident where several of my friends had been shot down doing exactly the same thing, but I didn’t let it bother me.  It is possible to overcome your fears of death, but it comes with the cost of losing some of your personality.  By this time in the war, I had almost zero fear of death or injury, despite considerable travel by air and ground.  I zig-zagged across the country, linking up with American military Engineers and combat Task Forces who had been stationed in various outlying areas of the country.  Someone had done a great job placing them where they were.  By the time I spoke to them, these Engineers were able to give me a detailed engineering analysis of the potential military capacity at each site.  Sometimes, it would be impossible to use the location; a lack of water and power resources, off the main supply routes, or near an insurgent stronghold.  The latter was not a good reason, but I accepted the analysis nonetheless.  I slept in various locations, usually in the base VIP quarters (typically just one room for senior visitors).  Since I came without much advanced warning, they did provide a liaison officer or senior NCO to brief me and make sure I got a thorough tour.  I was often able to make a quick decision whether any particular base was a feasible location to be used for the Surge or was in need of any upgrade or expansion.

NOTE:  For now, I’m continuing my series on the Pre-Surge as we were readying ourselves for an influx of American units.  I’ve decided not to write my book on this time in Iraq.  I may change my mind, probably not.  What I will do with these articles is publish them in a table-top book – to include photographs from that time – for my grandkids to read.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Clear, Windy, Dusty, & Warm

[December 9, 2025]   There never was a time when Soldiers said the weather in Iraq was beautiful.  Typically it was clear, windy, dusty, and warm (or hot as Hell).  We paid close attention to the weather because it was a major factor in the speed of construction; the hotter it was, the less efficient we could get any construction accomplished.  And the hot weather was dangerous. Construction workers died from heat exhaustion or from accidents caused by the slowdown of their mental faculties, leading to a fall or death that would not normally have occurred.  There were deaths from insurgents and terrorists of course, who targeted our workers to generate fear and drive them from our worksites.  Generally, this strategy by the bad guys didn’t work because we paid good money in cash, and treated our workers well.  We also cracked down on corruption by those who hired the workers directly.  This corruption came with a bribe and we refused to pay it or tolerate bribery in our employment system (when we knew about it).  In the early part of the war, in the years 2003 and 2004, we didn’t know any better, but by 2007, we had gotten smart and learned how to stop such corrupt construction practices.  We still had it happen, but we knew what we had to do, and the workers seemed to appreciate getting paid a little better and not having to pay about ten percent of their pay to some unscrupulous shyster, masquerading as a good guy.  The main part of the construction effort in preparation for the Surge was from April through August.  Anytime after May was hot and that’s when we had the environment kicking us in the ass every single day.  We complained about the weather every day, and the weather was the same every day, just like Groundhog Day.

There’s also never been a project where an Engineer hasn’t complained about material shortages and on-time delivery.  Such shortages are magnified a hundred-fold in a combat zone where the enemy knows where you are, what you are doing, and why.   You become an easy target.  Material shortages began immediately as we started building facilities for the incoming troops and equipment.  There was no time to create stockpiles and most of the world was unable to produce, ship, load, and transport their equipment and materials to us as fast as we needed it.  By late April, we started to see some replenishment of supplies, and that is thanks to BG Steve Anderson and his R&S folks at MNF-I.  He had a small group of Colonels who were logistical geniuses; at least I thought so.  US Army Colonel Mary Whitworth, who had traveled with me to Iraq, was one of the few strategic logisticians, and she was great at getting anything from point A to point B, often before I knew I needed it. This is also the time we were getting smarter about Iraqi politicians and their military.  It was amazing how much more we could get done with better cooperation from Iraq politicians.  The solution?  Give them credit for getting large-scale construction completed faster and with less hassle.  They got the credit and we got more motivated and experienced workers.  This was important because the work normally done by Iraqis was substandard, requiring a high level of supervision by U.S. Engineers.  We also spent a great deal of time fixing Iraqi construction mistakes.  The Baghdad AOR was still an active warzone, and we regularly got incoming mortars and rockets.  Generally, this was a nuisance but if you were injured from one, it was not a nuisance.

During the first six months of my tour, in the last half of 2006, we were closing bases as the Coalition strategy called for us to slowly drawdown our forces, turn over the bases we had occupied to either the Iraqi army or Iraqi police, and ensure we were adhering to American environmental standards.  Going by these environmental standards was a self-inflicted and unnecessary distraction that took time, resources, and did nothing for Iraq.  Iraqis didn’t care about their environment at all, except as a way to extract concessions, usually in the form of money, from us. Four months after the announcement of the Surge, we were still holding Basing Meetings and looking to close bases, as a surge of troops were inbound.  The goal was to shutdown about one base a month.  This was dumb, at least in my opinion, but I know the MNF-I commander had to show the world we were still “planning to leave Iraq.”  It was a political necessity.

A regular problem for me was TF-134 (Detainee Operations).  Their commander MG Gardner wanted everything yesterday and had zero priorities.  That drove most of my Engineer friends crazy.  I told them not to worry, the answer would be to give TF-134 what they needed before they realized they needed it.  Since we were coming up on the hotter months of the year, just as the Surge would be starting, it was a no-brainer that there would be a greater need for climate-control systems to ensure we kept the outside high temperatures at some level of tolerance for the detainees.  This meant a greater power generation capacity for their generator farm, more concrete pads, and steel cages for all their equipment that might come in contact with a detainee.  We were going to order this equipment immediately, so that it would arrive (we hoped) in time. At Bucca (in southern Iraq), where the largest number of detainees would be held, there was a problem with the bidding among potential contractors.  All bids were well over our internal government estimate.  And this was not our only issue with the possible explosion in the number of detainees.  At Taji, just north of Baghdad, I was told about the possibility of 5,000 detainees.  I wasn’t sure if this was feasible to build these detainee facilities as we were building for many more at Bucca.  At the time, I found it humorous that TF-134 asked me to provide them with an estimate of the number of detainees I projected.  This was their job!  I had no idea how many.  If they wanted to get this information, then they were certainly barking up the wrong tree.  In early May, it was MG Gardner’s last day and I was happy that he was leaving.  GEN Petraeus told me that “We’re still figuring out the way ahead.”  Wow, that’s nuts, for us being at the point where we were. He then ordered the infamous Abu Garaib prison closed.

T-Walls were a big deal about this time because they were easy to make, easy to transport, and were a good protective measure.  Plus, our troops loved painting various artistic graphics on these T-Walls to show that “we’d been here.”  Of course, the rush to complete tens of thousands of them led to quality problems.  The quality issue was exacerbated by the material shortages of cement for the concrete mixtures.  We were starting to get inferior cement from Turkey, and this was tied directly to stress fractures in many of the T-Walls.  I worked closely with the contractors that made the T-Walls and told them we would only pay for T-Walls that were delivered and placed in a FOB that didn’t have cracks.  I would not pay for T-Walls produced at the contractors worksite. These T-Walls became something of a goldmine for the manufacturers, and so we sent Engineers out to witness some of the concrete pours into the molds to figure out why some cracked.  There were many reasons, but the fact we were checking on them, we had fewer problems.  Check what you consider important.  These were not American contractors but most from the Middle East and were not to be trusted.

The normalcies of life also continued.  On my daughter’s birthday, I called her at 0430 hours the early morning after her birthday (Iraqi time), which was the late afternoon of her actual birthday in Pennsylvania.  She was with her friends, so I didn’t spend much time on the phone and because I was using a satellite phone (probably an improper use of it but I didn’t care).  I also took my semi-annual APFT physical fitness test that morning and in a note to myself, I “survived and passed.”  This test was not required in combat but it looks good on paper when you write up your accomplishments for the year.  It shows dedication and the Army looks for dedication.  I also turned over several American flags to one of LTG Odierno’s Soldiers to be flown over Al Faw Palace.  I would get the flags back with a certificate of authentication attesting that it had been flown, the date, and a “signature” by LTG Odierno. Naturally, he didn’t sign them.  There was no autopen, so one of his Staff Sergeants had his signature down pretty good.  Good enough for me.  I used these flags as personalized gifts to family and friends.  It was a popular gift to receive.

In early May, I was looking at my year in combat coming to an end.  I’d depart in early July, and that was a real concern for my boss and the General Officer staff at MNC-I and MNF-I.  Yes, I was doing a pretty good job.  I think losing me at the end of the tour was more about losing a tremendous amount of institutional knowledge and my ability to pull so many people together from so many organizations, and do so quickly, that did make me an asset.  Plus, I got things done.  If GEN Petraeus or LTG Odierno wanted something, they didn’t have to tell me twice.  Usually I’d get a head’s up from my boss.  That gave me a day or so to study the problem and be prepared for when I was called in to discuss their requests directly.  There was no going through people to get to me, they spoke to me face-to-face.  That way, there were no miscommunications.  And, yes, I was looking forward to going “home.”  Actually, I was looking forward to getting out of Iraq.  The weather was still clear, windy, dusty, and warm.  I was starting to burn out and the long hours took a toll on me mentally and physically.  But in the states, I had no home.  I had no place to live, no car, and all my meager belongings were in a storage container.  My wife had divorced me after my first combat tour.  I had to stay at a friend’s house for a few days before I could get my feet back under me.  I also signed up on a dating website.  Dating when you’re 55, and just returning from combat, would be another adventure.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Why Write About It?

[November 28, 2025]  My wife asked me yesterday, shortly after enjoying our Thanksgiving Dinner, why I was writing about the Iraq War, and pointedly asked, “Why are you focusing on this Pre-Surge?”  She noted that nearly everyone was focused on the “fight,” or just the “surge.”  And that is a good question, and one I’ve asked myself for many years.  As a side note, my wife is known to help me be a better person, and frequently challenges my weaknesses (somewhat frustratingly so), and fortunately without too much embarrassment to me.  I think the answer is not easy to write about, not because I haven’t given it some thought, but because it forces me to admit that the part that I played in it was of a lesser role.  True, the argument that I could have made is that combat requires preparation of the battlefield; where a great commander positions his forces correctly to an advantage and puts the enemy into a weak place, so when the fighting happens, we are in position to overwhelmingly destroy our enemies.  And, yes, my part was the Engineer part of the classic preparation of the battlefield.  The answer is more complex than that, but I think this is the crux of why I’m writing about the pre-surge time.

Also, and perhaps to a greater extent, my direct experience was to be in the position of Facilities Chief of MNC-I, which was at the time, the position that oversaw all large construction, prioritizing construction, planning, design, funding, and placing all the effort into position for maximum use of our resources.  I had future plans to write a book on the pre-surge even before my departure from my second of three combat tours in Iraq.  I also had plans to write about the “Surge” also and show how the pre-surge was a crucial element in the former’s success.  My boss at the time, COL Juan Fernandez, a great friend and wonderful commander encouraged this plan to write about it in book form and volunteered to help me as needed.  But, about a year or so ago, I changed my plans and will not write that book.  Life does tend to get in the way, but more importantly, the finer details of that time have been lost in my memory and I don’t believe I can do it justice any longer.  I may change my mind, but at this point, no book is on the horizon.  So, why am I writing about the pre-surge in these articles?  The short answer is, “I was there.”

Indeed, I was there about six months prior to the official announcement by President Bush that a “surge” was to be the new military strategy.  At the time, we didn’t know whether it would work, but we did know that what we were doing at the time, a small force both as occupier and attacker of those creating havoc in the country.  The surge would eventually work better than we’d hoped.  But the road to get there was long and painful.  The good news for me was that by the time of President Bush’s announcement of the surge, I knew all the key players in the Coalition, and they knew me.  I would then work another six months in preparing the battlefield from an infrastructure point of view, based on MNC-I’s Commander LTG Ray Odierno’s plans to bring the fight to the enemy.  Those six months, roughly between the end of December 2006 until I departed the country in early July 2007 were the most challenging time of my life.  The workload was insane, often 100 hours a week.  Fortunately, those I worked with were there to do everything they could to make the pre-surge a success.  And, my boss, COL Fernandez did what any good commander would do, he gave me plenty of rope to get ‘er done!

There is another reason that I’m writing about the pre-surge days from early 2007, and that is to let my grandchildren know about what I did and why, during the Iraq War.  Better that they read it in my words than to read about it in the biases of those who were not there, yet are called “experts of the Iraq War.”  One of the greatest regrets many combat veterans have is that they did not tell their kids or grandkids what they did during the war where they fought.  I’ve known many veterans and while some never wanted to talk about their battles, including battles after the war with the Veterans Administration, they are consistent in wanting to eventually tell someone about what happened to them and their battle buddies.  I’ve taken up this regret head on.  So, with that in mind, I’ll write about the war from my perspective and any analysis is my own, and my biases I will try to expose.  What I write is based on direct personal knowledge.  Fortunately, I kept a diary/logbook that is a blow-by-blow of what I did every day.  In the future, this logbook will be one of my pictures.  And I do have about 900 photographs to add to a photo book during that year in Iraq.  Digital cameras were just making a great and new way to take lots of pictures, and then, at some later date, sorting them out.  I’ll make this narrative and photos in what we call a tabletop photo book.

And here we are, the reasons I’m writing about the pre-surge.  My wife, once again, being someone who can see inside my soul, thinks there is another reason.  She believes that to write about my experiences in Iraq is necessary for me to come to grips with the loss of so many friends that year 2007 and to deal with all the internal devils that I harbor.  Maybe that is the case.  I truly don’t know.  I’m still going to record what I did, to the best of my ability and I am fully aware that much of it can be dull – or boring, as I used to say as a kid when I didn’t like something – and these articles might just turn people off who want to read about the Iraq War.  The pre-surge certainly is not something that will make headlines.  The pre-surge is not thrilling, not an adventure, not even a great story but it is a great experience that very few will ever have and I did use the time as a window into myself.  I learned the limits of what I could do, physically, emotionally, and intellectually, because I was pushed well beyond my personal limits and this was a good thing; I was tired but I did not break.  And that was one of the many successes I had in 2007.  For that, I’m proud that I fulfilled my responsibilities in the key role in the pre-surge Coalition Engineer effort that led up to the “surge” and reduced the violence in Iraq.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Reconstruction

[November 27, 2025] The Coalition Engineers would become more involved in the Iraqi reconstruction effort than perhaps originally planned. Reconstruction was meant to be an international effort, but that too failed to materialize. There was plenty of talk among diplomats and large businesses that wanted to participate in rebuilding Iraq, yet most of their efforts never got off the ground. The primary focus was on economic reform, mainly to repair and upgrade Iraqi water and sewer plants, with electricity production (by far the most crucial), hospitals, schools, housing, and transportation systems also on the agenda. This massive undertaking was to be funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Because it was highly infrastructure-driven, our in-country engineers—mostly U.S. Army personnel—were the ones our diplomats and commanders relied on. This is where the Corps of Engineers proved most valuable, and yes, they managed to get work done, but they were slow, costly, and hampered by bureaucracy. I can understand why so many senior officials in Iraq, the U.S., and the United Nations grew frustrated. The reasons for these efforts falling short included poor security in Iraqi neighborhoods, corruption within the Iraqi government and private sector, inadequate funding, and terrible coordination among international organizations. I also believe that most of these well-meaning organizations did not fully understand the country of Iraq.

Baghdad is the capital city, and what happens there influences the rest of the country. If Baghdad catches a cold, Iraq gets pneumonia. In April, Gen. Petraeus said that “Reconstruction in Baghdad has not been a good news story.” I observed this in the JPC Executive sessions I attended. The approach to restore Iraq through our reconstruction efforts was based on “[proper] synchronization and allocation of resources.” That was obvious. But, was the JPC getting enough ‘bang for the buck?’ All those Flag Officers present seemed to think not, yet they couldn’t quite pinpoint the problem. The issue was the struggle to define success and then measure it accurately. For example, BG McDonald argued that using employment as a success measure was wrong because the real focus is on whether we are restoring essential SWET services. There was also an understanding that there was little time to demonstrate progress—an urgent political issue. MG Berragan once noted, “We don’t have much time [by the end of 2007] to make a difference,” echoing what GEN. Petraeus had already been telling him. During one JPC Executive session, several questions revealed how much conceptual work the JPC still needed to do.

• What kind of difference can we make over next year, especially this year?
• What is it in the reconstruction arena?
• What is the metric that shows success?
• How many markets are we hardening [improved security]?
• Are there certain districts in Baghdad where work can be done that affects the most people, and in what time period?
• Can we establish a handful of major projects in each of the few select security districts that will help the most people?
• What does success look like?
• Can we do it in six months, by the end of this year?
• Can we have measurable progress by August [when the “surge” begins]?
• What’s the strategy to do this?
• What is our Information Operations campaign?

Certainly, the Coalition construction efforts and operational-level combat also affected how reconstruction impacted the average Iraqi. The issue with ASR Aspen was a clear example. Both Coalition forces and civilian traffic used this main artery and many other major routes, all maintained by Coalition engineers. There was expected to be a significant increase in traffic on this failing ASR due to additional inbound military forces heading north and improved economic conditions in the country. Furthermore, we began experiencing more spot shortages of materials, which impacted both construction and reconstruction initiatives. Essentially, we were competing with ourselves for materials, equipment, and manpower. I had seen this happen before at the start of the occupation in early 2004, which I documented in my book “Our Longest Year in Iraq.” Our engineers were also working with private contractors to train them in modern construction techniques and to show them how to protect themselves from insurgents and terrorists while operating outside the wire. Iraqi construction work was inherently prone to failure. To complicate matters, our higher command was often reluctant to give us input on which areas they wanted to close down or expand. This was frustrating because the entire country of Iraq functions as a connected network, where one project in a city can influence another project nearby.

This was discussed in a 2007 analysis by GEN Barry R. McCaffrey after his visit to Iraq in March of that year. He presented evidence of the dire situation in Iraq before the change in strategy known as the “surge.” Although there were many positive accomplishments, what was the way forward? Iraq was experiencing a low-grade civil war that had worsened since the invasion concluded in April 2003. Up to 3,000 Iraqi citizens were murdered each month by a small number of foreign terrorists and a few thousand Al Qaeda insurgents, who targeted innocents with suicide bombings and known torture complexes. Coalition forces faced attacks of up to 2,900 IEDs per month, along with rockets, mortars, snipers, and mines. Three million Iraqis had been internally displaced or had fled the country, mostly the educated elites, causing a serious brain drain that threatened the country’s ability to govern. As we know, no government function operates effectively nationwide—health care, justice, education, transportation, electricity, oil production, and especially security. The Iraqi Army remains too small, poorly equipped, dominated by Shia, and lacking discipline and training. Things indeed looked bleak. Additionally, U.S. domestic support for the war in Iraq had vanished and was unlikely to return. This was our reality and the environment in which we had to operate.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Engineers Talk

[November 24, 2025]  After ten months in the country, I had hit the pinnacle of my worth to the Coalition Engineer effort.  I knew who was who, those who could do the job and those who could not, those Flag Officers that would help in country and out (as a resource), those who were my closest coworker comrades at the O-6 level, and what was possible and what was not.  Given the state of the Iraq War in May of 2007, we had nearly all the funding needed, although there was still a lack of political will to send more troops into Iraq above the “surge” levels that had been committed by President George W. Bush.  I would say at the time, given my conversations with senior combat officers, that we were only getting a little of what we needed to bring Iraq into the modern world.  When a country like Iraq loses a war and gets occupied by the winner, good things are rare.  But we had learned through the history of post-World War II (Japan and Germany), that an occupation can work – given time and resources – and I dug deep into that history to find out more about what was done back in the 1940s, and how we could re-apply those lessons.  Of course, I was still caught in the vice grip of our own unwanted red tape and conflicting priorities.  My job was to help overcome those problems, and while they were not insurmountable, it took many long hours convincing senior officers and entrenched civilians how we could streamline the process of waging war while simultaneously conducting an occupation.

In May, most of the days began windy, dusty, and warm; warm meaning in the 80s and 90s.  Iraq still smelled awful and to this day, I cannot forget how every city and town had its own pungent odor.  I was still moving about the battlefield, primarily to personally observe the construction of projects we had planned, funded, and approved.  Despite the Anti-Deficiency Act violations, and the subsequent delays it caused, we made enormous progress to include bringing in privately-owned construction companies, mostly Iraqi.  This was a “must have” by GEN Casey and now GEN Petraeus who believed that the Iraqis were an integral part of their own future.  Like me, they also knew about Iraqi culture, and I would submit the argument that all Middle Eastern countries would just sit back and let others do the work necessary for their citizens.  Later, I would change that assessment to say that this is more of a product of Islam, rather than a country issue.  One of the good things about bringing on Iraqis was that we could brainstorm some nonstandard solutions to problems we faced.  They knew their own citizens better than us and they knew “where the skeletons were buried” and what areas to avoid.

By this time in my tour, I was trusted enough by the senior staff that I was working directly with CENTCOM and ARCENT.  Their forward elements located at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait was a godsend because they were in the same time zone and I didn’t have to wait for the world in America to wake up after their morning coffee break.  In May, I had a list of 36 major issues that I had on my plate to solve.  None were easy and all required approval from a number of military and intelligence agencies, plus some needed Congressional approval.  Some of these issues were: ASR Aspen repair, Fire Safety (I’d witnessed horrible burns and deaths that could have been avoided with the right firefighting assets), expansion of Taji and Bucca detainee camps (run by TF-134), RIP/TOA efforts, an IZ-to-VBC transition plan, incoming incinerators, losing some of my best and most experienced officers, barrier construction and distribution, the Overhead Cover program and fighting with the Department of State over priorities (we had the money, they didn’t), off-ramping to end the occupation, LOGCAP changes, BIAP airport expansion, and many more.  On top of this, all our bases were still receiving rocket and mortar fire, plus attacks on key points in Baghdad.  For example, on 11 May, three major bridges in Baghdad were hit.  This required a major coalition Engineer effort to repair.  I would spend a great deal of time working on the coalition’s need for specific types of infrastructure – construction, maintenance, and repair – to facilitate success of the incoming “surge.”

As a senior Engineer, I was invited to a CENTCOM Engineer Conference in Bahrain.  On 13 May, I flew out of Baghdad at 2100 hours, traveling with two Engineer friends.  Flying at night in a C-130 was largely uneventful because the bad guys couldn’t see in the dark, plus it was relatively cooler.  I traveled from Kuwait in civilian clothes, as just another civilian, flying to Bahrain on a commercial aircraft.  I visited NAVCENT and ARCENT headquarters and got a nice tour.  Being a little tired due to traveling at night, I still don’t remember who I met during my short tours.  The point of the Engineer Conference was to make sure our Engineers were “talking the same language” and that CENTCOM understood the issues we faced in preparation for the actual upcoming surge of troops in Iraq. And, they made me pay a $20 conference fee.  We discussed things such as the commander’s priorities, mission support, force protection, MILCON thresholds (a serious problem), safety and quality of life issues.  Tens of billions of dollars were at stake and we were warned not to take it lightly.  Democrats in Congress were creating all sorts of problems back home.  Also, it was a little unsettling for me not to be armed or walk around without body armor, but I got used to the freedom rather quickly.  Several of us went shopping and bought some gold jewelry and “Persian” carpets.  After several days of getting to see face-to-face who we had been talking to telephonically, during our daily conference calls, we now had a better idea of CENTCOM constraints and capabilities. One piece of good news from the conference was the new CENTCOM commander Admiral Fallon would keep Iraq as his priority of effort.  And, I actually got a good night’s sleep for once.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Grains of Diplomacy

[August 16, 2025]  Ordinarily, I don’t get involved in diplomacy as that is the purview of the Diplomatic Corps, the Department of State, and Flag Officers. I would get involved from the sidelines in what is commonly called “grain diplomacy.”  This term has historically been used to refer to the strategic use of grain exports or imports by countries as a means of promoting their economic or political interests.  One of the most famous examples of grain diplomacy dates back to the reign of the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius (161-180 AD). In order to gain the loyalty of the people of Egypt, Aurelius promised to supply the region with wheat at a reduced price. This grain diplomacy was a highly effective way to win the hearts of the people and was successful in securing the loyalty of Egypt to Rome.  Our DoS was interested in working out deals with oil, and that was the largest export market for Iraq, but there was always a need to import food, as much of the nation’s domestic food production had been interrupted by the war. My involvement in the Reconstruction effort, although at a minimal level, meant I could give formal recommendations. The most obvious was the restarting of existing construction and construction supply businesses, plus creating new ones, driven by the immense purchasing power of the Coalition.

Additionally, R&S under BG Anderson, MNF-I, and in partnership with experts from DoS, started the Iraqi-Based Industrial Zone (IBIZ). This program helped Iraqi entrepreneurs work with the U.S. military, providing secure locations on or near military bases for privately-owned businesses employing Iraqis. Technical training was provided to banks, and efforts were made to increase micro-finance institutions and access to capital. Agriculture, oil and electricity, infrastructure, and financial services were the main areas of effort. The number one problem to stabilize the Iraqi economy and implement reforms was security issues and complexities in transitioning the Iraqi economic structure.  By this point in 2007, improvements in business and government-supported basic services, like water delivery and policing, were marked by regular setbacks. There were, however, signs of gradual progress. For example, one measure of stability – power production – had nearly recovered since the U.S.-led invasion and would surpass that point in October. Local governments were better at collecting garbage and cleaning local parks and other public areas.  And oil production had already rebounded to pre-war levels.

There was a clear, observable difference in economic activity that we could see traveling about from base to base, both inside the city of Baghdad and outer, smaller towns, and in the open countryside. Irrigation wasn’t back online to pre-war levels, but the increase in crop production was rebounding. Like so many governments that hinder progress, the new parliamentary, representative democratic GoI was overburdened by self-inflicted bureaucratic bloat and inefficiency, political instability, and the legacy of a socialist command economy.  We were interested in getting ordinary Iraqis back to work because there was a direct link between unemployment and the radical insurgency. Stability Operations in early 2007 focused on revitalizing Iraq’s industrial base, particularly by restarting factories to create jobs and restore normalcy. Initial plans involved reopening 10 factories with funding from the Iraqi government. Despite these initiatives, challenges persisted in Iraq’s economic recovery this year. Growth remained slower than the “experts” at DoS expected, primarily due to limited oil production and sales, power generation, business expansion, and security problems. To illustrate, the effort to increase electricity generation – setting records – was successful, but the output was still less than half the country’s demand.

While this significant reconstruction effort was underway in a classic Stability Operations environment, our Coalition Engineers were working in parallel with a variety of organizations umbrellaed under MNF-I. I received a call from MG Jim Snyder, whom I’d got to know as the Fort Dix, New Jersey commander back in pre-9/11 days and who was now part of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO).  This was the organization that oversaw all those reconstruction meetings I’d been required to attend and had so many Flag Officers at the table. I would be tied closely to IRMO for all of my current tour (the slot was unfilled) because they were the ones tasked to focus on short-term development, as I was at the Army Corps level with MNC-I. IRMO folks had their hands full, as they also worked alongside USAID.  USAID concentrated on mid to long-term development. Eventually, IRMO would have its responsibilities transferred as the reconstruction effort evolved and increased. I would lose the guidance from MG Snyder when he left the theater. In a couple of weeks, I would be submitting my promotion packet to the General Officer Assignment Advisory Board (GOAAB) with the hope of getting picked up.

One of the advantages of working with so many skilled military and civilians in Iraq was the variety of senior personnel from around the world. One man who made a difference was MG William Berragan, British Army, and the DCG of MNC-I. He had arrived in January this year and would be part of the planning and execution of Operation Phantom Thunder, which would kick off in mid-June. The units involved were part of the early arriving troop surge that we expected, such as 2/3 HBCT and 3 CAB in the Baghdad AO and 13 MEU out west. He was also one of the Flags in the JPC working on reconstruction. His comment to me was, “We don’t have much time (by the end of the year) to make a difference.”  He was referring to GEN Petraeus’s guidance to make fast ” shorter-term impacts where people will notice right away, and this includes employment.”  He also acknowledged the terror ”threat to sewer and water was less than to power, where someone stands something to lose.”  The short version was that we wanted to have the ordinary Iraqi civilians notice that the new GoI and our military presence were beneficial to them personally. MG Berragan would help me get around much of the Army-level MNF-I bureaucracy, substantially saving me time. This reconstruction and construction effort was hard, and having a 2-star Flag helping was a godsend.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Bases and Dams

[August 11, 2025]  The weather in the latter half of April was heating up and our Engineer effort was as well. There is nothing like inbound American BCTs on a fixed, but secret timeline (I was on the “need to know” list) to motivate us. Our Engineer missions at a variety of bases, large and small, had to be finished sufficiently to allow BCTs to occupy their new bases with expanded and new facilities (various buildings, roads, utilities, and force protection). These bases were the anchor to GEN Petraeus’ strategy that rejected the previous “whack a mole” approach that did not work as intended. Petraeus wanted our troops to work from secure bases but also to get out more into the neighborhoods, to get to know the people and show them we were there for them, and to provide concrete, visible help on things the Iraqis said they needed. This strategy was similar to the Vietnam War idea to “win the hearts and minds” of the populace.

Then there were the dams. The U.S. Corps of Engineers had identified and studied the dams in Iraq and learned several strategic issues. The first is that whoever controls the dams controls the country. Large amounts of electricity are generated at these dams, and, in the past, the artificial lakes were also a source of water for irrigation of crops and recreation.  Approximately 90% of Iraq’s water originates outside its borders; thus, the capture of water from these sources was crucial for the supply of clean drinking water. In the arid climate of Iraq, water is king. This all meant that the Coalition had to be available to secure the dams and surrounding water areas and road networks. Mosul Dam is the largest, but it has serious structural issues. I was aware of the potential catastrophic failure back in 2004 on my first combat tour. I would this time brief GEN Petraeus on the impact if the dam failed. He was shocked to hear that potentially tens of thousands would die and that there was also a risk of losing Coalition lives. The plan to evacuate forces in the path of the water was to “get out of town ASAP.”  Get in your vehicles and leave. There would be little warning. And, where do you go?

It was hard to believe, but we were still closing some of the smaller bases, mostly in outlying areas of Anbar Province, where the terrorists and insurgents were not operating at the levels near Baghdad. However, the closing of these bases did not end the requirements to put combat forces where the enemy was operating, and this meant the construction of additional small Forward Operating Bases and the more primitive Combat Outposts (military) or Joint Security Stations (mix of Iraqi police and Coalition military). We were briefed daily on the expansion efforts that supported our troops, generally at the morning BUB (with a secret classification but regularly sourced to the New York Times and other similar large news organizations). The briefing for those attending was for Situational Awareness only. It was frustrating to read “secret” information being publicly distributed. I don’t know if they ever caught those involved, but I hope they did. If it were an Iraqi, the GoI would have tried and hanged them.

There were a number of strategic projects on the books, so to speak, that made a significant impact on our military operations. ASR Aspen, the Baghdad Bypass, tactical basing in COBs and JSSs, large incinerators, the OHC effort, American troop housing and recreation, Internment Camps and TF-134, T-Wall placement, and the Reconstruction Projects for the Iraqis, which were costing tens of millions each and were potentially multi-year, ongoing projects. We had to ask ourselves whether we were getting the right “bang for the buck” and if each passed the political smell test. Politics played a significant role, specifically any effort that made it appear the “Americans were staying permanently.”  I think most of us were aware, but at the same time, we thought the occupation of Iraq was temporary on its face. The only question was how long we were going to be there, and in early 2007, that answer was not known. The fact that the endpoint of the occupation was unknown and conditions-based was a good military strategy.  The setting of a hard date would be a self-inflicted blunder.  Later, President Obama would do precisely that, and we would withdraw in 2011.

IEDs and enemy attacks were a serious problem. The terrorists were truly evil and had no problem using mosques, hospitals, and government offices as locations to plan and stage from for the hit-and-run tactics. Weapons, extra food and water, bomb-making materials, maps, and an assortment of materials for their kinetic operations were useful. And their torture houses could be found there, too. They knew we were either prohibited from entering these locations or had to provide advanced notice. It’s not hard to figure out that our ROE was detrimental to the war effort. This is why politicians should not dictate military operational methods. More Iraqis and Coalition members died as a result than if we had been allowed to go where the enemy was hiding and damn the short-term consequences.

On the last Friday in April, a small group of us took our semi-annual APFT at 0645 hours. In my notebook, 4 of 5, page 144, I wrote “survived and passed.”  The temperature is on my lost APFT card, but it was likely around 35°C or about 95°F.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: the Message

[August 7, 2025]  To this day, I firmly believe that America’s decision to enter a war with Iraq inside a coalition was the right decision. And it was the right thing to do, not because the government of Iraq was radically anti-American, or because it “possessed WMDs,” or due to its storied history of initiating wars in the region, or that it used its oil as a weapon, or because it was a radical Islamic nation – and that was all true – but because Iraq and other Islamic nations were exporting terror throughout both the Middle East and to the Western world. The world needed to see what happens when any nation works with terrorists to further their cause through recruiting, training, equipping, and directing cells of terrorists to conduct a campaign of murder and intimidation. The lesson had to be big and lasting. Ultimately, that’s what kept us in Iraq, fighting a protracted battle with insurgents and terrorists. The problem, however, was that this message was not getting out.

On Saturday, 14 April 2007, GEN. David Petraeus, commander of the coalition headquarters known as Multinational National Forces – Iraq, said at our morning BUA, “We need more media down to LTCs and Majors in the battle space.”  It was pretty clear to everyone by this point that many Americans had turned against the war, and a more radicalized Democrat Party was taking this on to advance their political agenda and to wrest away power from their enemy, the Republican Party.  General O said at the time, “[Media] networks are not really interested and have many self-imposed [Leftist political] restrictions.”  The reason for the war, “the message” of why we were at war, was not getting out to the American people, and the reason didn’t matter, and it didn’t matter who was responsible for that failure. Having studied insurgencies and revolutions as military officers, we understood that messaging was just as important on the battlefield as an additional armored division, maybe more.

As for the coalition Engineer effort, nothing really changed. We were expanding our operations through the construction of new structures and by renovations of existing old Iraqi army buildings. One example was the request by KBR to use the BIAP aircraft hangars for their expanding complement of personnel. In my arena, there was a concern about keeping the funding separated and ensuring we didn’t exceed any MILCON thresholds and even whether these spending limits were applicable.  Additionally, due to heavier use of roadways, utility systems, and other infrastructure, plus having to deal with the repair of oil and gas pipelines, we were being stretched. Our engineering capabilities were not being expanded at all, or in proportion to the increased combat footprint. This made our Engineer staff work harder since we were drawn into the systems analysis of utilities being undertaken by MNF-I.  This utility systems analysis would frustrate anyone, as there were so many problems with old Iraqi construction and the cultural habit of not maintaining their equipment. And, of course, the age-old question of when we get the results, “Can we even do anything about it?”

A couple of days later, a small group of senior Engineers from both Army commands (3 & 4-star level), flew to Besmaya to get an on-the-ground check to see how our USAF Civil Engineers – a REDHORSE unit – and contractors were making out as they readied the base for an incoming Armor-heavy BCT. On this Blackhawk flight were BG Steve Anderson and  COL Mary Whitworth, Kim, Pat, and me. We met up with COL Wayne Grigsby, the 3/3 HBCT commander, to get an update on the finishing touches needed to bring this base fully online. He said that he needed more RG-31s for route clearance, and RAID towers and “electronics” to reduce the manpower effort to secure the base 24/7. This meant most of his needs were logistical and not engineering-related, except to ensure he was adequately supplied with the Engineer-related equipment that he needed (like the RG-31s, concertina, and stakes).  We were concerned that this new base had sufficient water and power.  Water was short, and BG Anderson assured this commander that a regular run of supply trucks would carry enough water in the near future.

Sometimes, seemingly good ideas that do not work as intended in extreme environments never seem to die. A recommendation made to our Besmaya Engineers was to bring in military canvas tents and use a commercial foam to encase and harden the tent, about 10 inches thick. This would increase the ability to keep it cool and provide some minor fragmentation protection. I’d studied this months earlier as I worked with the commercial vendor. We were authorized to spend dollars on a limited and restricted basis, and a commercial product we thought might help. I rejected the proposal and explained why. The numbers promised could not be delivered. After I left the theater of operations, the good idea fairy appeared again, and the project was approved. What a waste of money and manpower. We were still operating at full speed. The Baghdad Bypass, ASR Aspen upgrade, Incinerator plans, the Anaconda hospital OHC, assisting MNSTC-I with technical engineering expertise for the Iraqis, uncooperative and inaccuracy of GoI MOIs, canal flows, Mosul Dam discussions, incoming firefighter personnel and tricks, and discussions on what to do about blatant and what appeared to be “media bias.”

While on my first combat tour in Iraq with the 353rd Engineer Group and as part of the 1st Cavalry Division in 2004-2005, I was right to note that everything seemed to be broken in the country of Iraq.  Little had changed by 2007, and I concluded that this condition was a feature of a socialist-style dictatorship.  One good thing was that our troops had figured this out and all our efforts were designed and built to be as dummy-proof and failure-proof as much we could make it.  We overbuilt everything.  Fortunately, the folks we had to work with in the military were exceptional professionals: technically and operationally proficient, brutally honest, and dedicated to getting the mission done under the most extreme circumstances. If not for them, the task to prepare the battlefield for incoming combat troops would not have succeeded. However, the message that we were doing good for the ordinary citizens of Iraq was lost.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Delays

[July 25, 2025]  That Wednesday morning began cool, with lightning, thunder, and rain beginning around 0230 hours. This was great for plants but hard on our construction efforts in the Iraq War. The reason was the mud, and not just any mud, but mud made of extremely fine particulate. It was stuck like glue to anything it came into contact with, and when the mud dried, it was difficult to scrape off. Like most Wednesdays, we began our day at 0600 hours with a Prayer Breakfast run by Colonel Rust. Our breakfast was to be the calm before the storm that each of us was about to enter. And our Facilities Section was losing Major Pat Wentz, one of our better and more reliable Engineer officers, who much of our efforts depended upon. In particular, his efforts to keep the main effort at Besmaya on track were crucial and later, that massive project would fall behind.

We would be increasing our need for water and electricity, and that stressed our capacity and pushed us to be innovative and be ready to make last-minute changes. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had its hands in large projects and helped with Engineer priorities. Donn Booker was my primary contact at the Corps, and he was the best man for the job. The Corps recognized his value, and around this time, he was promoted to SES (a rank of distinction within the civil service).  I called to offer my congratulations, and he said that now he was to leave Iraq. His replacement was Colonel Lonnie Baker, whom I did not know.

Over time, we were to learn some interesting intelligence. For example, our combat forces were running into more “homemade explosives.”  Finding more HME meant that our efforts to clean up UXO from the battlefield were paying off. HME is typically less reliable and less lethal. We also discovered that Saddam was paying the Sheikhs a salary as his way of co-opting them to his purposes. We would gain some mighty graphic and disgusting information on some of the worst and evil atrocities ever perpetrated on man. Someone, someday, needs to write a history of the fall of Saddam Hussein and the evils that we uncovered, and that starts with his use of WMD (chemical weapons) that killed thousands. The evil of that regime continues to echo throughout the Iraqi culture, exacerbating the tension between Sunni, Shia, and Kurds, and has led to a near-failed state and unthinkable violence. We had our suspicions confirmed that the New York Times and other major media outlets were paying “stringers” for video and news. The problem was that they essentially paid for propaganda.  And, of course, they never checked with us for comment.

For a number of reasons, we began to fall behind our planned construction timelines (that were overly optimistic) at Besmaya and Taji. This was aggravated by not knowing the location of several combat units. I understood the need for OPSEC to protect the MNC-I Commander’s operational plans, but he trusted me enough to share that information. He didn’t yet know where he would need them the most. Basic Life Support efforts began to hold us back at Besmaya, a place far from most other unit bases and difficult to supply because transportation remains risky, fraught with insurgent attacks. General O told me that he was concerned that our Engineers didn’t have enough Route Clearance assets to protect resupply convoys and that we needed to get at it and up our patrols. I passed this along to BG Ken Cox, the senior Engineer and C-7 senior officer.

One big engineering issue was the need for electricity for the Iraqi population. Not only was the demand increasing, but the old model of electricity distribution was changing to create a system where more of the population had electricity. In Saddam’s time, all power generated went to Baghdad to keep it entirely in power. Any leftover power then went to other cities. These smaller cities experienced rationed power, sometimes none at all, during peak demand, like on the hottest days of the year. During the night hours, demand might fall, but it was not unusual for the temperature to not drop below 90-plus degrees Fahrenheit. One morning, my outside thermometer read 100 degrees at 0600 hours. Speaking with BG Brooks (reconstruction) in the Joint Planning Committee that Iraqis were “concerned” about the overall lack of power in Iraq. Some of our technical experts believed Iraq would, at best, not have full-time power until 2013 (another five years).

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council would play a significant role in overseeing reconstruction infrastructure efforts in Baghdad. Additionally, the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center, with which I coordinated (distinct from the Council), was heavily involved in the rebuilding efforts.  The latter focused on power, sewer, and water systems. The Coalition Engineer effort that I ran was often in competition for the same resources, driving up the cost of contract work and materials, and slowing any planning to bring these systems online. The Center worked closely with the Baghdad Amanat and was successful in teaching the Iraqi government how to synchronize with the Coalition and internally with the GoI ministries. This was a success story because I was hesitant to believe Iraqis could do this at all.

From a weather standpoint and the most efficient months to get work done were starting to come to an end. May would arrive soon along with hot weather, and despite longer daylight hours, the heat was debilitating even for native Iraqis. We had under our knowledge that we had to get our pre-surge, base construction finished, or it would take us longer to complete any project. And, of course, there was the regular rotation of Coalition personnel, enemy fire, the Iraqi culture, political pressure, the MNF-I and MNC-I commanders’ push to be ready to accept new units, and a drive to get ‘er done that would constantly stress us.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Being “Read In”

[July 10, 2025]  The early morning of Thursday, 5 April 2007, was among the nicer weather days of the year. “Clear and cool” is what I jotted down in my notebook. A nice, cool day was rare, and so we would enjoy it while it lasted. Because building Coalition facilities was a precondition for the success of the overall Iraq War Pre-Surge strategy, I would be “invited” (more precisely, required) to attend a number of high-level meetings to ensure adequate cross-communication.  I would be “read in” on all major Coalition efforts. The MNF-I Commander did not want any disconnects on his Surge strategy.  These meetings, while classified Secret, needed widespread information dissemination. As expected, much of the “how” to carry out the Surge was getting out to the insurgents and terrorists. I’m not sure this helped the bad guys much, but it did worry me that our Engineers and Iraq suppliers/contractors might come under attack. I was less concerned that the Surge would work. Increasing troop strength could only benefit us operationally and the Surge would not fail.

That Thursday was a typical day. Our Engineers were planning how to increase the production rate of concrete barriers, Overhead Cover (OHC), and strategic steel-fuel storage tanks. We were also expanding our firefighter capability, a challenge since most of the contract employees would have little or no firefighting experience.  I was shocked to learn that piece of information from a senior KBR representative. They would learn through on-the-job training!  And, of course, there were the traditional ankle-biter issues, such as getting my tax information to an accountant back in the States. While in combat, we were exempted from the IRS tax deadlines, but I didn’t want to deal with it upon my return. I was also informed, I think by Major Ken Heaney, that many of our deserving Engineers from the 353rd Engineer Group (my unit, 2003-05 in Iraq) had not received their Combat Action Badges for being actively engaged with the enemy. Initially approved in May 2005, the badge was retroactively awarded but required documentation. I submitted the appropriate paperwork and proof.

Senior Iraqi government officials were regularly invited to attend senior-level meetings as a sign of goodwill. They would also be an outside source on how the people of Iraq viewed activity by the Coalition. Looking back, getting accurate and real-time feedback from the Iraqis present at our meetings was based on three faulty assumptions.  The first was that these officials were knowledgeable about how their own government functioned.  Hint, they didn’t understand how a Parliamentary system worked.  Second, it was assumed these officials cared about all Iraqis. Rarely was this the case. Their tribal loyalty might have been strong, but the idea of citizens of the “country” of Iraq was a fantasy. If you were part of their tribe, great. If not, then too bad, because you’re going to get screwed. I also learned quickly that parts of the Iraqi government did not talk with other parts of their own government. In the American military, we call this “stove piping.” Information goes up and down, but not laterally across agencies. Plus, there is the Middle East cultural practice of hoarding information, which added to our problems. And third, we assumed that the old way of running their government was destroyed for good. Wrong!  Elements of the previous regime remained in place, and these old ways meant problems.

This was about the time I was made aware that our Main Supply Route (MSR), Aspen as it was called, was falling apart and, shockingly, it had been designed and built too narrow for some of our vehicles to pass each other going in opposite directions. I was flabbergasted. Ironically, I sent one of my Navy Engineers out in a helicopter to verify this information, and, indeed, it was true. This was also the time we discovered that AQI terrorists were using hospitals for their Command and Control, weapons and ammunition storage, combat staging areas, that some AQI had infiltrated the hospital administrative and local security staff, and were inside some of the medical staffing. We found they did this mainly in Sunni-dominated areas of Baghdad and acted to control who gets treatment. Such control was not new, having seen this back in my first tour. JAM terrorists were doing similar things and using hospitals as a jumping off point for murder and intimidation. The feedback we got from the Iraqis was that people were terrified to go to the hospital. General O emphasized this as well during his briefs.

I also made a note observing how well Coalition forces operated in their respective AOs.  U.S. forces captured or killed many enemies in our operating areas. But it is rare for the Iraqi Army, SE(UK), CS(Polish), or NE(Zytun) to do so. In fact, our Coalition partners were more likely to get killed or wounded than they inflicted on the enemy. I remember at some point during this tour getting a call from our Southeast UK Engineers asking for assistance to build structures that could withstand heavy machinegun and mortar fire. They said they were having increases in attacks on their bases, and their CG was worried. I was out of line, I’m sure, but I told him to tell his soldiers to “get their butts outside their bases and go kick ass.”  That was the solution, something we had learned the hard way during the Vietnam War. The more aggressive the combat patrols were, the fewer attacks on bases. And the attacks that did occur were, more often than not, weak and ineffective.

“Iraqi Freedom Day” was officially designated 9 April by the new Iraq government because this was the date in 2003 when Iraqis celebrated the day Baghdad fell to U.S. forces.  This date in 2003 marked the end of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime and the liberation of Iraq from oppression.  Not to be outdone symbolically, our forces discovered this day another “torture house” in Baghdad. The terrorists operating under the guise of freedom were vicious thugs who would torture and kill anyone they believed was not on their side. Many of these terrorists had been captured in the act, but were let go because we Americans were using U.S. law rules of evidence. Frankly, that doesn’t work well except in a peaceful country with a well-trained police force. Our Facilities section was still working with TF-134, Detainee Ops, on the expansion of the Camp Bucca facility. I had already gotten construction and funding approval authorization just a few days before. I planned a personal visit to get an eyes-on and to better understand the issues our Military Police were currently having.

On 10 April, I would be formally introduced to MG Doug Stone, USMC, who would take over from MG Gardner, TF-134 Commander. I did not know it at the time, but MG Stone would breathe some fresh ideas into Detainee Ops and make my life better by working with me, as our Engineers helped him to expand Camp Bucca capabilities. He wanted to hold more terrorists and insurgents that were expected to be captured during the Surge event. I would also meet BG Edward Cardon, 3rd ID Deputy Commander for Support. He would be my link to 3ID as we built facilities for them. He was originally an Engineer officer, so he understood how we operated. These two General Officers, streamlined the information flow and stopped conflicting guidance. If I needed help, they were there.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: the Basics

[June 16, 2025]  Being selected as the new Facilities Chief in C-7 (Engineers) was a true honor. My section would be the lead effort for the Coalition Engineering effort at this stage of the Iraq War.  Other than Route clearance of IEDs, which was a relatively new and smaller Engineer mission, Construction and Reconstruction were the highest visible efforts to support our fighting forces. For the first and only time in my military career, I would have an overlap with my predecessor, LTC Capps. He would fill me in on how he operated, key projects, and where the “speed bumps” were as he ran this section. Shortly after arriving, I asked him and the section leaders to prepare a list of Boards and Working Groups they were on, and the purpose of each. Plus, they were to put together a list of key players outside C-7, a continuity book, and a RIP/TOA matrix.  I would use this information for my briefing to section heads on Monday, July 24.

Anytime a new senior staff officer takes over, I believe that it’s important for those already working in that section to know where this new officer is coming from and their leadership philosophy. I’d been in the country now for a week, and they had seen me about, and I had already spoken informally with everyone, but they also saw that I was gone most of the time. I had explained that I was getting to know all the key staff members in MNC-I, MNF-I, and other major organizations like TF-134 (located at Camp Cropper), MNSTC-I, JIEDDO, DRMS, TF-Odin, and various Coalition partners (like the ROKs, Australians, Poles, and British which formed the backbone of the Coalition). Who you know does matter. For me, when I call upon someone – usually at the peer level – to assist, it’s crucial they know who I am, the authority I have, and my personality.  Plus, they needed to hear that I was fully available to them and any request they made of me (or my section or the C-7), I would be there to see it through. They call, I’ll be there, period.

That Monday, I had my first sit-down with the Facilities Section to discuss my staff philosophy. If I’d been a commander, this philosophy (or guidance) would have been in greater detail, and I’d put it in writing. I had two purposes for this meeting. The first was for me to learn about them (their goals, needs, and getting to know their expertise) and how they thought the section was supposed to operate. The second purpose was for them to learn about how I operated as a section leader. I liked to work in a decentralized manner, so I required getting regular backbriefs, plus being copied on important emails. Furthermore, I always have an open-door policy, meaning any of them could walk into my area (there was no office but an isolated area near the back of the building) to talk about anything that was bothering them or that they needed to tell me.

My philosophy was to tell them what I wanted accomplished and not “how” they had to do it. If I did tell them how, there was a good reason (usually a short time factor) and that they could see this as “guidance.”  I made it clear that they were the technical experts, and they would be treated with the proper deference when there was ever a problem or conflict. I also like staffers with good work habits, being efficient and effective, and so I would not set office hours, but I would monitor results closely. I then prepared a time to speak with each of them in a one-on-one setting. Section heads were: Major John Chaput, USA (Plans), Captain Abby Jarabek, USA (Environmental), Major Pat Wentz, USA (Operations), and Chief Mowatt, USA (Power, 249th Prime Power).  The C-7 was fortunate to have these professionals as part of its staff. I was pleased that I was about to inherit the Facilities Section. I was to take over on 1 August formally.

If an Army is known for its bureaucracy, then a coalition is known for its supercharged bureaucracy, and that was part of my learning requirement. I had to get into the insides of why things were done a certain way, the rules (and in some cases, U.S. law), and when I could circumvent the rules as a shortcut (or what we called a “workaround”) to get a task done faster. I would not become comfortable with this for several months, and just in time for the pre-Surge announcement in the upcoming December.

The weather was extremely hot and the enemy – a combination of hardcore terrorists and disaffected Iraqi insurgents – were continually lobbing mortars into our perimeter with an occasional rocket mixed in. Later, we would install a Vulcan in Victory Base and a few other select locations. This gun was impressive when used in an anti-aircraft and anti-indirect fire role.  The M61 Vulcan is a hydraulically, electrically, or pneumatically driven, six-barrel, air-cooled, electrically fired Gatling-style rotary cannon that fires 20 mm rounds at a high rate of fire.  The gun ran off an automated radar without human intervention. It did make me a little nervous whenever I flew over our base in a helicopter. The ADOC (under the Garrison) was in charge of base air defense, and they were allowed to link directly with us in C-7 to expedite the platform on which to mount the Vulcan.

Each Friday, the C-7 would have some team sport activity, early in the morning, just as daylight was breaking. Just before I took over the Facilities Section, we played “combat soccer,” a game that required considerable dexterity and stamina to play (there are photos of this game somewhere on my computer today). By 1000 hours, we were back at work, showered and ready for a C-7 senior staff huddle. This regularly scheduled meeting is where I would update the C-7 COL Haight on the largest or most visible construction efforts and where we were on each, plus estimated completion dates. Like any good officer, he was most interested in what he could do to help remove any obstacles we were running into. He liked the fact that I rarely needed his help because I’d already had contacts at ARCENT, CENTCOM, and FORSCOM in their Engineer sections who were big-time problem solvers for me. I also relied upon the Corps of Engineers’ ERDC out of Vicksburg, Mississippi, where I could get testing done with just a phone call.

My first week back into the Iraq War was highly profitable in terms of networking, mostly among other Colonels, and learning the bureaucracy of that huge Coalition organization. In addition, I was already in excellent physical shape and maintained it by running four miles each morning in my Army PT uniform and carrying my M16 rifle at port arms. In the heat of the day, I would get a number of combat Soldiers yelling HOOAH at me, a good sign. Being physically fit meant I could tolerate the heat and dust, the work stress and dangers of being in a war zone, and I could tolerate the full year without any time off. I knew what to expect and how to pace myself. Most new folks in the theater were new to the heavy workload and struggled to adapt. My previous combat tour in Iraq in 2004-05 and at Victory Base put me back in familiar territory. These circumstances put me at a huge advantage and were why I immediately came online and was ready to work.

I could tell by now that this combat tour was going to be good for my professional and personal development, but most crucially, I would be making a positive impact on the war effort. Furthermore, I would help develop many junior officers from the U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy, and a small number of Coalition Engineers. Many would remain friends to this day. As well, I would learn more about and directly experience the Iraq culture. And that was positive in that I now had a better understanding of the dynamics of the Sunni-Shia intra-religious conflict, the constant low-simmering tribal warfare, and how a socialist-style, newly democratic society reacts to stressors (hint, not well). In my first week on the ground, I was learning the basics, exactly what I would need for this one-year combat tour.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Knowing the Key Players

[June 12, 2025]  Of all my combat tours in the Iraq War, this one would provide my Facilities team and me with the greatest responsibilities and hardest challenges. I was lucky in many aspects of this job, including having some truly professional-level officers working for me, highly educated, experienced, and – importantly – dedicated to getting the job done right the first time. Getting the job done right meant planning and overseeing large, complex engineering projects, which would be completed when promised, under budget, with the least disruption of combat operations, and built to modern safety standards.  By mid-July of 2006, we had not yet been privy to high-level discussions going on at the Office of the President, the Chiefs of Staff, and the top commanders who were on the ground in Iraq. The pre-surge mission was months away.

What this time provided was time for me to get to know those who worked for me and key personnel, nearly all Americans or English-speaking coalition partners.  And it allowed me time to develop trusted relationships and confidence in our capabilities fully. I was also given time to interview all my officers to determine if they were actually qualified for the job, which they were, but with one exception. I’d just received a female Captain Engineer from the States. She told me that her college degree was in Criminal Justice. I was shocked. How could senior Engineers in FORSCOM, who vetted these personnel replacements, send someone without the educational background into the most intense engineering environment in the world? I was polite to her, but made arrangements with an Engineer unit in Baghdad to send her there. She would be subjected to some basic on-the-ground, company-level practical experiences. She would be better off; otherwise, she’d have been a drag on our efforts.

The Facilities organization was organized into four sections: Operations (x4), Master Planning (x4), Power (x4), and Environmental (x2).  Plus, I had an NCOIC. The sections were a mix of U.S. Army and Navy officers, one Civilian Engineer, and several senior enlisted Army and Marines. Altogether, this was 16 personnel, including me.  When I arrived, they had three main projects that occupied most of their time: the Baghdad Bypass, Al Asad Hospital, and a large complex of Barracks (in four locations).  I was tasked by the C-7 himself, COL Bill Haight, to get up to speed ASAP on MNC-I policies and programs. I would quickly discover that the bureaucracy was daunting and, frankly, far more complicated than necessary. In my opinion, which I often shared, the design was a peacetime model based on a lack of trust in those executing the job. I would spend too many wasted hours in meetings, conferences, and sitting on boards designed to dot every I and cross every T.

July in the Middle East is hot—and I mean HOT. On 21 July, the high would be 115 degrees F with humidity. Earlier that morning, in our PT shorts and shirts, we played Frisbee Football at 0630 hours, and I worked up a good sweat. I was embarrassingly bad at the game despite being in excellent physical shape. We were informed that LTG Carl Strock, Chief of Engineers (who worked directly for the Secretary of the Army). LTG Strock was the only three-star Engineer Officer and was a major player on the world stage.  We were to prepare major talking points, items of concern, especially big picture items. This would be easy for me because I have always had one major point. We are fighting a war using peacetime rules, and in doing so, we slow down our progress, implement impossible tasks, and force our Officers to compromise their integrity.  The argument over building standards was still happening, but low-key until I entered the picture. The Army wanted me to use U.S. building and electrical standards, an impossibility. My guidance to my team was to use British standards (since most of their construction is concrete masonry) and, when that wasn’t possible, do the most reasonably safe thing they could.

An old rule of Infantry was always to know your higher HQ, units on your left and right, and your subordinates. Our higher HQ was MNF-I. Resource and Sustainment was a small section that I would coordinate with continuously. MG Kathleen Gainey (Transportation) and BG Steve Anderson (Loggie) were easy to work with, plus they believed in not being reactive to MNC-I requests but in pushing help down to us. And that was greatly appreciated when the pre-Surge time eventually came. USAF COL Bill Macon was the only Engineer on the R&S staff, and his sole job was to work as closely as possible with C-7 in all aspects. They had been tasked to lead the efforts to oversee Master Planning and Base Closures.  What I liked most about R&S was that they would take much of the bureaucratic burden away from C-7, and although they were small, they made a huge difference in our ability to get construction projects approved (a two-star advocate was a plus).  Planning and funding were still an MNC-I responsibility, and that was okay with me. I would directly meet face-to-face with those I needed at MNC-I in the Al Faw Palace, just a couple of hundred yards away.

Other than the three big projects we had at MNC-I, our biggest effort was participation in formal Base Closures. Our military strategy, at the time, was to slowly begin to pull back from the outer bases, either turning them over to the Iraqi Army or Police forces, and concentrating our forces into large bases like the Victory Base Complex. This sounds simple, but due to the restrictions we put on ourselves, it initially took months to ready a base for turnover. R&S developed a 100-day model that included a simple step-by-step process.  We would meet several times per week with MNF-I to keep updated, especially on security and environmental issues. Initially, the civilian from my Environmental Section was tasked to inspect these closing bases before we turned them over. He was required to use U.S. environmental regulations, meaning the bases were truly clean, with no hazardous waste of any kind. We all knew this was a waste of resources; the time wasted was worse because the Iraqis were filthy. Anyone visiting one of their bases immediately could see this, and our efforts were just plain wasteful. I’d heard that this was how corrupt Iraqi officials in their government were being paid extra. Shameful. The American taxpayer was getting ripped off.

The primary meetings I attended with MNC-I were:

• JFUB
• JARB
• Battle Space Working Group
• Battle Space Management Board
• Force Protection Working Group
• HAZMAT Working Group

Meetings led by MNF-I were:

• Force Basing Board
• Force Readiness Council
• Disposal Working Group

This all makes sense, but it was some of the most boring times. I was busy, but still bored. Over time, I slowly handed off these meetings, spreading them out among those in my section.

I called my Dad on his birthday, 22 July, to wish him well. The fact that this was even possible shows the miracle of technology and the efforts of our Communications people. I was still visiting key leaders, and on this day, I saw the Commanders of the 17th FA and 16th Engineer Bde. The 17th was acting as the “mayor’s cell,” which was responsible for leading the effort to secure the base perimeter, which units went where, and who lived in which LSAs. My CHU was B-8, Redleg (a reference to Field Artillery). When being briefed by the 17th’s Commander, COL Ried, she went over Victory Base Complex using a large CAD drawing. After she explained the location of various important features, she looked at my name tag and then the name on the CAD drawing. She asked, “Are you the same Satterfield?”  “Yes, I am. This drawing is from 2004 when I was with the 1st Cavalry Division.”  Later that day, I met Jana Weston, a civilian, who was the LOGCAP Deputy Program Director. She informed me that KBR’s Task Order would be changing from TO89 to TO139 on 1 September, and that would bring a number of significant changes.

By now, I’d been in Iraq less than three weeks, and I was running up to full speed—and that included recovering from jet lag. Over the next few months, I’d get to know more of the major players. They would be the reason I succeeded at my job once the Surge was announced.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: My Tour Begins

[June 1, 2025]  On Sunday afternoon, July 9, 2006, a small group of Soldiers in civilian dress waited at the airport in El Paso, Texas, for pickup.  Arriving at Ft. Bliss, we were dropped off at our barracks, found a bunk, dropped our travel gear, and reported to Building 500A for ACU uniform fitting. After a formation in our new uniforms, much like recruits – but looking like a bunch of old folks in oddly-fitting uniforms – we were transported by an OD-Green Army bus to a facility for a Commander’s Briefing. The men and women in this group were “fillers” for key staff positions in Iraq. Nearly all were full colonels, all occupation branches, experienced (with a few exceptions that would fail to ship out), and eventually be key contacts of mine during the upcoming year of my deployment.  Arriving over several days, this mixed group of about 300 Soldiers (no General Officers) and civilians would fill a number of high-level staff vacancies for the Iraq War.

For the next five days, we would be poked and prodded by medical and dental staff (I would get a new tooth filling), issued more gear, take mandatory classes (like first aid), qualify with the M9 pistol and M16 rifle, and eat some poor-quality meals at the Bliss DFACs. Then we were ready to depart on a civilian aircraft, Boeing 777, chartered by the Army out of the El Paso airport.  We were assisted by the Bliss Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group. Like raw recruits, we were pretty much cattle at this point, going where we were told and following directions.  I was selected to be the aircraft commander with the unenviable task of ensuring no one strayed away or got lost and handling the flight manifest and other assorted paperwork on which the military travels. We would have a stopover in Germany before continuing to Kuwait, as the aircraft crew was changed. The flight left Texas on Saturday, July 15, at 2355 hours. My journey herding these cats and dogs would last for about 48 hours, thank goodness.

My original assignment in Iraq was to be in the MNC-I C-9 (Civil Affairs) as part of their efforts to integrate the “effects” of the coalition’s main effort. I’d been selected for this position a couple of months before my deployment by the Army because I was a “good fit,” already having on-the-ground construction experience in OIF-2 (2004-2005) with the 353rd Engineer Group, part of the 1st Cavalry Division engineers. Before deploying, I read up on the ongoing missions of the C-9, and I’d been in contact with several of the Civil Affairs staff currently in Iraq, preparing myself for a new job. I was looking forward to this new assignment because I would also be working closely with engineers out of the C-7 shop, and I would be back in familiar territory.  By this time, I was aware of the Corps and Army command structure and the inner workings of that huge bureaucracy.  Being knowledgeable of one of the largest bureaucracies in the world gives any “staff puke” a tremendous advantage over his peers.

We arrived in Kuwait the next day, July 16, at 0545 hours, and after picking up time flying west to east across the Atlantic and Europe. This day would be a long day.  We were briefed as if none of us had ever been in combat before. I was okay with updates but the Army training officers and DACs giving us briefings seemed bored. I got the impression they didn’t think much of us despite the high rank we carried. We learned that “Kuwait is our friend” and that we would be handling weapons and ammunition, so we should be cognizant of the Theatre ROE and remember military standards. We would gather back with our original group that we’d left with from Ft. Bliss on the next morning at 0635 for flight GL53 to BIAP in Iraq.  En route, headed north to Baghdad, I was sitting next to a female civilian who was getting airsick. I told her to use her helmet if she needed to throw up and how it would be bad form to vomit on any of us.

We landed at BIAP at 1230 hours on Monday, July 17, and it was HOT as Hell outside. Departing the rear of the C-17 Globemaster Cargo plane, we were also met with the exhaust of four huge revved-up jet engines. At the terminal, I called the C-9 phone number I’d been given. I knew not to assume someone would come to get me at BIAP or know that I was even in the country. The C-9 himself, COL Brad Ward, spoke and informed me that I was no longer assigned to him. Telling me that he was disappointed to lose an experienced officer but he had consented, as he got a call from the MNC-I Deputy Commander notifying him of the change. Also, I would be assigned to the Engineers in C-7 at the Boathouse. I was elated to hear this news, although curious how the reassignment had come about. It turns out that COL Ken Cox (from 1st Cavalry days), acting as the C-7 Reconstruction Officer, had convinced the Corps that I would be much more valuable in the C-7 shop than in C-9. This decision would pay off greatly in December of that year when the “Surge” was announced.

I was picked up by the C-7’s Secretary, a nice older woman in a white Chevy Tahoe with a powerful air conditioner system. She drove me straight to the C-7 Boathouse to meet with the C-7, COL Bill Haight, and his Australian deputy COL Neil Sheet. I would settle in that day, meeting those who would work for me in my new role as the Facilities Chief and with the key staffers in C-7 (like COL John Moore, EHCC counter-IED and LTC John McComb, Chief Plans and Operations).  I was happy to hear that Fatin Thiab was the interpreter for C-7 and that I would see her daily. We’d become good friends on my previous tour. We had breakfast together the following morning to catch up on the year I’d been in the States.

I was convinced that the C-7 was in good shape and that my tour would be a good one and that I could make a positive impact. At the MNC-I morning BUB to the CG – LTG Peter Chiarelli (later Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army) – we were told that our mission would be to “Isolate access to Baghdad.”  The idea was to prevent outside terrorists and internal insurgents from penetrating cleared areas in the city of Baghdad to create chaos and blame the Coalition.  Of course, this would be an enormous challenge, and I had no idea how he could accomplish his intent without more boots on the ground. In fact, this idea of increasing the troop presence debate had spilled over into the public several months back. The idea of more troops to quell the increasing violence was taking shape.

That Tuesday, I discovered the C-7 was organized into four sections: Coalition Munitions Clearance, Reconstruction, Facilities, and Ops/Plans. I would be replacing LTC Steve Capps, a very capable engineer who had been in the position only for a few months and had fallen seriously ill, requiring his transfer back to the States for better medical attention and a moderate climate. I also met USAF COL Bill Macon, the MNF-I Force Basing Officer in MNF-I R&S.  He (plus his replacement) and I would work closely together, mostly on base consolidation and shutdowns.  Along with BG Steve Anderson, COL Mary Whitworth and Navy Captain Mike Zabel (Doctor Evil), they would be critical to get the pre-Surge planning at MNF-I R&S off the ground. I would also get to know US Navy Captain Rich Marrs, MNSTC-I J-7, who would struggle to work with, train, and create a military cultural change within the Iraq Army.  COL Bob Rush, MNC-I Deputy Chief of Staff, would be invaluable in helping me in my job, especially once the pre-surge effort began. Bob was a wonderful Christian man, and we attended Wednesday’s Prayer Breakfasts together.

By Wednesday, and in-country just short of three days, I’d visited all the MNC-I staff, several key MNF-I and MNSTC-I staff, KBR leadership, and other support elements that made this large bureaucracy work. It was a complex but effective machine that fought a war of occupation. Our nation has produced many great Americans, and I was proud to be among them.

Travels from Ft. Bliss, TX to BIAP:

• COL Mark French – MNF-I, Center for Excellence
• LTC Mark Jackson, Theater Provost Marshall
• COL Dave Hill, MNC-I C-8
• COL Charles Campbell, MNF-I
• Jamie Lopez, ATF from Lubbock, TX
• COL Perry Henson, MNF-I Strategy
• COL Dave Dornblaster, Security Assistance
• COL Joe Wallace, MNSTC-I, J-3
• COL Juan Arocha, MNSTC-I, J-5
• COL Carl Johnson, MNSTC-I, J-1
• COL Mary Whitworth, MNF-I, R&S Logistics
• CSM White

… and more that I didn’t immediately get their names. Plus, there were civilians mixed in.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Battle Rhythm

[May 3, 2025]  What we called our “Battle Rhythm” was the formalized daily cycle (or pace) at which the command staff, at all levels, worked. The idea was to synchronize future combat and support operations.  It worked, but the effort was grueling, complex, structured, and generated a massive set of taskers that had to be cross-referenced and tracked. Staff section inter-communication improved up and down the chain of command and was an effective method for MNF-I, MNC-I, and subordinate Divisions. The commanders loved it; their staff, however, had to work hard to maintain the rapid pace. Our Battle Rhythm during the pre-Surge was huge, especially due to Engineering technical missions and the compressed bureaucratic timelines we worked under.

As I was re-reading my notes in OIF 06-08 Book 4 of 5 (yes, I was that particular tracking my logbooks) on April 4, 2007, I jotted down a military joke. At  the time, I thought it was funny, but the humor in combat does not reach the same level we normally demand. It went like this: “How many pilots does it take to screw in a lightbulb?  None. The wife always gets their house.”  Ha Ha.

My mornings typically started with breakfast at 0600 hours; then, I walked to the C-7 Engineer Boathouse by 0645. The MNC-I Battle Update Brief, BUA, always began at 0730. This was a Secret Classified briefing; need to know, only. My day was filled with coordination meetings, information briefs, project plan reviews, future planning, and the big-time Engineer Reconnaissance of possible locations for inbound Surge troops. If there was no travel that day, I would end my day around 2200 hours, seven days a week. The bureaucratic wrangling over every detail was mind-numbing. Fortunately, I’d discovered ways to avoid my attendance at some meetings by sending some of the senior officers who worked for me. We were working on so many infrastructure projects that we used special computer software to track their status.

The Reconstruction effort – where I was a minor player as the Engineer representative – was taking up more of my time as the Government of Iraq started to gain its footing. Their government was designed on the Parliamentary Model based on a Federal Constitution. Coalition military members were smart to tune into the GoI’s government struggles; with the Iraqis having little experience with a Democratic process. Plus, the age-old religious tension between Shia and Sunni continued to raise its ugly head. Historians will write about how Iraq citizens hated America’s (read that as a Coalition) military occupation, but they hated themselves more and took out their religious zealotry on each other with deadly consequences. Around this time, we discovered another torture house. The Kurds in the north of Iraq were such a thorn in the side of the GoI that they largely gave up on the Kurds. And the Kurds thought that was just fine with them because at least they weren’t being exterminated. In Saddam’s time, he used WMD chemical weapons on some of their villages.

“Reconstruction” meant politics, and politics with the GoI was largely a guessing game requiring patience, smarts, diplomacy, bullying, knowing the Iraqi breaking point, and knowledge of cultural differences and norms. I attended the weekly Joint Planning Committee meetings in the International Zone, usually traveling in BG McDonald’s armed convoy. In the meeting on April 5, we discussed issues such as communications, linkages between the Coalition and the GoI, infrastructure problems and plans to resolve what’s broken (and it seemed everything was broken), political philosophy, project priorities, terrorism, violence, Iraq Police and Army development, economic development and investment, and plenty of ankle-biter problems that always seemed to dog us every time. ThebGoInwas being built from ground up,and it was fascinating to observe it in action.

Representatives within the Iraqi government Ministries would complain to us about their federal government and lack of response and shortage of money (often to get us to pay for what they were responsible to pay for). In one exchange, a Deputy Minister talked about the complaints of the Baghdad Amanant (a powerful position similar to a city mayor) that there was no cooperation and the Amanant marginalized them and suffered from “previous regime” syndrome. This wasted time and material resources. Another Deputy Minister complained about sewage drainage out into public streets and blamed this on American tanks ruining their roads. Of course, this had nothing to do with our tanks. They were trying to get us to pay for maneuver damage (like what happens in Germany). These Iraqis were good at sucking dollars out of the American government.

At the time, we were getting regular updates such as the status of Iraqi Special Forces (their most highly trained soldiers). We got their updates at the daily BUAs.  The contrast between the Iraqi and the Coalition was stark. But we pushed back, saying their SF had to get more into the fight and bring an Iraqi hand to security operations. About this time, we were also getting Intelligence that both JAM (Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM, جيش المهدي militia) and AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq,  القاعدة في العراق, militant Sunni network) were using Iraqi hospitals as Command and Control Headquarters, storage and staging areas, infiltrating the hospital’s staff, local security, as well as some medical personnel. Typically, we found this in Sunni-dominated areas and acted to control who gets treatment. They also use hospitals as weapon caches and centers for murder and intimidation. General O told us that Iraqi citizens were very afraid to go to the hospital.

The JPC was a wealth of good information for our warfighters (who I referred to politely as “door kickers”).  I also found out that Iraqis knew that Americans in the Coalition Forces were doing a good job of cleaning out insurgents and terrorists in their assigned Area of Operation (Central). But it was rare for the Iraqi Army, United Kingdom (in the Southeast), the Polish military (in the Central and South), and Zytum (South Koreans in the Northeast) to do so. They were “more likely” to get killed or wounded than inflict losses on the enemy. I found this view of the Iraqis funny at the time.  There was a time when I got a call from my counterpart, the UK Army, asking for help with Engineering design work because they were getting so much indirect and direct fire. Their personnel losses were unacceptable. I asked our J-3 for advice. He told me to tell the UK folks to get their butts out of their secure bases and do more patrolling and direct action. That’s how you stop the fires coming into their bases.

I was flying several times per week by U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopter to smaller bases in the Baghdad area for quick recons and for deconflicting engineering efforts. In one case, a KBR manager refused to do some simple earthwork to stop flooding that damaged an area controlled by the Iraqi Army. True, it was technically outside the scope of his contract, and I knew this. His equipment was idle at the time. I called the main KBR HQ to inform them about an uncooperative manager. He was replaced that same day and was on a plane back to America the next morning. This is how things are done: fix problems now and worry about minor technicalities later.  Use common sense.

I wedged all this travel, reconnaissance, outside meetings, and planning into the MNC-I and C-7 Engineer Battle Rhythm. Honestly, this was the busiest I’d ever been in my lifetime for such an extended period of time.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: SWET Services

[May 1, 2025]  One of our major challenges as an occupying military force in Iraq was to keep major SWET (Sewer, Water, Electricity, Trash) services online.  Back in 2005, a mere two years earlier, the 1st Cavalry Division developed operational tasks for its BCTs as we transitioned from primary combat to what is called Stability Operations. A combat force breaks things one day and then moves on to repair and replace key infrastructure that is an integral part of normal life. The acronym SWET was still being used by those of us with experience from our 1st Cavalry days, as it was an easy way of communicating to those new in this theater of war. Sometimes we added other letters to it like SWET-S, the last “S” standing for Security (Iraqi police and military). This is where we were in our pre-Surge Iraq War planning.

Iraqi culture, like much of the Middle East that practiced the religion of Islam, had a different view on how we build, maintain, and control large infrastructures that provide life-needed services. Iraqis did not maintain their equipment as Westerners do; in fact, they often ignored typical maintenance to the point of failure.  This applies to a local electrical generator in one small building, up to an entire power generation and distribution network.  For an Engineer like myself, this was frustrating, and no amount of convincing I could do seemed to change their behavior.

One example of frustration was our ability to provide electricity throughout the country. During Saddam Hussein’s rule, all electrical generation and distribution was centered on the city of Baghdad, and northern areas controlled by the Kurds were not even second priority but last to get their share. All outlying areas were subordinate to Baghdad’s power. We immediately changed this calculus in order to gain the support of the entire population. The residents of Baghdad did not appreciate this philosophy because they had more frequent outages. At one point, Baghdad was being cut off from power coming from the north. Coalition leaders thought this was a coordinated effort by terrorists to drive a wedge between the citizens of Baghdad and our occupation forces. In reality, the distribution lines were being cut by local governments so northern cities could stay online.

I was still working both Colonel staff jobs under C-7 Engineers – Construction and Reconstruction – and while Reconstruction would take a back seat in late 2006, that was about to change. As we progressed into early 2007, this build-up for the Surge (construction), the consensus by Army senior leaders was that we had to do both simultaneously. I would suffer for that decision as I was pushed hard to do both full-time, an impossibility. Furthermore, I had less knowledge about the high-level conversations being had behind the scenes between the Iraqi government, Coalition leaders, and the U.S. Department of State. When the weekly Joint Planning Committee met in the International Zone, I was the lowest-ranking member of the group.

One person on the JPC that I liked and discussed operational problems in common sense terms was BG Vince Brooks from the MNF-I staff. For example, BG Brooks said that he believed that water and sewer were bigger problems than electricity; he was right in my view. He was also concerned about what the impact would be on all the reconstruction (projects for Iraqis) efforts, how they are tied together as a utility system, which ones had no effect, and the wildly different views of Iraqi federal and local government officials. BG Brooks said we need to focus on success but also recognize there’s a bunch of it out there. We are now focusing more on systems and getting the Government of Iraq to participate (including paying for the projects).

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE-Gulf Region Division) played an important technical role in the reconstruction effort. On April 2nd, there was a USACE meeting with their commander BG Mike Walsh, Mr. David Leach (who was the Deputy Director), Mr. A h Ed Al Saadawi (advisor to Iraqi’s Prime Minister on air and seaports), Mr. Shirwan Al-Wadi (acting Minister of Transportation ), and others to discuss Capacity Development in Iraqi laws and regulations, to support building out the nation. This would be one of the few meetings where I actually received valuable feedback on how the GoI perceived our reconstruction efforts. Shortly after my back brief to both my immediate boss at C-7 and to the MNC-I Chief of Staff, BG Joe Anderson, I would be formally tasked as the “C-7 Director of Facilities and Reconstruction.”  Exactly what I did not want, to have both these jobs simultaneously.

Of course, all this time, we were working hard on the pre-Surge effort while still not knowing where all these new units were going. On an early Wednesday morning, I made it a habit to attend a prayer breakfast in the Corp’s DFAC. This was going to be a good day, April 4, 2007. For the first time, I was to meet BG Ed Cardon, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the 3rd Infantry Division. Oddly, he was an Army Engineer in an Infantry slot, obviously chosen for his abilities. He was one smart dude and a great leader. He and I spoke at length several times but this one I made special note of in my Green Book.

He talked about his previous service time in Baghdad when his unit rolled up many terrorist cells (especially the IED makers) by allowing lower-level guys to go free and who they linked up with later. That way, the good guys were able to roll up higher-level terrorists and crush several cells completely because when you get higher-level guys, they squeal on their lower-level guys. That’s how you wind up getting all of them. He also spoke on how to teach terrorists a lesson not to come close to U.S. equipment by baiting them with a “damaged” vehicle overseen by a sniper team. Those getting into the vehicle were shot and killed. He said it didn’t take long for terrorists to figure out they had better leave the equipment alone.

This became a typical day. So much critical information flowed, and military lessons were learned that it was difficult to remember it all. My books, 1 through 5, are caulked full of unclassified information that I’m happy to have still in my possession. All three of my tours, documented in them, are a great read, as they take me back to the “old days.”

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Supply Delays

[April 13, 2025]  Was there ever a battle or war that was won without supplies?  Our Army was fortunate to have some of the nation’s best logisticians, always ensuring the fighters had what they needed. But, like in all wars, nothing is easy and in the Iraq War, we were experiencing critical supply problems as we prepared our Pre-Surge construction efforts. The problem was there was not enough “logistics throughput” – meaning trucks and aircraft – to get us everything we needed when we needed it. This meant that those supplies prioritized Class I, III, and V were the classic high priority (food & water, fuel & lubricants, and ammunition). Without these, you cannot fight. My problem was that construction materials were Class X and one of the lowest priorities.

The fact that a major construction effort was needed to prepare the battlefield for inbound units was not lost on General O because I briefed him. To solve the problem, I was given an Infantry Task Force to guard several Class X convoys. When I woke up in late March to a clear, mild-temperature morning just before sunrise, I knew this had to be solved today. In a discussion with GEN Petraeus, he asked what the impact would be of a shortage of Class X materials on his new strategy.  I told him the problem wasn’t having enough supplies or transportation, per se, but that those supplies were in Kuwait, and we didn’t have enough PSD security to escort the supply trucks up north to Baghdad. Our construction for his troops would slow to a grinding halt.

Butler Range was largely under control at this point, and the 411th would solve the many problems (like UXO on the base), physical security, logistics, and managing the various Army and Air Force Engineer units. I’d asked the 411th Engineer Brigade Commander, Brig. Gen. Mike Silva to assign his Deputy, COL Jeff Elam to be the main POC for Besmaya. Jeff was an excellent choice. However, our preparation to receive other large combat units was suffering from shortages.  We had other problems. For example, Taji would be our northernmost military base in the Baghdad AOR and would accommodate a large troop expansion, given all the available land area. There were old lessons learned; the main one here is that anybody can talk tactics without getting the logistics right.

The purpose of all this preparation was to house incoming BCTs that had the job of “kicking Al Qaeda’s ass.”  We had fancy names for this strategy, but taking the fight to the enemy was what we had to do. I had an interesting conversation with GEN. Petraeus at the end of March 2007. I’m paraphrasing here a bit and throwing in my two cents worth.

“An interesting sociological phenomenon that we are seeing is that it is easy for AQI (Al Qaeda) to operate in richer, more educated areas of Baghdad as compared to other areas of average citizens. It is easier to control a rich, educated population. We also know that the university and other schools in the city are easily intimidated and bullied. Girl schools are attacked, yes, but what is surprising to me is that the rich and educated have failed to stand up against terrorism. — COL Doug Satterfield notebook 4 of 5, pages 60-61

While reading about Engineer mission challenges, it’s easy to forget that we were still in a fighting war, and the point of bringing in these BCTs was to quell the heightened violence.  Our Engineers were not complacent, a dangerous mindset to avoid.  Often it was the case that our Soldiers were operating on small bases without dedicated security. This means we – us Engineers – were the force protection, which also cut down on our ability to do our Engineer missions. On the last day of March, several of our C-7 Engineers had their living quarters hit with rockets. It was “interesting,” according to one of our Majors.  I think he meant something a little different, but it was a wake-up call. Only a few days before, our troops discovered a “torture chamber” in a Sunni Mosque, plus a large cache of explosives. And yet, we’re not allowed in mosques.

There were several large projects, each costing more than $50 million each. I’m not sure how cost-effective they were, but, at the time, we thought they made sense by saving lives. One was the Baghdad Bypass. At the time, all our convoys headed north went through the city instead of around it. A ring road had been in the early city planning, so we could actually see this area – no building was allowed in the corridor. I had less than 24 hours to put together a briefing for Congress. MIT would later be approved. Another was the Overhead Cover (OHC) project, funded for over $200 million. This was a way to put a barrier over the top of “soft” inhabited areas like Dining Facilities, PXs, gymnasiums, and other high-occupancy structures.

 

The bureaucracy and supply shortages continued to drag us down at every opportunity, and we fought it with a real determination not to let down the warfighter.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Butler Range

[April 11, 2025]  In preparation for the Surge, an area east of Baghdad was not part of high-level planning, mostly for reasons of little insurgent activity and environmental issues like a lack of reliable water supplies. As the commander of MNC-I, General O wanted a unit to cover his easternmost flank in case things went wrong in the Baghdad AOR. Our Engineers were quick to identify an old Iraqi Republican Guard location as the only option that met his overall military strategy. And, the construction work we were going to undertake would be a lower priority. That would change when General O made it clear that incoming combat units at Butler Range were critical to crushing the military arm of the insurgency.

Butler Range (originally called “Hammer” by US forces, then later named “Besmaya”) was going to be transformed from a sleepy outpost to a major BCT base, projecting firepower throughout the area. 3/3, the unit there would be responsible for keeping eastern Iraq free of trouble through interdiction efforts of terrorists moving into Baghdad from the east and to tamp down a local insurgency that had been brewing there for several months. This meant that our Engineers would be required to shift the construction effort into high gear. Completing the accommodations for 3/3 would become a major effort because the location lacked the very things a desert-located unit would need.

Early on Monday, 26 March 2007, a small contingent of senior Army officers flew out to Butler Range to get “eyes on” what would soon become a major base upgrade. The contingent included BG Ed Cardon (DCG, 3ID), COL Juan Fernandez (MNC-I C-7), Jerry Vincent (C-7 Environmental), several KBR personnel, other officers, and myself, all traveling on two Blackhawk helicopters. By this time, we had already planned for a larger base at Butler Range and now we were given the green light. I remember that day like it was yesterday. We arrived at the helipad and got hit with a shot of superheated desert air. The wind was whipping everything around, commonplace in the open desert but hard on humans.

As we entered the main Command Post tent, we were greeted by early 3/3 arrivers and Engineers. They knew me but had never met the rest of the arriving party of officers. We were asked if we would like water, and, of course, we accepted. One of the NCOs asked me if I’d like a water enhancer that made the water taste better. It was something called “Crystal Light,” a new product rich in electrolytes.  I chose iced tea as the flavor and saw the NCO add two packets to a two-liter bottle. The drink was the best thing I’d ever had. I immediately slugged down the entire bottle.

We spent most of the day “inside the wire” getting educated on the setup of the Force Provider sets and the good (fast setup) and the bad (little room to move) of these FPs. We were briefed on the local enemy threat and we were relieved to hear there were no major problems. The small C-7 Environmental Team had found water about two miles up a dry canal that local farmers had blocked so they could get more water for their crops. We unblocked it. KBR had also brought in a welldriller for groundwater, although there was a very high saline content requiring filtration from ROWPUs (reverse osmosis water purification units). Water and electrical power are the two resources we need to function. Water would remain a problem for the duration of the occupation of Butler Range.

One persistent problem was the delivery of supplies: logistics. In part due to the influx of more troops and equipment, our transportation networks were becoming increasingly strained. Per the commander’s guidance, we had to make do with existing assets. Mr. Guy Laboa, KBR’s principal manager, noted that KBR had the assets to transport, but we needed greater transportation flexibility to protect the movement of those critical items.  This would best be accomplished by contracting for external specialized PSD (personnel security detachments) or using internal assets. Both would come at a significant cost.

While Butler Range was getting more attention, I stumbled upon a serious contracting problem. Legislation enacted by Congress called the Antideficiency Act (ADA) prevents federal employees (like the military) from spending over certain limits. This is an old law, originally passed in 1884, but regularly updated. It makes sense to ensure money allocated by the federal government is spent in accordance with Congress’s intent. The law is not that complex, but the only entity that can make exceptions is the U.S. Congress itself.

Prior to my arrival, units had avoided the law by leasing large and expensive facilities instead of purchasing them, and this, they thought, avoided the legal spending limits. The problem is the case law anticipated such workarounds and leasing a facility that exceeds 90% of the estimated cost of a facility means an ADA violation. I found that all the major electrical power generating plants, dining facilities, and several other buildings were all in violation. The established remedy is to immediately shut down any ADA violation upon discovery.  Of course, that was not going to happen in the middle of a war, so I compiled a list of the violations, briefed GEN Petraeus, and he traveled to Washington, DC to get approval from Congress. This is how we were able to continue using these leased facilities.  This was no minor problem, and it took weeks and many man-hours to overcome.

Late in the war, Butler Range would again be a sleepy outpost and eventually an Iraqi Army base.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Things Go Wrong

[March 30, 2025]  The good news was that by the end of February, the weather in Iraq was getting nice, with clear skies and temperatures in the upper 60s and low 70s. Of course, with Surge units about to arrive and construction in full swing, I was moving about Iraq, seeing how this construction was progressing. There is nothing better than seeing for yourself how troop and contracted base building was going. Overall, we were making significant progress, but because speed was necessary, mistakes were being made, and things were definitely going wrong. My biggest fear was someone getting killed, and that was a line I’d drawn, never to cross. Fortunately, I’m happy to say that none of those working for MNC-I were ever killed while carrying out our Engineer Surge mission.

Butler Range would become the most difficult and complex site on which to build, with the most challenging problems. The base had been absolutely devastated by the U.S. Air Force in the war, and there was nothing like having to clean up huge pieces of concrete that had been a part of a building and cleaning up UXO before any construction could commence. These Surge bases would be built without the typical niceties like Air Conditioning and the commanders, naturally, were unhappy. But I did now have a list of inbound units, size and the location where they would go, with approximate Main Body arrival times.  All this crucial information had initially been denied. Things were coming together well enough for me to leave the theater for a few days to attend a CENTCOM Engineer Conference in Alabama. I’d first arrived at the CENTCOM HQ in Tampa, Florida for a meet and greet.

Before I left for my trip to the states, I had first to put out a few fires. One problem we had on ASR Aspen was the road was inadequate for heavy traffic. The only realistic solution to the narrow road was to build turnouts spaced evenly the length of the ASR, so our large HMETT heavy haulers could pass side by side.  Another fire was when a good-idea fairy had thought of putting up solar-powered lights throughout Baghdad City. I think this originally came to be a USAID initiative, and it was dumber than dirt to think these street lights would last in the dusty, grimmy, hot atmosphere of Iraq. I killed the idea, but every time I left the theater, it seemed to re-emerge stronger. This “good idea” was similar to the environmentally-friendly, foam-insulated tent cover idea. No one liked to think through the concerns, but I killed these overpriced, risky, “good for the environment” but ultimately unreliable projects every time they popped up.

The CENTCOM conference was good for networking and, of course, most of those attending were interested in my take on Engineering in the difficult desert environment. Since I was the Corps’s Engineer Facilities OIC, I had my finger on all the problems, concerns, what went right and the most valuable, useful techniques. Getting me out of Iraq may seem easy to do, but it was difficult. And my flight itinerary was screwed up, and planes were delayed. I also had to use my personal credit card because SATO had messed up my flights. I did get to see a couple of entertaining movies on the flight back to the States, and the first I’d seen since arriving in the country. I left Iraq on a Friday and was in airports or on a plane for about 30 hours in total.

We all faced challenges in the war zone, but the Engineering aspect was unique. I had one of the more popular presentations. Here are the “biggest challenges” in Iraq for design and construction (nowhere else have these been listed or discussed since that Monday, back in 2007):

• MILCON thresholds. The solution is to raise the minimum and reduce the huge bureaucratic obstacles that slowed the project and added more costs.
• Legal Issues. Potential and actual Anti-Deficiency Act violations took time to repair. This problem had been ignored until I stepped in and started to raise awareness.
• Contingency Construction Authority (CCA) speed was still too slow.
• Construction Inflation. As expected, with units independently contracting civilians, there was pressure to use better contractors, escalating costs.
• Shifting Security Threat. Operating in a war zone means the enemy has a vote on whether, when, and where to attack.
• LOGCAP Limitations. LOGCAP IV was inbound but still had not reached the point where we could use it for new construction.
• Manpower and Skill Set Shortages. We never had enough military or civilian engineers or contractors who knew how to operate efficiently and safely in the Iraq war zone. This hindered us at every step.
• Environmental and Lack of Resources. Our requirement to adhere to U.S. environmental regulations was one of the dumbest things we were required to do. And the resources we needed were often extracted at unknown environmental costs.
• The Corps of Engineers.  Too slow, too expensive, and too bureaucratic.
• Troop Labor. The entire American military engineering effort would not have been enough. If we intend to do extensive troop construction in the future, we’ll need to plus-up the number of Engineers.
• Quality in Construction. If it can go wrong, it will. Books will be written on this topic someday, and we will be shocked at the poor quality of materials and lack of skills.

There were other helpful discussions, such as how to properly employ the Force Provider war stock we were getting for Butler Range. I would fly out the following Saturday, March 3, and was made aware that on March 1, near us, a massive EF4 tornado hit a high school in Enterprise, Alabama, killing nine. I saw the National Weather Service video footage with catastrophic damage. By this time, I’d become largely immune to news of deaths, but this one made a particular impact on me for reasons I didn’t understand.

Returning was largely uneventful, except my luggage was lost (it would be found two weeks later).  At the U.S. military issuance facilities in Kuwait, I picked up my helmet and body armor and wore it over my khaki pants and light blue shirt. As I was disembarking the USAF C130, I did get a few odd looks for my mixed uniform appearance. The plane arrived at BIAP at 1530 hours. One of my USMC NCOs picked me up, and I went straight back to the C-7 Boathouse to work. I met up with COL Mary Whitworth, a loggie, to discuss designs and construction of “strategic fuel” that would be held in large steel tanks and caught up on what had transpired the week I was gone. She also updated me on the pace of T-wall concrete construction, Bucca Detainee facility expansion, and Butler Range (where we were falling behind).

On March 19, we had a Butler Range meeting to discuss that progress was falling behind schedule. This was obvious and 43 Soldiers of 3/3’s Advance Party would arrive at Butler Range in four days. We did not yet have a Main Body arrival date, but we could expect about 800+ within 30 days. MG McDonald told me to get out to Butler and “grab those engineers by their pubic hair and get on schedule.”  I would go, but first, I had to attend a high-level meeting of the Joint Planning Commission, a civil-military capacity planning group made up of mostly American Flag Officers. Balancing this “reconstruction” effort with my main job as a “construction” Engineer would stretch me very thin. I would soon travel to a Butler Range to speed up their progress.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Force Protection

[March 22, 2025]  As I look back upon those times we were planning and building in preparation to receive the great Surge, I am surprised our Engineers were not attacked while convoying. I suppose luck played a part, as it will do during combat, but there is never an excuse to unnecessarily expose your troops to enemy action. We did actively protect our Engineers while moving about the battlefield. This was done in two ways. The first was standard convoy active measures like direct fire weapons, planned routes outside hot zones, and dedicated gun trucks. The second way was to be capable of reaching a more lethal quick reaction force (Army Aviation or Combat TFs).

We were still working at the Butler Range (Besmaya). Unlike other locations we were using wells and surface water sources that contained a high saline content. The distance and less-than-good road network were a problem in transporting equipment, personnel, and supplies (like water, fuel, and food) to and from Baghdad. Protection of the Butler Range base was paramount and would need extra layers of defense given that it was located within sight of a known insurgent stronghold. This enemy area was co-located with a huge Iraqi brick production site, which I wanted to visit but was persuaded not to by the local U.S. Marines. We would use an Air Force REDHORSE unit, commanded by LTC Garner, to be the main Engineer effort; the first major project they would conduct and the first time I’d worked with this kind of unit.

On 9 February, I would be introduced to BG Ed Cardone, the 3ID Assistant Division Commander for Support (ADC-S).  The more engaged our Engineers became involved in preparing for the Surge, the more senior officers I needed to engage for coordination and information flow. This was also the date GEN Petraeus informed me that the 3ID would not come with “enablers.”  Enablers were units responsible for Intelligence, Reconnaissance, Artillery, etc. The arriving Surge unit designations, numbers and types of equipment, arrival times, command and control information and the timeline (minus enablers) were classified Top Secret. It would be our job to translate the needed TS requirements into detailed, unclassified plans for our contractors to build while not giving away vital, classified information. BG Cardone would be of great help to us.

COL Volesky, working at MNF-I (who I’d worked with in my first Iraq War tour) was interested in ensuring our Engineers had adequate Force Protection. We appreciated his help as a combat  Infantry officer with experience with enemy insurgents in the Baghdad AO.  He would also help me get the number and type of incoming troops by Battalion and by Brigade HQ so we could ensure we had the construction right-sized.  Of course, the C-7 Engineers were still working on Overhead Cover, generator farm expansion, Incinerators, the Baghdad Bypass, LOGCAP change from III to IV, C-7 staff Engineer shortages, fuel and water farms, and all the support necessary to properly augment the Surge.

I found that a good way of getting to know key senior military and civilian personnel in this combat zone was to schedule a breakfast meeting. We had to eat regular balanced meals anyway, and a good breakfast always seemed to be the ideal way to sort through what these officers (and sometimes senior NCOs) did and how they might help.  It was not unusual that these officers were active duty, reserve, and National Guard. Some were from other nations, English speakers from Canada, Australia, New Zealand, or the UK. If they had been sent to us, they would have been working in MNF-I and would have been highly effective at their jobs. I discovered them all to be honest and straight shooters. What I liked most about the reservists and National Guard officers, as they were also professional civilians, was that they often knew people back in their country of origin who could lend us assistance.

Unfortunately, I was still fighting rules and regulations where we were required to adhere to peacetime regulations during combat.  The biggest fight for me was with Military Construction (MILCON), a Congressionally authorized and appropriated project where funds are obligated for five years. Construction in a combat zone cannot work on such a lengthy timeline plus, even more difficult, the cost limits made planning a very frustrating process. We had fights over what was the definition of a “project” and the lengthy, convoluted, complex process. And while we were able to compress the times greatly, they were still too long. On more than a few occasions, I joked that I had to have a contract JAG officer attached to my hip.

The earliest Surge unit to arrive would be 3/3 (3rd BCT, 3rd ID), and it was planned for Butler Range. The environment was “austere,” a word I’d use often, much to the consternation of senior commanders. I did promise that we would be improving the unit’s QOL (quality of life) by fabricating a PX, a medical clinic, better physical structures (getting rid of the Force Provider), improved safety through better force protection, an incinerator, a water plant, and a power distribution system for more reliable electricity. 3/3 was to arrive on 27 March, a little over six weeks away. MNC-I senior staff would hold a classified VTC weekly to keep 3ID informed.

On 17 February, I did a recon of “Area 51,” about two kilometers from our C-7 HQ building. Inside the area was a scattering of buildings that had been taken over “without permission” being received from the Victory Base mayor. One large building – 51F – was a good size to turn into a Division HQ, and so I gave all the Soldiers bivouacking 24 hours to get out. We sent in our Engineers immediately to begin stripping out everything in preparation for turning it over to 3ID. Inside the structure was old machinery for printing. Rumors said the printing press was to print money. This would be a problem because of building-use change and the associated costs; the old peacetime rules in a wartime environment problem. I classified the structure as “light industrial” and made the change of use easy.

COL Toby Green, the G-3 Operations Officer—a tough but fair officer—was concerned that MND-Baghdad would not provide the required security to our Engineers at Butler Range or as we traveled about with our heavy equipment. The issue remained a concern for us throughout much of late February. Butler Range was important and a priority, but we had four more brigades inbound. One would be an Aviation Brigade and would go north to Taji.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Butler and Bucca

[March 15, 2025]  By early February of 2007, we were in the throes of intense planning for the pending Surge. My work week was non-stop meetings, briefings, development of new Surge sites, construction paperwork, and the typical daily grind of staff work. Fortunately, I was in excellent physical shape, except I had damaged my right knee while running. The Army doctor said I had torn my ACL, but later, it was determined to be a torn meniscus.  Running was off the table and sad for me since that was my most efficient way of staying in top physical condition. Now, I would walk and lift weights, which would take longer.

Based on General O’s guidance, I began to look beyond Baghdad to find homes for larger BCTs. To the east, there was an old Iraqi Army base where their 50th Republican Guard Armored Brigade had been located before we destroyed it. And I was asked to increase my level of help for TF-130, the unit responsible for Detainee Operations. These would be two major efforts in our plan to be ready for an increase in combat power to bring the violence down in Iraq. Baghdad, being in a strategic location of two major rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates, became the point at which the insurgency and terrorists would put their main effort.

This meant the Surge in U.S. Army units would eventually go there. My job was to give General O as many options as possible, meaning I had to see and evaluate all the sites where it was possible to place a BCT. It also had to have a road network from that location that could allow movement to Baghdad in support of the main fight. The first location outside Baghdad I considered was Butler Range.  This was the old 50th Armored location and was about 50 miles east of Baghdad. For some reason, I don’t know; the U.S. Marines had a small element there. I have no idea what they did, but the location was perfect. I needed that base.

Butler Range was a terrible base in a great location. The U.S. Air Force – and I love those guys – had destroyed Butler Range in the early part of the war by flattening every building but two. Looking at the base, we needed to know if we could get support from KBR, running logistics between Butler Range and our main supply point in Baghdad. My initial thought was that this could be a good U.S. Division HQ location but I later rejected that idea for a more centralized location.  General Casey was now quizzing General O about where base construction would take place in relation to the campaign plan and when. I could see General O was under pressure to lock down locations to base the incoming firepower.

In February, I traveled to Butler Range by convoy to do an in-person reconnaissance of the base and surrounding area. I took several of my MNC-I Engineers. Since the base was so far from the river, the area was dry. If we were to use this location we needed water and needed it fast. I sent my guys looking for it while I met with a USMC major in charge. After a drive through the area, I was amazed and surprised by the extent of damage and the large amount of unexploded ordnance (UXO) lying out in the open. “Sir, watch where you step.”  I didn’t need to be told to be careful. This project was going to be a dirty, dangerous job for Engineers. On the hood of a HUMMV, the Marine major and I drew out the limits of the incoming yet unidentified BCT that would be based here.

Working with TF-130 was a challenge because their commander was a “nut.”  Actually, I thought he had gone mad from the pressure, but he was later promoted, so he survived. He wanted an expansion of several existing detainee camps. The largest camp we controlled was in southern Iraq at Bucca. I flew down there on February 7 for an on-the-ground reconnaissance to get an idea of how the camp was run and their infrastructure problems, like sewage disposal and prison overcrowding. While being briefed before I left, TF-130 staff gave me their plan. Part of their brief was a tiny graph showing a projected increase in prisoner population over time. When I asked how they came up with that estimate, they were quiet. It was a guess. I told them that if I were ever called before the U.S. Congress to testify about spending millions of dollars based on a tiny, unsubstantiated graph, I would be doing some name-dropping. I couldn’t agree with their analysis.

Like any major project being planned, designed, built, and maintained in a compressed timeline, mistakes will be made. Therefore, I had all these bases overbuilt. Extra capacity was built in whenever possible. I’d learned in my first combat tour that whatever assumptions I was told to use would inevitably be wrong. At Bucca, I spoke to the Navy Lieutenant in charge of their SEABEEs, a renowned Navy organization, to get an idea of what I could expect. The first thing he told us was they were “not allowed to go outside the wire.”  This was ridiculous. Whoever heard of this?  I would take this up with his commander in Kuwait, a female Navy Captain (O-6). She told me the same thing. My comment went something like this, “You will order your SEABEEs to push the berm (outer perimeter) outward from the inside, and that way, they never have to go outside the wire.”  She declined. I told her that her next phone call would be from GEN Casey, relieving her of command. She consented to my “request.”

There were hundreds of major engineering projects starting up and ongoing that took a hands-on approach. For example, we had already identified a number of upper respiratory infections from the dust kicked up in our bases. The MNC-I Surgeon told me he thought a combination of dust and smoke from burning garbage caused the infections. This is why we began an incinerator program. We couldn’t buy them and install them fast enough. Around this time, I was flying or traveling by convoy to a number of smaller bases to determine how many Surge units could go there. While we were planning on five BCTs, that number kept changing.

GEN David Petraeus took command of MNF-I on February 10. From him, I would find out that the 3rd Infantry Division HQ would be the command over the Surge troops. This meant I could now get time to discuss construction with their commanders over a classified VTC. I was having regular meetings with the KBR top man, Guy Laboa, to ensure they would be ready to support the incoming Surge under the LOGCAP IV contract. I was also helping MNSTC-I, an American training-support element to bring the Iraqi Army and Police up to full mission readiness. I knew most of their Colonels and remained in touch, learning about their problems and occasionally lending some technical assistance.

MNF-I Resource and Sustainment (R&S) was a huge help. Colonel Mary Whitworth, a loggie with tremendous skill, helped me get approval for a Force Provider package for Butler Range. I’d never even seen one before, only read about them. This is a bare-base support system of various tents with equipment, all stored in large CONEX containers. We would eventually use several of these packages, but only after the U.S. Defense Logistics Agency relented. We were initially denied because they were classified as “strategic war stock.”  Well, we were at war. The actual deployment of the Force Provider at Butler Range is a story in itself and should be told someday.

Some folks say they want an easy lifestyle. Not me. I want to be in the game, not watching from the sideline. I always wanted to be the man in the arena. Being in charge of construction for incoming Surge troops was the most difficult, dangerous, and inspirational time of my life. I loved it.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: USAID

[March 3, 2025]  It was late January of 2007 and tensions were running high in the Iraq War. Our Engineers were working all out and the pressure to ready facilities for incoming American troops was enormous. Fortunately, we weren’t the only element in-country that we had on our side. MNF-I was a full partner, as were a variety of NGOs, USAID, and several large American logistics firms like KBR, Flour, and DynCorp International which operated under the U.S. Army’s LOGCAP III contract. Similar to LOGCAP, the U.S. Air Force had a smaller contracting program called AFCAP. There was concern about proper oversight and rightly so. As the lead facilities engineer, I was responsible to ensure all these entities were tied in with us and synchronized.

MNC-I (Corps level) Engineers were one of the major organizations for Construction and Reconstruction efforts in-country for the war. I was the senior Engineer for all our construction efforts, meaning any engineering project “inside the wire” or those that helped the U.S. military and our coalition partners. This is why my office was a hotbed of activity of planning, analyzing engineering intelligence, providing guidance, and directing subordinate engineering units (through our commander). In this capacity, USAID came to me to keep us informed and, most needed, to assist them.

I was also acting as the MNC-I Reconstruction officer (a critical vacancy), meaning I was also responsible for MNC-I’s American-centric construction that was “outside the wire” engineering that was to help the Iraqi government and its citizens. Reconstruction was a complex, high-visibility, often frustrating effort because of the involvement of so many different government agencies, outside organizations, and political International inputs. Because my staff and I were working hard to get pre-surge projects on-track and coordinated, we sometimes were not as focused on the reconstruction effort.

Reconstruction was a lower priority at MNC-I because we had the immediate kinetic mission to fight the insurgents and terrorists. This is why USAID was talking to us. Their message to us was that their task was to engage Iraqis at all levels in order to meet the intent of MNF-I Commander’s intent (GEN Casey).  This was part of Casey’s “Clear, Hold, Build” strategy. GEN Casey was the top commander, so ignoring his intent would be not just unprofessional but also counterproductive in the long term. He had insights that we could not even imagine. I was onboard, of course.

It was time to acknowledge the Reconstruction effort and bring in another full Colonel to fill the position which I was attempting to do part time and not as successfully as I should. This U.S. Army colonel was selected and sent to us. When he arrived in Kuwait, he called to let me know that he would be there for two weeks to “acclimate and train.”  He already had a combat tour in Iraq so I told him to take the next flight north to Baghdad, no excuses. “Consider that an order,” I said. He ignored me initially. After a week in Kuwait, he flew north to finally take his place.  Shockingly, he went missing. By the time he called me more than a week later, he said that he had “toured” Iraq and was ready to come to work.  I had him immediately fired (by the C-7 himself) and returned to the states. We would not tolerate someone who disobeys me or anyone and was willing to disregard directives. This put us in a bind but better than having a renegade running about.

USAID should have been a godsend to us. It was run by experienced, professional Americans. As a side note, Americans and our English-speaking partners were trustworthy (with rare exceptions).  We had two simple rules. The first was to never trust an Iraqi. Always verify everything from an Iraqi, check everything they tell you, and never trust them with your life or with the lives of others. They might be honest and good individuals but we had no way of knowing for sure. The second rule was anyone working with us had to prove they were willing to work hard, keep us informed, provide good leadership, and be clear about their capabilities and resources. I had been told that USAID was doing great work in Iraq, working at the highest levels in the Iraqi government and at the Provincial level.

As the acting Reconstruction officer, I met with Kent Larson from USAID on January 28 to discuss what they wanted to do. He was the director of the USAID/Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Team Office in Baghdad.  He would do a great job getting together with the multitude of Iraqis from all walks of life and to establish a list of things they needed. The problem I had was that his folks could not provide projects to the local level. He had resolved many big problems in the Baghdad AO at higher levels, but we at MNC-I were just not part of the equation. While my experience with USAID was limited, they did have the support of senior Flag Officers like BG Vincent Brooks, who later became one of America’s most famous Generals.

Soldiers at these PRTs regularly complained to me that USAID personnel were poor at follow through, were afraid of going “outside the wire” to meet directly with Iraqis, and they were often so green that they were worthless in the combat zone. BG Brooks and his team were able to help them streamline USAID’s processes and educate them on how to better work with the combat forces – that’s us – from MNC-I. Brooks was one of those generals that was best at being in the role of mediator and it worked. His smooth demeanor, patience, and tact went a long way towards the ultimate success of USAID in Iraq. And, yes, they were successful.

USAID’s success can be attributed to many factors. One of the most important factors was learning enough of the U.S.military culture to operate with us. But, I didn’t think at the time that they had sufficient trained staff. In a meeting with General O, I mentioned that USAID needed to send their projects to us for review. This is how synchronization of effort works.  I’m sure they got the word because I started to receive possible projects at my office, although the descriptions were light on details and with boilerplate justifications.  It would take them months to learn to work with us better. The good news is they had the funds to do any work they wanted, a rare position to be in.

Many have written about the great successes of USAID in Iraq, in particular during these years, 2006-2007. I’ve read many articles published in open media about the tremendous effort in “winning the hearts and minds” of the Iraqi citizenry during the “Surge.”  I’m sure that is true. But I never personally saw anything of value.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Helicopter Down

[February 21, 2025]  The day begins badly. It’s Sunday, January 21st; we begin our day attending a memorial service for an Engineer Soldier killed in the line of duty. I sit in a row of chairs reserved for Colonels and Sergeant Majors, front row. Oddly, beside me is an empty chair with COL White’s name affixed. He is the National Guard liaison. It’s not like him to miss a local memorial service. After returning to my duties at the “Boathouse,” I was informed that he was on a Blackhawk helicopter that was shot down returning to our base; all hands lost.  I knew five of the 12 Soldiers killed that day, and I would also later attend their memorial services.

It’s easy to count the dead and wounded when you either don’t know them personally or when you have no skin in the game (of providing security for the people of Iraq).  Many back home, and a number of Democrat politicians, threatened to shut down our efforts and made their positions known by verbal attacks on our troops. This is a classic Liberal method to hold onto political power, and I find it disgraceful and disrespectful. However, for those of us in Iraq, the degenerate behavior we saw was minor when compared to the gross contempt shown to our Vietnam War veterans. To this day, I stand proud of those veterans and always thank them and say, “Welcome home.”

Today, we continued our planning for the Surge. Part of that planning was oversight of our military reduction of outlying bases. We had been withdrawing from those bases, and we did not stop that effort. Initially, I was confused about that effort, but it made sense in a way. U.S. troops were concentrating on larger bases while the Iraqi Army and their Police were filling in behind us in those bases. By doing this, the Iraqi government was taking on a greater role in their own security and also building up a culture of maintaining security for all their people, based on their citizenship, and not based on tribal affiliation.

We were moving fast to meet General O’s orders to prepare to receive five BCTs and a Division Headquarters. To do so meant two things had to happen at the same time. First, we streamlined our construction-approval process to make it more responsive and faster but still retain General Officer oversight. I was given the authority at the G.O. level, as well. Second, we were given the authority to coordinate directly with more units outside III Corps, MNC-I.  This was a big deal but came with additional responsibilities like keeping our chain-of-command informed (through a two-star liaison from MNC-I’s HQ).

We added Living Support Areas (LSAs) and Tactical Operations Centers (TOCs) to our construction priority list but with the assumption that none would be permanent buildings. Tentage would be the primary source of lodging, followed by renovated existing structures. TOCs would be in some form of structure, either concrete or a thin-skinned trailer. General O asked me for a list of potential locations he could send the incoming BCTs, the final location determined by potential threat and ability of Iraqi forces. His primary goal was not to reduce sectarian violence, per se, but as a subset of protecting the population in the Baghdad area. General O’s insights on our mission was correct, given that appropriately 3,000 Iraqis were being killed each month.

We were getting good progress on building Dining Facilities and power distribution efforts. Nevertheless, we modified our construction priorities to reflect these changes and include additional guidance from General O. I had been telling him that we could achieve his goals but it would require considerable reduction in additional inessential capabilities like Moral Welfare and Recreation (MWR) locations. He agreed but wanted these added back into our priorities. Here is our modified construction priorities list that would largely remain unchanged from this point in late January of 2007 to when I departed months later:

1. LSAs (billeting)
2. TOCs and Command and Control (C2)
3. Medical Hospitals and treatment
4. Ammunition Storage
5. Detainee enclosures
6. Power
7. Water
8. Waste Water
9. Solid Waste Disposal and Incinerators
10. Laundry Pickup and Dropoff
11. MWR basic facilities

Low on our priority list would be any future project that could be delayed without jeopardizing already approved funding or unnecessary increasing costs. This included bus shelters, additional MWR improvements, and Reconstruction (Iraqi projects).

Late January was when I was blindsided by a piece of crucial information brought to me by an Engineer heavy-haul Soldier. He told me that the Main Supply Route (MSR) from Kuwait into Baghdad – MSR Aspen – couldn’t accommodate two heavy haulers passing side by side going different directions. That was nuts. How could it be that we had rebuilt this supply route and many of our vehicles were too wide to pass one another?  Looking into this problem I found that the U.S. Corps of Engineers had reduced the roadway width due to costs. I am sure someone high up had approved this change but I was not aware. When I told our MNF-I Logistics folks, they nearly blew a gasket.

I sent one of my Air Force Civil Engineers out by helicopter with priority directions to hop a mile at a time and inspect MSR Aspen. When he returned, he confirmed the roadway was too narrow and to make things worse, the edges of it were crumbling due to a failure to correctly prepare the roadway bed. Over time, this meant the roadway would narrow as it decayed. I requested that the Loggies at MNF-I begin the work to submit a plan to either expand the road or find an alternative solution.  Eventually they determined we could build turnouts faster and cheaper and not rebuild the road. This was a good solution but would take lots of time we didn’t have.

Our Engineers were not working alone on these issues. LTC Andy Knight at U.S. Army Central (or Third Army, called ARCENT) was a real goldmine of information and influence. Him and his team helped us with much of the paperwork.  We were also helping U.S. staff at Multi-National Security Transition Command (MNSTC-I); a training and support command assisting the Iraqi military and police. When they could, they would help us too. I also found some help in a few General Officers at MNC-I, like BG Neil Braverstock, an Australian.

We were still getting fast-paced requests that added friction to our main mission. For example, on the 26th of January, we were tasked to construct four or five 1,000 detainee Hasty Compounds within 30 days. Also additional improvements to guard towers and lighting “outside the wire” so our guards had better visibility. And, of course, the enemy “has a vote” and we were getting an increase in mortar and rocket fire. This got everyone excited and wanting more Overhead Protection.

That same evening, we had a memorial service for those killed in the helicopter shoot down.

And, we were told not to call this increase in troops a “Surge” but to call it a “Plus-Up.”  Looking back on the Surge many years later, this was a silly thing to do.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Planning & Priorities

[February 19, 2025]  It was time for our Engineers to get to work. We’d received approval from “General O” ( LTG Ray Odierno) to move forward with the hard planning necessary to accommodate the incoming Surge. By this time in the war, the U.S. government had agreed to follow both the rules, guidelines, and standards of both the new government of Iraq and the U.S.  While that sounds good on paper and looks like the logical thing to do – our Department of State was happy – making this work was nearly impossible.

We were also tasked with improving general security and protection. For example, the military was sending us C-RAMs to install on the larger coalition military bases. This system was the 20mm land-based Phalanx Weapons system used for automatic weapon close-in detection and destruction of incoming mortars, artillery, and rockets. We were further ordered to devise improvements to guard towers to make them less susceptible to small arms and RPG fire. Fortunately, the C-3 Operations staff had a physical security section, and they were able to assist our Engineers.

Not all of our Engineer efforts in preparing for the Surge were directed toward military matters. We also had the mission to support Iraqi civilian economic zones. This meant that many projects would be generated by what the Iraqis wanted. Our C-9 Civil-Military Operations staff helped with this. We were about to enter one of the biggest buildups in our history since the Korean War, and the directive to accommodate Iraqi civilian desires into our plans was going to be a speed bump to our preparation for our expanding warfighting effort.

Here’s how I handled this. The C-9 himself and I agreed that he would keep the Iraqis happy if I promised to utilize Iraqi civilian contractors as much as possible, barring potential security issues. This was a good compromise.  I agreed with his proposal. We were also eager to get more Iraqi contractors vetted anyway. We desperately needed the manpower, and although the average Iraqi worker was unskilled, uneducated, and inefficient, they were loyal, hard-working, willing to learn new construction skills, and generally had a positive disposition.

We also had an ace up our sleeves, so to speak. An Iraqi architect named Dr. Jamal, whom I knew from my previous deployment a year earlier. He had been one of Saddam Hussein’s chief architects before we invaded Iraq in 2003 and was highly skilled.  Dr. Jamal also could quickly hire hundreds of semi-skilled Iraqis, engineers, and religious leaders (who would keep their tribe members placated). He would be our go-between as a businessman running an Iraq-American joint venture. And he had important connections with the new Iraqi government.

There would be four main sources that made sure we had the proper facilities for the incoming Surge. The largest in numbers were the Iraqis themselves, who appreciated any chance to earn hard currency. The most skilled, efficient, and reliable were non-Iraq professional companies from all over the world, mostly from Kuwait, Turkey, South Africa, and Syria. And there was the ongoing American contractor KBR, which technically could not do “construction” but could renovate and repair existing facilities. Lastly, we had American military Engineers (mostly Army and Air Force) who were also used for quality control and assurance and who could be fast to engage or redirect.

Plans and priorities were developed that were as good and as fast as planning can be, and not yet knowing where all the surge BCTs would be located General O. This meant a heavy reliance initially on reconnaissance by myself and parts of my team. Unlike my first combat tour, where I traveled by convoy, I’d now travel by helicopter, a faster and safer method.

Our construction priority overall would be:

1. Billets (including troop space, heat/AC, safety, and force protection)
2. Tactical Operation Centers, Offices, and Administrative/Logistical Centers
3. Dining Facilities
4. Water (access, purification, bottling, and delivery)
5. Waste Water (removal and security)
6. Power (electricity generation and distribution) and to users
7. Motor Pool Space
8. Force Protection overall

Any other facility requested by a unit that did not appear on this list had to be both justified in writing and approved at the Division level. If a commander at a lower-level unit could verbally justify a need to me, and we had the time and materials, I had the authority to approve it myself. This gave us flexibility in our construction effort. And, there were priorities within these priorities. An example would be a request for a hasty helipad or a new road which could be fairly easy.

What we would soon discover is a shortage of quality construction materials (lumber, cement, electrical wiring and components, etc.) would slow us down. Also, there was no way to bump up our power generation capability quickly. Although large generator purchasing was centralized, we still found ourselves competing against ourselves as units attempted to purchase the same items we controlled. This is why we had a central system, to begin with. Our C-4 logisticians were pulling their hair out over this. This meant we sometimes purchased lesser-quality materials, and that meant either over-designing and building to compensate or suffering with a greater failure rate.

A problem I stumbled upon involved the leasing of facilities, including Dining Facilities and power plants. Clearly, those who originally approved leasing as a way of circumventing U.S. legal Military Construction (MILCON) spending limits did not anticipate us staying in Iraq for as long as we were. In my opinion, the legal issues were mostly ignored. But the problem was massive and was not going away. There would become a point where the U.S. Congress would have to get involved. The timing was bad. We were already stretched thin and in gross violation of the Anti-Deficiency Act.

Later, I’ll discuss how this was fixed. For now, we had our hands full assisting U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) with flushing out “Surge” standards, bringing in additional firefighting teams, locating Overhead Cover, dealing with a difficult Department of State, building concrete barriers and other “hardening” efforts. And I had to continue to fend off a gaggle of General Officers who believed I worked for them.

One bit of good news was that on 20 January 2007, I was finally given the names of the incoming BCTs. This gave me the ability to plan for finer numbers of personnel and equipment. For example, a Light Infantry Brigade is configured differently from a Stryker Brigade. But it was the level of bureaucracy that often frustrated me the most. I know about how the Army bureaucracy can stymie any good plan and I was determined not to let that happen. Feed the beast and you might survive to fight another day. So, I fed the beast.

This was a good time to be in the position I was in. By this point, I’d been in Iraq earlier for a full-year tour and was now in Iraq for an additional six months. I knew all the key players, the bureaucracy, and key commanders, and how to get the money and materials for construction. And, best of all, I had the approval by General O to “move out, get ‘er done!”

Perfect. Now, plan hard, engineer right, protect our workers, do recon, and communicate and coordinate.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Briefing MNC-I Commander

[January 24, 2025]  Saturday morning, 13 January 2007, was cool, cloudy, wet, and muddy. I was awake early as usual, around 5 am, and looking forward to what would likely be the most important day of my military career.  I was to brief LTG Ray Odierno, MNC-I Commander on the capabilities of Engineers to “house” the upcoming surge in troops, equipment, and supplies.

I walked into his office in Al Faw Palace, which ironically had been one of Saddam Hussein’s best palaces, fully prepared. My boss, COL Juan Fernandez was with me. In attendance were: BG McDonald, BG Anderson, COL Volesky, COL Murray, COL Printz, and COL Wilson. Gen. Odierno wanted to ensure his Engineers were up to the task. I had been summoned to his office only a few hours before, so the meeting had been quickly arranged. For such an important briefing to the MNC-I Commander, there had been little time to prepare.

Gen. Odierno established our mission to bring in five Brigade Combat Teams and as few support elements as feasible. He wanted the existing support elements to support the troop surge, and thus put as much firepower forward as possible. His question to me was, “Can our Engineers establish enough housing for the incoming forces?”

What was unknown to those present, except for Juan, was that I’d spent an aggressive three days prior coordinating with key players that would be needed to carry out the construction. I had done a deep-dive into an analysis of our capabilities. I knew it was only a matter of time before I’d be asked to brief Engineer capabilities, so I was ready.

I asked for clarification on one item; that was “when” were the BCTs arriving.  Were they coming all at once or spread out over some known interval?  Also I needed to know where they would be located. Gen. Odierno said the plan was to space the BCTs out to arrive approximately 45 days apart and there would be no Division Headquarters. Plus, he could not commit to exactly where they would be located but I’d know at least 30 days in advance.

My answer to him was that we would be ready. Generals are not stupid and they understand the proclivity of staff officers to be Yes Men, because staffs want to please their bosses. Gen. Odierno asked? “How do you know you can do this?”  I explained what I’d been doing over these past three days to do a thorough analysis and based on my experiences with the existing players I was confident we were ready. But I needed those 45 days’ notice.

Gen. Odierno agreed but couldn’t guarantee in every case I’d get that much time. Then he said the first unit arrives in 44 days and would be coming into the Baghdad area. We would be ready.  I was to speak with the C-3 COL Murray for the area most useful location for the first BCT to occupy. There were some details I needed like the type of BCT, the numbers of troops, and the equipment so I could plan for the materials and manpower.

Everyone there at Odierno’s meeting shook my hand and I left to get right to work. Three days before, I’d already ordered the 411th Engineer Brigade to stand ready which was a good thing. We had a three day head start. We were going to need it. Engineers are never in reserve, meaning they are always working on missions. Turning off missions and restarting on new missions can take time and involves risks, especially in combat. The meeting lasted about 20 minutes, no wasting time or effort as the mission was clear.

For the next six months, we would meet all deadlines but not without needing Gen. “O” – as we called him – to run interference for us on occasion. Some of the senior Flag Officers and Consultants didn’t like the accommodations provided and a few wanted to let me know about their displeasure. For me, I listened intently but their comments rolled off my back. Unless there was a danger, these folks got what I could provide, even if the accommodation were ”austere.”

A Division Headquarters was tasked to act as a command and control element for the five BCTs. I’d anticipated the move and had a location selected that would be ideal and on Victory Base. The 3rd Infantry Division would arrive well into the BCT-arrival sequence, so most of their Soldiers would live in tents, much to the dislike of the 3rd ID Commander, MG Rick Lynch. I understood his concern, he just wanted the best for his troops.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Saddam Hussein Executed

[January 7, 2025]  The year ended with the execution of Saddam Hussein by hanging at approximately 5:00 in the morning on Saturday, December 30, 2006. His execution was for crimes against humanity. His co-conspirators were executed later. U.S. Americans had no part in the execution because this was part of our philosophy of allowing the Iraqis to run their own government.

Around the start of the new year, we were still in the mode of closing smaller, outlying bases or turning them over to Iraqi police or their military. This was keeping everyone busy, specifically since we were trying to adhere to U.S. environmental standards (a mistake since the Iraqis didn’t care). A question that concerned us in the early planning for an increase in troops was where we would put them; all were to be U.S. troops, mostly 3rd Infantry.  Our footprint, meaning troop beddown capacity, was growing smaller by the day.

This planned increase in troop strength was expected to last six to nine months, steadily increasing in numbers with Brigade Combat Teams arriving about every 30 days. Who they were exactly and where they were going was an obstacle to both operational and logistical planning. That’s the kind of thing that drives Engineers up the wall. I was told the specific decisions were “in the bureaucratic system.”

My boss, COL Juan Fernandez, had just returned from emergency leave because his dad had passed away. His duties had fallen on my shoulders while he was away, and I’d never worked so hard in my life. On one day, for example, I attended 20 required meetings. But my work was nothing compared to the dangers of foot Soldiers and Marines who were the “door kickers.”  Except for weekly travel by Blackhawk helicopter, I was rarely at risk of being killed.

On New Year’s Day, some of our Soldiers discovered 155mm Chemical Weapons rounds.  These were classified as WMD and were Mustard Gas (HD), a nasty blister agent that had been in wide use during World War I. They were likely part of a stockpile that had been used by Saddam’s army part of a stockpile that had been used by Saddam’s army on civilian Kurds and Peshmerga in the north, killing upwards of 5,000 men, women, and children in 1988.  This got our undivided attention.

Later that day, I was selected to fly out to Al-Asad Airbase and visit the Western part of the country, meet important Sunni Iraqis and a few of our Engineers.  BG McDonald told me that the Iraqis wanted an “American Engineer,” and that’s why I got the job. Before we were to depart on January 6th, there was plenty of Engineering planning work that needed completion, plus extra meetings, special dinners, lectures, project updates, problem-solving, and even updates on Iraqi basing issues. For example, I was dragged into the Mosul Dam problems again, a long-term nightmare.

Before we left for Al-Asad, I updated my boss on the subject of Overhead Cover (OHC) and the history behind it from 2004 when the 1st Cavalry Division implemented it.  Another big project was the detainee camp expansions to accommodate an anticipated increase in captures because of increased troops’ presence. Task Force 134, Detainee Operations, was the driver.  They were a separate entity reporting directly to MNF-I and outside my chain of command. I was, nevertheless, asked to assist them, much to my displeasure. But, you do as ordered.

An army Engineer, MAJ Matthew Jefson, was the TF’s point man for this big task. As a side note, someone needs to capture the history of this operation, and maybe they have. Jefson was a good man, but he had to work for an MG “Jack” Gardner, a real ass, in my opinion. They asked for my help, but Gardner was insulted that his team would bring in an “outsider to assist.”  It was not my problem, but I provided my advice silently. I came close to walking out, but being a team player, I provided some positive input to their plan.

In my next post on the pre-surge environment, I’ll discuss what happened when President Bush publicly announced the “surge” on television. It is good to know that up to this point, our planning for this troop increase was mostly academic and involved little actual coordination among staff sections and with our contractors.

One thing that kept me sane during this time was our Sunday morning prayer breakfast. COL Ken Cox attended with me, and we would go for breakfast together, then get a haircut and scalp massage. We’d be at work before 9:00 a.m.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: BG John McDonald

[December 26, 2024]  There were so many Generals between III Corps and MNF-Iraq that it was hard for me to know who worked for who and, more importantly, who had the authority to direct our Engineers to do specific tasks. Every senior officer, it seemed, wanted us to do something – all of which made sense – but there were not enough of us to go around. This is the time when BG John McDonald came into my world.

I wasn’t planning on writing about specific individuals during our war in Iraq, but it’s necessary to get an idea of how and under what conditions that decisions are made.  In this case, because BG McDonald is one of those kinds of people you can’t ignore, and with his outgoing and happy-go-lucky ways, I found him easy to work with on Engineering issues. His personality and unique way of thinking are worthy of some comment, which I will attempt to do justice to.

My boss had just returned from MNF-Iraq headquarters at the Al Faw Palace, visiting a new General recently assigned, BG McDonald. He came to see me to prepare for a brief on the construction effort housing TF Odin drones. At the time, much of the drone operation was classified, but it is now in the public domain. ODIN is an acronym standing for Observe, Detect, Identify, and Neutralize. In 2006, we were taking a beating from IED ambushes; that’s where TF Odin came into play.

Using the MQ-1B Predator, unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), we could keep  In simplified terms, the UAV patrolled the roads and could attack a team of insurgents trying to install an IED. This would be a bad day for them. These were big UAVs with a wingspan of approximately 55 feet. The aircraft needed large rigid hangers to protect them from sun, sand, and wind. That’s where I came in.

BG McDonald’s problem was that there were no doors on the UAV hangers, and this needed to be solved. My boss had just returned from BG McDonald’s office, where he claimed that he had “just been chewed up by a General.”  My boss did not have the answers BG McDonald needed, and this General wanted answers now, not tomorrow. My boss said, “If you go see McDonald, be fully prepared.”

Later that afternoon, I was called into BG McDonald’s office and asked why our Engineers had refused to put doors on the UAV hangers. I told him that the order had come directly from me. I thought he was going to blow his stack, looking at me like I’d countermanded his order.

I went on to explain that these hangers were considered Military Construction (MILCON) projects and, therefore, were at their Congressional limit as to how much money could be spent on them. This, I said, was based on U.S. law, not Army Regulations. If we wanted that changed, the process meant going to Congress, a difficult, long, but not impossible task.  Then, I quoted the law, the line and the section (I’d looked it up earlier and memorized the information).

He said, “What are you?  Some kind of smart guy?”  I told him that it was my job to keep him and the Commanding General out of jail. Although this was technically true, it would certainly not be enforced.  The Congressional limit is the limit, period. I would find a solution, but it needed two weeks. I called a large door manufacturer in the U.S. and got the donation of several doors. With the Air Force flying in the doors, the problem was now solved.

But that was not the end of the problem. The Battalion Commander of the TF had installed other doors in direct contradiction to BG McDonald’s orders. In the military, it’s not known to be to your advantage to disobey a direct order from a General. When I told BG McDonald about this, he was calm but looked at me and said, “Well, it’s time to go relieve that m****f***ing commander of his job.”

Before I left his office, he told me about his thoughts on the Iraqi peoples. Of course, I have my own views of the Iraqi people and I wrote about them eight years ago in a popular article (see link here).  BG McDonald’s view is still interesting to me. This also gives us a good idea what is behind the fighting part of the war.

“Iraqis don’t care about democracy because they have only seen the dark side of democracy. They have seen violence, threats, less food, less electricity, and a weak government unable to get a handle on the situation. Iraqis want a strong government to fix the problem and they don’t care what type – democratic, dictatorial, or whatever. They want the criminal and insurgency hit hard and held down so,they can get about their regular lives. They do,prefer to live where they don’t have to worry about things like food and electricity. The Socialist system gives them these things.” — BG McDonald, December 26, 2016, Al Faw Palace, Baghdad, Iraq (from personal notes)

The next day, I would brief LTG Raymond Odierno, the III Corps (MNC- Iraq) Commander on the Coalition’s ability to take on short-notice construction projects (like TF Odin) and development of “surge” infrastructure. Unknown to me at the time, I was about to be directed to turn around our entire Coalition Engineer efforts. That would be a challenge unlike any thing I’d ever done.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: 5 BCT Staff Study

[December 16, 2024]  In 2006, the Coalition Strategic Plan in Iraq was to reduce the number of U.S. bases and personnel, consolidating them into larger bases near Baghdad. The Iraqi military would take over those bases and increasingly engage in combat, doing so slowly as they gained numbers, experience, and a professionalized force. This plan was feasible and allowed flexibility, but it was a slow, methodical process.

The problem was that the number of attacks on Coalition forces, as well as the Iraqi military, government, and civilians, was more frequent and destructive. No security meant no freedom of movement, and only a small, struggling commercial effort hampered the country’s economic well-being. Plus, these attacks were taking a toll on water, power, wastewater, and transportation facilities.

This growing insurgency had to stop or at least be significantly reduced if we were to leave Iraq. At some point, senior U.S. leaders decided to create a surge of American troops to solve this dangerous situation. I don’t know if President Bush decided on this new strategy but a formal announcement did come a month later. Studying this five BCT surge plan, we were flushing out some of the major operational concepts at the higher headquarters in Baghdad.

The first time I got concrete information that something big was about to happen was when I got a call from a staff officer at the 4-star command’s Resource and Sustainment (MNF-I Logistics).  They wanted me to look at a proposal they were working on that would plus-up forces in Iraq by five Brigades and a Division headquarters. The requirements required that all these units were to be located in or near Baghdad. I got this call on Wednesday, December 13, 2006 to report the next morning early for a presentation at the R&S staff building.

In the presentation, R&S staffers focused on the logistics aspect of this increase in units. By the next day, it became clear this was no simple staff plan to test patience. Word had come down from the highest levels – look at expanding the combat footprint. Somebody important wanted to know if such a concept was possible.

During the briefing, an R&S Navy Commander said, “Basing is a constraint but can accommodate up to five BCTs with a Division HQ in identified Coalition Force bases.”  At first, I thought he was joking. I also thought to myself that this was not going to be easy if the trigger got pulled.

Our Engineer staff was always busy with base consolidation, but this new planning directive kicked us into high gear. We continued with our base consolidation meetings, and on the ground, nothing changed as we turned over more bases. For the Engineer effort, consolidation had been our main focus. Now I also started looking into increasing basing capacity in the Baghdad AOR, who would do the work, where to bring in supplies from, and who could help us stay on track. My section at MNC-I C-7 Engineers would be responsible for that effort.

That evening, I took a few minutes to get some chow in the Dining Facility, and that’s where I met Bill O’Reilly. I thanked him for being here to meet the troops. He is a tall man, I guessed about 6’5”.

The planning we were doing was classified Secret – some parts Top Secret – which created a problem because it restricted my ability to determine the capacity of civilian contractors both in country and back in the states that could be pushed to us.  Clearly, no final high level decision had been made yet and this was not known to us at the time. We asked for more details to refine our planning efforts but received nothing of value.

In the meantime, I was in charge of both the Coalition construction and our Iraqi Reconstruction efforts. Another U.S. Army colonel, still in the U.S., was identified to assist me and was inbound to take over running the Reconstruction effort. Good news because Construction would be my main effort within C-7.

Then I got the news that Task Force Odin needed help and I got the call from BG John McDonald and that is a story for next time.

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Iraq War Pre-Surge: Oil & Gas

[December 11, 2024]  On this date in 2006, the Iraq War was entering a new phase. There was yet no new Army Operations Order, no special briefings, no new command guidance, or change in leadership. We would not even recognize this date for what would later become – the beginning of pre-Surge deployments of troops designed to destroy a growing insurgent threat. It all began with the Commander of the Coalition asking for a closer look at Iraq’s oil and gas infrastructure.

The “Surge” had not yet been formally announced, but there were indications that something big was on the horizon. We knew it had to be big, and it turned out we were right. I worked at the Corps level – Multi-National Corps Iraq – and even then, we were kept out of the loop. There was something brewing above Top Secret, and for now, out of our wheelhouse.  That would change in a few short days.

The first point I knew something was up was when Army Commander General Casey asked about crude oil and gas flows inside Iraq and offshore. His request was unusual but important because oil and gas flows were at the heart of Iraqi modernization and cultural development. Without oil and gas, there could be no modern world. This translated into electricity for nearly everything a modern economy needs, including transportation, storage, health care, and government.

I was informed by the Army staff that Gen. Casey was working with Iraq’s Ministry of Defense to see what they were doing to protect the oil and gas pipelines that were like arteries in an animal’s body. For the entirety of the war, these pipelines were a problem. They were attacked by both terrorists (outside jihadists) and insurgents (inside disaffected Iraqis) and the pipelines often leaked due to a lack of proper maintenance. Our frustration at what seemed like intentional sabotage by unknown “friendlies” was intense.

Fortunately, by this time, the majority of senior commanders and staff had considerable experience in Iraq, most having a year or more in country. Personal relationships had developed among the Americans, Coalition partners (including the Iraq Army), and Iraqi government officials. We all had a better understanding of our lines of authority (what we were allowed to do and not do). We also knew how it was possible to be misled by Iraqi officials at every level. Caution was important. Prudence was our watch word.

In the following days, an accurate picture of the oil and gas distribution system emerged. During that time we found that only the Five Eyes (FVEY) gave reliable information and turning it into useable intelligence. All other information was highly  suspect. Five Eyes is short for AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US Eyes only. However, I’d learned how to utilize Iraqi and other foreign nationals to gather accurate information, which most of my peers struggled to do.

The yet-to-be “Surge” was coming, and we would be as prepared as possible, knowing little about what this meant from a strategic or operational standpoint. This would become the most challenging assignment I ever undertook as an Army officer.

Over the next few months in my blog, I’ll run a series on the pre-Surge events telling the Engineer/Logistical story that should be told. It would be a credit to the combat units that ultimately destroyed the enemies of Iraq, but we set the stage for that victory.

NOTE: I arrived in Iraq for my second combat tour in July 2006 with considerable experience with Arabic culture and knowledge of Coalition strengths and weaknesses. I was assigned to the C-7 Engineer staff of the Multi-National Corps (the same staff I’d complained about in my first combat tour for being out of touch)  Upon arrival, I made sure that I created strong personal links with key Army (4-star), Corps (3-star), and Coalition staffs. Plus, I made sure I was connected to the special staffing groups that were part of each’s internal workings.

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THE END