[July 19, 2025] Taken from my 2021 book Our Longest Year in Iraq, I made a crucial distinction between “insurgents” and “terrorists.” To understand the difference makes us understand them better. In that we failed and regularly made no distinction between a homegrown insurgent and international terrorist. Both were bad but we owed it to our mission to know them.
There is one enduring military principle about victory on the battlefield. “Know your enemy and know yourself.” Millennia ago, an ancient Chinese general named Sun Tzu wrote that this was the only way to victory.
But we were slow to realize who our enemy was. Yes, we knew some of them, but we did not know or understand the culture that drove them. We assumed they had similar motivations and they were like us. We were wrong. The two basic types of enemies on the battlefield were the insurgents (mostly Saddam’s Ba’athist members, disaffected Iraqi citizens, and religious fundamentalists) and international terrorist organizations (like Zarqawi’s group, Iranian-backed Shia militias, and al-Qaeda).
Unfortunately, U.S. administrative policies helped create the insurgency and keep it alive. For example, leadership within the Coalition Provisional Authority wanted to empower Iraqi’s Shia majority at the expense of the formally dominant Sunni minority. That was a mistake at the strategic level. It would, however, take a couple of years before we realized it.
We needed to know our enemy to fight him. To those in the middle of the battle, there was no difference in who it was attacking us; they were the bad guys, period. We would use a broad-brush counterinsurgency tactics; the effect was marginal. At the time we could not figure out why, looking back from today, it starts to make sense.
The insurgency was made up of a mishmash of groups, primarily Sunni. With some effort, we could have turned them to our side. And two years later in 2006, that did happen in the western Anbar provinces. What became known as the Great Al-Anbar Awakening transformed one of Iraq’s bloodiest battlefields into its greatest success stories.
We warned our troops about being captured by insurgents, especially by terrorists. Terrorists were fanatics; the best fighters of the enemy, generally more experienced and were well trained. The terrorists were highly motivated to kill or capture Coalition members, especially U.S. forces. Terrorists were the most brutal, and they could not be reasoned with or turned. To them, it was an ideological war; they were on the side of Allah.
Coalition offensive operations had not ceased by early 2004. Unexpectedly, a brutal enemy sprung up to attack convoys, coalition bases, neighborhoods, and random people throughout most of central and southern Iraq. However, insurgents’ primary targets were Coalition forces – then known as the Task Force-7 and Iraqi Security Forces.
Terrorists mainly targeted Iraqi citizens and their Security Forces. Insurgents and terrorists saw Iraqi forces as collaborators with the Coalition and traitors to be dealt with harshly. The enemy would be a tough problem by March of 2004. Later, in 2005 the enemy would increase their attacks until January of 2007 when a “surge” of troops once again drove them to ground.
I told my team that if captured, our fate would be horrific torture and humiliation, and after gaining a “confession” of war crimes, they could expect to be beheaded. All this would, of course, be captured on video and shown the world over. We would fight to the death. The enemy would give us no quarter, and we would give them none as well.
At the same time, we respected the large population of Iraqis who just wanted to be part of their community and family and left in peace. Respect was easy to show, and we went out of our way to express the respect they deserved. We were in their country, and we wanted to encourage them to do what was necessary for a better Iraq.
Neither did we blame the Iraqi citizen for the insurgency; they were victims more than the cause. We would not hold them responsible nor shame them with collective guilt. They were the solution to a free and prosperous Iraq, not us. The military coalition was there to provide security long enough for them to get back on their feet.
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The insurgents were composed of a diverse mix of private militias, pro-Saddam Ba’athists, local Iraqis opposed to the MNF–I and/or the post-Saddam Iraqi government, and a number of foreign jihadists. The various insurgent groups fought an asymmetric war of attrition against the MNF–I and the Iraqi government, while also fighting among themselves. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraqi_insurgency_(2003%E2%80%932011)
I never gave this any thought at all. One more Nickel in my pocket of knowledge
Good read about what our troops did not know about the culture of Iraq (or of the Middle East). But tha t is something the leadership should have known and taught our troops and made it part of the campaign plan. This is what good leadership is about. And explains also why strategic errors were made early on that doomed much of what followed later.
Was it the Department of State that screwed this up? I think so. But that doesn’t alleviate what the Generals knew or didn’t know. They should not have relied on the “Experts.” That got us into trouble.
Thumbs up. Thanks!!!!!
👍👍👍👍👍👍👍👍
Educating the civilian public, good luck!!!!!!
Good distinction … I had no idea. 🕷🕷🕷🕷
Good thing I read this. I too find that also military personnel use these terms interchangeably and sow confusion in the ranks. They need to step back, and reevaluate their own words and when to be more specific. This helps those who work for us to also be more accurate in what we say. There is nothing worse than a miscommunication and even worse in combat.
Danny, great to hear from you again, and YES we all need to be precise. See this article by Gen. Satterfield on this same topic. “Leaders must be Precise in their Speech” https://www.theleadermaker.com/leaders-must-precise-speech/
Use language precisely, ensuring everyone understand both the intent and words that are being spoke. One way to do this is to make effective use of terms of reference, rehearsals, keeping things simple, personal coaching, and a host of professional tools that make the job of good communication more effectively. When working with people, even professionals, if something can go wrong it surely will go wrong. Clear, precise use of grammar and syntax, along with a common understanding of technical terms, is what good leadership is about.
I’ve found that most folks are absolutely clueless about this. So sad. And they wonder why things go haywire in their lives so often. 🔆
Good find, in that old article. Gen. Satterfield has been on top of this idea for a long time now. The reason, I think, is that he has run into it as a big problem.
That’s why so many of us read these comments. You might get someone like Tracey who remembers articles of the past. Also, you can use the website search feature to hunt down similar articles. This is a huge advantage when trying to do reasearch.
Thanks, Gen. Satterfield. We do need to be more precise in our speech. This is what good leaders do.