[July 25, 2025] That Wednesday morning began cool, with lightning, thunder, and rain beginning around 0230 hours. This was great for plants but hard on our construction efforts in the Iraq War. The reason was the mud, and not just any mud, but mud made of extremely fine particulate. It was stuck like glue to anything it came into contact with, and when the mud dried, it was difficult to scrape off. Like most Wednesdays, we began our day at 0600 hours with a Prayer Breakfast run by Colonel Rust. Our breakfast was to be the calm before the storm that each of us was about to enter. And our Facilities Section was losing Major Pat Wentz, one of our better and more reliable Engineer officers, who much of our efforts depended upon. In particular, his efforts to keep the main effort at Besmaya on track were crucial and later, that massive project would fall behind.
We would be increasing our need for water and electricity, and that stressed our capacity and pushed us to be innovative and be ready to make last-minute changes. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had its hands in large projects and helped with Engineer priorities. Donn Booker was my primary contact at the Corps, and he was the best man for the job. The Corps recognized his value, and around this time, he was promoted to SES (a rank of distinction within the civil service). I called to offer my congratulations, and he said that now he was to leave Iraq. His replacement was Colonel Lonnie Baker, whom I did not know.
Over time, we were to learn some interesting intelligence. For example, our combat forces were running into more “homemade explosives.” Finding more HME meant that our efforts to clean up UXO from the battlefield were paying off. HME is typically less reliable and less lethal. We also discovered that Saddam was paying the Sheikhs a salary as his way of co-opting them to his purposes. We would gain some mighty graphic and disgusting information on some of the worst and evil atrocities ever perpetrated on man. Someone, someday, needs to write a history of the fall of Saddam Hussein and the evils that we uncovered, and that starts with his use of WMD (chemical weapons) that killed thousands. The evil of that regime continues to echo throughout the Iraqi culture, exacerbating the tension between Sunni, Shia, and Kurds, and has led to a near-failed state and unthinkable violence. We had our suspicions confirmed that the New York Times and other major media outlets were paying “stringers” for video and news. The problem was that they essentially paid for propaganda. And, of course, they never checked with us for comment.
For a number of reasons, we began to fall behind our planned construction timelines (that were overly optimistic) at Besmaya and Taji. This was aggravated by not knowing the location of several combat units. I understood the need for OPSEC to protect the MNC-I Commander’s operational plans, but he trusted me enough to share that information. He didn’t yet know where he would need them the most. Basic Life Support efforts began to hold us back at Besmaya, a place far from most other unit bases and difficult to supply because transportation remains risky, fraught with insurgent attacks. General O told me that he was concerned that our Engineers didn’t have enough Route Clearance assets to protect resupply convoys and that we needed to get at it and up our patrols. I passed this along to BG Ken Cox, the senior Engineer and C-7 senior officer.
One big engineering issue was the need for electricity for the Iraqi population. Not only was the demand increasing, but the old model of electricity distribution was changing to create a system where more of the population had electricity. In Saddam’s time, all power generated went to Baghdad to keep it entirely in power. Any leftover power then went to other cities. These smaller cities experienced rationed power, sometimes none at all, during peak demand, like on the hottest days of the year. During the night hours, demand might fall, but it was not unusual for the temperature to not drop below 90-plus degrees Fahrenheit. One morning, my outside thermometer read 100 degrees at 0600 hours. Speaking with BG Brooks (reconstruction) in the Joint Planning Committee that Iraqis were “concerned” about the overall lack of power in Iraq. Some of our technical experts believed Iraq would, at best, not have full-time power until 2013 (another five years).
The Joint Requirements Oversight Council would play a significant role in overseeing reconstruction infrastructure efforts in Baghdad. Additionally, the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center, with which I coordinated (distinct from the Council), was heavily involved in the rebuilding efforts. The latter focused on power, sewer, and water systems. The Coalition Engineer effort that I ran was often in competition for the same resources, driving up the cost of contract work and materials, and slowing any planning to bring these systems online. The Center worked closely with the Baghdad Amanat and was successful in teaching the Iraqi government how to synchronize with the Coalition and internally with the GoI ministries. This was a success story because I was hesitant to believe Iraqis could do this at all.
From a weather standpoint and the most efficient months to get work done were starting to come to an end. May would arrive soon along with hot weather, and despite longer daylight hours, the heat was debilitating even for native Iraqis. We had under our knowledge that we had to get our pre-surge, base construction finished, or it would take us longer to complete any project. And, of course, there was the regular rotation of Coalition personnel, enemy fire, the Iraqi culture, political pressure, the MNF-I and MNC-I commanders’ push to be ready to accept new units, and a drive to get ‘er done that would constantly stress us.
————
Please read my books:
Ah, fresh off a great weekend at the North Carolina shore with my family and dogs. We just got home and after emptying the car and throwing in a load of wash, here I am reading about the inner workings of Engineers inside the Surge. Too many folks think this task is easy but they are the same ones who think anybody can be a soldier.
Welcome back, AT. 👍
🙏 Bless you, sir and thank you you for your Iraq War articles. 🙏
Yep!!!!
“One big engineering issue was the need for electricity for the Iraqi population. ” – Gen. Doug Satterfield.
This is one BIG problem for a modern world. We need cheap, realiable electricity. And most of the world doesn’t have it.
Sir, another classic example of pulling back the curtain on what goes on, out of site, that makes our war in Iraq successful on the battlefield. But, as we know, the strategic value was questionable. Is Iraq worth bringing into the 21st century? Or, should they have been left to suppress their own people and kill thousands of Kurds and other ethnic minorities. Now, no one has so far given a good answer to that question.
Great question, mainer.
Indeed another classic by Gen. Satterfield, but if you read his book, “55 Rules for a Good Life,” you will see that this is from his book! Of course, I love it and own several copies that I will be giving to my grandkids once they’re old enough.
—-
Let’s just say that Gen. Satterfield is giving the gift that keeps on giving.
—-
Hurray for reality which does have a habit of poking its head up. When Gen. Satterfield writes about the ‘inside’ story of the pre-surge or is the early part of the ‘surge’, then we know we are reading what real leadership is like. And most of it is personal network ties that is the oil that makes the bureaucratic machine continue to humm.
The BIG question that Americans will be asking for a long time is, “Was the Iraq War worth it?” That answer is going a to be not easy and we have yet to establish exactly what our goals were. And that is the crux of the problem.
Wow, must have been fantastic to be part of this great endeavor.
“The Joint Requirements Oversight Council would play a significant role in overseeing reconstruction infrastructure efforts in Baghdad. Additionally, the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center, with which I coordinated (distinct from the Council), was heavily involved in the rebuilding efforts. The latter focused on power, sewer, and water systems.” — Gen. Doug Satterfield. I was there!!!!! And I have the coffee mug to prove it. Ha Ha Ha Ha
I’m enjoying your series, sir. Thank you. I. Looking thru the lens of a different war but also a long way from home.
Same here, Army CPT. 🫡
Wow, keeping this series alive. Yep, things don’t always go,according to plan. Well done, sir, keep this going and us informed.
This is what I like to read, Susie Q, just like you……
“From a weather standpoint and the most efficient months to get work done were starting to come to an end. May would arrive soon along with hot weather, and despite longer daylight hours, the heat was debilitating even for native Iraqis. We had under our knowledge that we had to get our pre-surge, base construction finished, or it would take us longer to complete any project. And, of course, there was the regular rotation of Coalition personnel, enemy fire, the Iraqi culture, political pressure, the MNF-I and MNC-I commanders’ push to be ready to accept new units, and a drive to get ‘er done that would constantly stress us.” — Gen. Doug Satterfield. 🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡
The only folks I know that obsess over the weather are Weathermen and Military soldiers.
We call this “friction in war.” Things may seem simple but are actually very very hard. See this War College article.
https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/friction/
Friction in war refers to the unpredictable challenges and complexities that arise during military operations, making even simple tasks difficult and complicating the execution of plans. That’s what we’re seeing.
That’s great thank you for the education. 👍👍👍👍👍
The more I read this series, the better.
New signup here.
🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡🫡
Keep ‘em coming.
Sir, as an Iraq War vet myself, thank you for this peek behind the scenes into what I never even knew existed. All I was aware of, was that I had a CHU to sleep in that was air conditioning and had heat so me and my buddies didn’t have to always endure the harsh weather of the country. I’m glad I did my part and I know we planted the seed of democracy into some of the citizens of Iraq and now it is up to them to turn into the modern world or stay a 7th century tribal society. Which do they want? We still do not know.
I agree………
Great to see you back here, Anya.