Iraq War Pre-Surge: SWET Services

[May 1, 2025]  One of our major challenges as an occupying military force in Iraq was to keep major SWET (Sewer, Water, Electricity, Trash) services online.  Back in 2005, a mere two years earlier, the 1st Cavalry Division developed operational tasks for its BCTs as we transitioned from primary combat to what is called Stability Operations. A combat force breaks things one day and then moves on to repair and replace key infrastructure that is an integral part of normal life. The acronym SWET was still being used by those of us with experience from our 1st Cavalry days, as it was an easy way of communicating to those new in this theater of war. Sometimes we added other letters to it like SWET-S, the last “S” standing for Security (Iraqi police and military). This is where we were in our pre-Surge Iraq War planning.

Iraqi culture, like much of the Middle East that practiced the religion of Islam, had a different view on how we build, maintain, and control large infrastructures that provide life-needed services. Iraqis did not maintain their equipment as Westerners do; in fact, they often ignored typical maintenance to the point of failure.  This applies to a local electrical generator in one small building, up to an entire power generation and distribution network.  For an Engineer like myself, this was frustrating, and no amount of convincing I could do seemed to change their behavior.

One example of frustration was our ability to provide electricity throughout the country. During Saddam Hussein’s rule, all electrical generation and distribution was centered on the city of Baghdad, and northern areas controlled by the Kurds were not even second priority but last to get their share. All outlying areas were subordinate to Baghdad’s power. We immediately changed this calculus in order to gain the support of the entire population. The residents of Baghdad did not appreciate this philosophy because they had more frequent outages. At one point, Baghdad was being cut off from power coming from the north. Coalition leaders thought this was a coordinated effort by terrorists to drive a wedge between the citizens of Baghdad and our occupation forces. In reality, the distribution lines were being cut by local governments so northern cities could stay online.

I was still working both Colonel staff jobs under C-7 Engineers – Construction and Reconstruction – and while Reconstruction would take a back seat in late 2006, that was about to change. As we progressed into early 2007, this build-up for the Surge (construction), the consensus by Army senior leaders was that we had to do both simultaneously. I would suffer for that decision as I was pushed hard to do both full-time, an impossibility. Furthermore, I had less knowledge about the high-level conversations being had behind the scenes between the Iraqi government, Coalition leaders, and the U.S. Department of State. When the weekly Joint Planning Committee met in the International Zone, I was the lowest-ranking member of the group.

One person on the JPC that I liked and discussed operational problems in common sense terms was BG Vince Brooks from the MNF-I staff. For example, BG Brooks said that he believed that water and sewer were bigger problems than electricity; he was right in my view. He was also concerned about what the impact would be on all the reconstruction (projects for Iraqis) efforts, how they are tied together as a utility system, which ones had no effect, and the wildly different views of Iraqi federal and local government officials. BG Brooks said we need to focus on success but also recognize there’s a bunch of it out there. We are now focusing more on systems and getting the Government of Iraq to participate (including paying for the projects).

The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE-Gulf Region Division) played an important technical role in the reconstruction effort. On April 2nd, there was a USACE meeting with their commander BG Mike Walsh, Mr. David Leach (who was the Deputy Director), Mr. A h Ed Al Saadawi (advisor to Iraqi’s Prime Minister on air and seaports), Mr. Shirwan Al-Wadi (acting Minister of Transportation ), and others to discuss Capacity Development in Iraqi laws and regulations, to support building out the nation. This would be one of the few meetings where I actually received valuable feedback on how the GoI perceived our reconstruction efforts. Shortly after my back brief to both my immediate boss at C-7 and to the MNC-I Chief of Staff, BG Joe Anderson, I would be formally tasked as the “C-7 Director of Facilities and Reconstruction.”  Exactly what I did not want, to have both these jobs simultaneously.

Of course, all this time, we were working hard on the pre-Surge effort while still not knowing where all these new units were going. On an early Wednesday morning, I made it a habit to attend a prayer breakfast in the Corp’s DFAC. This was going to be a good day, April 4, 2007. For the first time, I was to meet BG Ed Cardon, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the 3rd Infantry Division. Oddly, he was an Army Engineer in an Infantry slot, obviously chosen for his abilities. He was one smart dude and a great leader. He and I spoke at length several times but this one I made special note of in my Green Book.

He talked about his previous service time in Baghdad when his unit rolled up many terrorist cells (especially the IED makers) by allowing lower-level guys to go free and who they linked up with later. That way, the good guys were able to roll up higher-level terrorists and crush several cells completely because when you get higher-level guys, they squeal on their lower-level guys. That’s how you wind up getting all of them. He also spoke on how to teach terrorists a lesson not to come close to U.S. equipment by baiting them with a “damaged” vehicle overseen by a sniper team. Those getting into the vehicle were shot and killed. He said it didn’t take long for terrorists to figure out they had better leave the equipment alone.

This became a typical day. So much critical information flowed, and military lessons were learned that it was difficult to remember it all. My books, 1 through 5, are caulked full of unclassified information that I’m happy to have still in my possession. All three of my tours, documented in them, are a great read, as they take me back to the “old days.”

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).