[May 3, 2025] What we called our “Battle Rhythm” was the formalized daily cycle (or pace) at which the command staff, at all levels, worked. The idea was to synchronize future combat and support operations. It worked, but the effort was grueling, complex, structured, and generated a massive set of taskers that had to be cross-referenced and tracked. Staff section inter-communication improved up and down the chain of command and was an effective method for MNF-I, MNC-I, and subordinate Divisions. The commanders loved it; their staff, however, had to work hard to maintain the rapid pace. Our Battle Rhythm during the pre-Surge was huge, especially due to Engineering technical missions and the compressed bureaucratic timelines we worked under.
As I was re-reading my notes in OIF 06-08 Book 4 of 5 (yes, I was that particular tracking my logbooks) on April 4, 2007, I jotted down a military joke. At the time, I thought it was funny, but the humor in combat does not reach the same level we normally demand. It went like this: “How many pilots does it take to screw in a lightbulb? None. The wife always gets their house.” Ha Ha.
My mornings typically started with breakfast at 0600 hours; then, I walked to the C-7 Engineer Boathouse by 0645. The MNC-I Battle Update Brief, BUA, always began at 0730. This was a Secret Classified briefing; need to know, only. My day was filled with coordination meetings, information briefs, project plan reviews, future planning, and the big-time Engineer Reconnaissance of possible locations for inbound Surge troops. If there was no travel that day, I would end my day around 2200 hours, seven days a week. The bureaucratic wrangling over every detail was mind-numbing. Fortunately, I’d discovered ways to avoid my attendance at some meetings by sending some of the senior officers who worked for me. We were working on so many infrastructure projects that we used special computer software to track their status.
The Reconstruction effort – where I was a minor player as the Engineer representative – was taking up more of my time as the Government of Iraq started to gain its footing. Their government was designed on the Parliamentary Model based on a Federal Constitution. Coalition military members were smart to tune into the GoI’s government struggles; with the Iraqis having little experience with a Democratic process. Plus, the age-old religious tension between Shia and Sunni continued to raise its ugly head. Historians will write about how Iraq citizens hated America’s (read that as a Coalition) military occupation, but they hated themselves more and took out their religious zealotry on each other with deadly consequences. Around this time, we discovered another torture house. The Kurds in the north of Iraq were such a thorn in the side of the GoI that they largely gave up on the Kurds. And the Kurds thought that was just fine with them because at least they weren’t being exterminated. In Saddam’s time, he used WMD chemical weapons on some of their villages.
“Reconstruction” meant politics, and politics with the GoI was largely a guessing game requiring patience, smarts, diplomacy, bullying, knowing the Iraqi breaking point, and knowledge of cultural differences and norms. I attended the weekly Joint Planning Committee meetings in the International Zone, usually traveling in BG McDonald’s armed convoy. In the meeting on April 5, we discussed issues such as communications, linkages between the Coalition and the GoI, infrastructure problems and plans to resolve what’s broken (and it seemed everything was broken), political philosophy, project priorities, terrorism, violence, Iraq Police and Army development, economic development and investment, and plenty of ankle-biter problems that always seemed to dog us every time. ThebGoInwas being built from ground up,and it was fascinating to observe it in action.
Representatives within the Iraqi government Ministries would complain to us about their federal government and lack of response and shortage of money (often to get us to pay for what they were responsible to pay for). In one exchange, a Deputy Minister talked about the complaints of the Baghdad Amanant (a powerful position similar to a city mayor) that there was no cooperation and the Amanant marginalized them and suffered from “previous regime” syndrome. This wasted time and material resources. Another Deputy Minister complained about sewage drainage out into public streets and blamed this on American tanks ruining their roads. Of course, this had nothing to do with our tanks. They were trying to get us to pay for maneuver damage (like what happens in Germany). These Iraqis were good at sucking dollars out of the American government.
At the time, we were getting regular updates such as the status of Iraqi Special Forces (their most highly trained soldiers). We got their updates at the daily BUAs. The contrast between the Iraqi and the Coalition was stark. But we pushed back, saying their SF had to get more into the fight and bring an Iraqi hand to security operations. About this time, we were also getting Intelligence that both JAM (Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM, جيش المهدي militia) and AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq, القاعدة في العراق, militant Sunni network) were using Iraqi hospitals as Command and Control Headquarters, storage and staging areas, infiltrating the hospital’s staff, local security, as well as some medical personnel. Typically, we found this in Sunni-dominated areas and acted to control who gets treatment. They also use hospitals as weapon caches and centers for murder and intimidation. General O told us that Iraqi citizens were very afraid to go to the hospital.
The JPC was a wealth of good information for our warfighters (who I referred to politely as “door kickers”). I also found out that Iraqis knew that Americans in the Coalition Forces were doing a good job of cleaning out insurgents and terrorists in their assigned Area of Operation (Central). But it was rare for the Iraqi Army, United Kingdom (in the Southeast), the Polish military (in the Central and South), and Zytum (South Koreans in the Northeast) to do so. They were “more likely” to get killed or wounded than inflict losses on the enemy. I found this view of the Iraqis funny at the time. There was a time when I got a call from my counterpart, the UK Army, asking for help with Engineering design work because they were getting so much indirect and direct fire. Their personnel losses were unacceptable. I asked our J-3 for advice. He told me to tell the UK folks to get their butts out of their secure bases and do more patrolling and direct action. That’s how you stop the fires coming into their bases.
I was flying several times per week by U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopter to smaller bases in the Baghdad area for quick recons and for deconflicting engineering efforts. In one case, a KBR manager refused to do some simple earthwork to stop flooding that damaged an area controlled by the Iraqi Army. True, it was technically outside the scope of his contract, and I knew this. His equipment was idle at the time. I called the main KBR HQ to inform them about an uncooperative manager. He was replaced that same day and was on a plane back to America the next morning. This is how things are done: fix problems now and worry about minor technicalities later. Use common sense.
I wedged all this travel, reconnaissance, outside meetings, and planning into the MNC-I and C-7 Engineer Battle Rhythm. Honestly, this was the busiest I’d ever been in my lifetime for such an extended period of time.
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Please read my books:
Just like the Hamas terrorists that the IDF is fighting in Gaza.
“ About this time, we were also getting Intelligence that both JAM (Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM, جيش المهدي militia) and AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq, القاعدة في العراق, militant Sunni network) were using Iraqi hospitals as Command and Control Headquarters, storage and staging areas, infiltrating the hospital’s staff, local security, as well as some medical personnel.” They know to use certain places that Western values hold dear.
True. I wonder where Hama learned this trick?
This is why such Islamic terrorists or insurgents will always be in conflict with the West. They value little in the way of lives or property. They are Muslim and their religion is and will forever remain in opposition to Christianity and Western values. Gen. Satterfield called out Islam, writing that it needs an internal reconning.
EXCELLENT
Sir, thanks for continuing your series on the pre-surge of troops into Iraq during the war. Most books and articles focus on – very heavy on – the year 2008, when the surge was in full effect. But you are showing us taht the efforts to get to that point was significant, compels, costly, and methodical. Well done, sir! Please keep writing about this topic, we live it.
I agree with you Nick. I’m learning alot and in particular that youndontbjustbthrowmtroopsmintomanfight but that you’ve got to get the stage set first.