[August 7, 2025] To this day, I firmly believe that America’s decision to enter a war with Iraq inside a coalition was the right decision. And it was the right thing to do, not because the government of Iraq was radically anti-American, or because it “possessed WMDs,” or due to its storied history of initiating wars in the region, or that it used its oil as a weapon, or because it was a radical Islamic nation – and that was all true – but because Iraq and other Islamic nations were exporting terror throughout both the Middle East and to the Western world. The world needed to see what happens when any nation works with terrorists to further their cause through recruiting, training, equipping, and directing cells of terrorists to conduct a campaign of murder and intimidation. The lesson had to be big and lasting. Ultimately, that’s what kept us in Iraq, fighting a protracted battle with insurgents and terrorists. The problem, however, was that this message was not getting out.
On Saturday, 14 April 2007, GEN. David Petraeus, commander of the coalition headquarters known as Multinational National Forces – Iraq, said at our morning BUA, “We need more media down to LTCs and Majors in the battle space.” It was pretty clear to everyone by this point that many Americans had turned against the war, and a more radicalized Democrat Party was taking this on to advance their political agenda and to wrest away power from their enemy, the Republican Party. General O said at the time, “[Media] networks are not really interested and have many self-imposed [Leftist political] restrictions.” The reason for the war, “the message” of why we were at war, was not getting out to the American people, and the reason didn’t matter, and it didn’t matter who was responsible for that failure. Having studied insurgencies and revolutions as military officers, we understood that messaging was just as important on the battlefield as an additional armored division, maybe more.
As for the coalition Engineer effort, nothing really changed. We were expanding our operations through the construction of new structures and by renovations of existing old Iraqi army buildings. One example was the request by KBR to use the BIAP aircraft hangars for their expanding complement of personnel. In my arena, there was a concern about keeping the funding separated and ensuring we didn’t exceed any MILCON thresholds and even whether these spending limits were applicable. Additionally, due to heavier use of roadways, utility systems, and other infrastructure, plus having to deal with the repair of oil and gas pipelines, we were being stretched. Our engineering capabilities were not being expanded at all, or in proportion to the increased combat footprint. This made our Engineer staff work harder since we were drawn into the systems analysis of utilities being undertaken by MNF-I. This utility systems analysis would frustrate anyone, as there were so many problems with old Iraqi construction and the cultural habit of not maintaining their equipment. And, of course, the age-old question of when we get the results, “Can we even do anything about it?”
A couple of days later, a small group of senior Engineers from both Army commands (3 & 4-star level), flew to Besmaya to get an on-the-ground check to see how our USAF Civil Engineers – a REDHORSE unit – and contractors were making out as they readied the base for an incoming Armor-heavy BCT. On this Blackhawk flight were BG Steve Anderson and COL Mary Whitworth, Kim, Pat, and me. We met up with COL Wayne Grigsby, the 3/3 HBCT commander, to get an update on the finishing touches needed to bring this base fully online. He said that he needed more RG-31s for route clearance, and RAID towers and “electronics” to reduce the manpower effort to secure the base 24/7. This meant most of his needs were logistical and not engineering-related, except to ensure he was adequately supplied with the Engineer-related equipment that he needed (like the RG-31s, concertina, and stakes). We were concerned that this new base had sufficient water and power. Water was short, and BG Anderson assured this commander that a regular run of supply trucks would carry enough water in the near future.
Sometimes, seemingly good ideas that do not work as intended in extreme environments never seem to die. A recommendation made to our Besmaya Engineers was to bring in military canvas tents and use a commercial foam to encase and harden the tent, about 10 inches thick. This would increase the ability to keep it cool and provide some minor fragmentation protection. I’d studied this months earlier as I worked with the commercial vendor. We were authorized to spend dollars on a limited and restricted basis, and a commercial product we thought might help. I rejected the proposal and explained why. The numbers promised could not be delivered. After I left the theater of operations, the good idea fairy appeared again, and the project was approved. What a waste of money and manpower. We were still operating at full speed. The Baghdad Bypass, ASR Aspen upgrade, Incinerator plans, the Anaconda hospital OHC, assisting MNSTC-I with technical engineering expertise for the Iraqis, uncooperative and inaccuracy of GoI MOIs, canal flows, Mosul Dam discussions, incoming firefighter personnel and tricks, and discussions on what to do about blatant and what appeared to be “media bias.”
While on my first combat tour in Iraq with the 353rd Engineer Group and as part of the 1st Cavalry Division in 2004-2005, I was right to note that everything seemed to be broken in the country of Iraq. Little had changed by 2007, and I concluded that this condition was a feature of a socialist-style dictatorship. One good thing was that our troops had figured this out and all our efforts were designed and built to be as dummy-proof and failure-proof as much we could make it. We overbuilt everything. Fortunately, the folks we had to work with in the military were exceptional professionals: technically and operationally proficient, brutally honest, and dedicated to getting the mission done under the most extreme circumstances. If not for them, the task to prepare the battlefield for incoming combat troops would not have succeeded. However, the message that we were doing good for the ordinary citizens of Iraq was lost.
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Please read my books:
Sir, again thanks for the inside viewing of the events leading up to the surge. We see this in other major military operations. I hope you eventually publish a book on it.
Sir, another great article on what happens to ensure success in a military campaign. “Preparation of the Battlefield” is what they call it in the Army. Well, in the US Army anyway. See this excellent article that supports what you say. “The 4 F’s of Fighting” https://www.artofmanliness.com/skills/manly-know-how/4-fs-fighting/
Editor’s note: The following excerpt was included in FM 21-13, an Army field manual published in 1952. As with all discourses on the art of war, it’s interesting both on a literal level, as well as in its applications to the practice of strategy and teamwork in endeavors beyond the battlefield.
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield.
Sir, well done, seeing the insides of how to establish your combat forces is something we never really get to see.
👀 Thank goodness for this series of articles explaining what happened before then”surge.” We would like to know.
The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb
https://www.theleadermaker.com/the-decision-to-drop-the-atomic-bomb/
Today is the anniversary of dropping the first Atomic Bomb on a civilization. President Truman authorized the use of the bombs on the nation of Japan. His decision, as difficult as he says it was, was the right decision morally and pragmatically. Anyone who argues otherwise is willfully blind to the circumstances leading up to that point in World War II.
Sir, I’m new to your blog-website and am enjoying reading such a wide-variety of articles daily. They are actually stretching my mind – – that is the point anyway. Thanks for that! This series, as I understand is new, really sparks my imagination. My problem is that I have no military experience or expertise in the history of warfare. And some if the acronyms baffle me, often. I went back to earlier posts within the series and found that helpful so I do recommend new readers start at the beginning of the series. Just a few comments as a newbie here. Well done! 👏
WELCOME
Welcome aboard, Larry.
Thank you, Gen. S. for the inside scoop. This is a story untold. You are the only one who is telling us a story that needs telling.
“Be Prepared”. Best leader advice……..
https://www.theleadermaker.com/best-leader-advice-be-prepared/
That is a fact.
More on Gen. Satterfield’s series that we should read and learn from. Success is not always flashy and wonderful.
Sir, this series of events as our engineers prepare for the incoming Surge is a story not told. IMO, the reason is simple, the Surge (or Preparation of the Battlefield) is never “exciting “ enough. But this is where the battle is won or lost. The fighting is where our attention lays because it is like a bright and shinny lure to the fish in the lake. They naturally go for it. But without having ypthat lure in the first place determines the basis of the catch.
So true, Dale. “Be Prepared.” Not easy or exciting but nonetheless necessary.
Dale … you got that right. 👍👍👍👍👍👍
We all should be paying close attention to this.
We are. Those who know leadership are reading this series closely because it gives us crucial info about what happens to ensure success. Whether on or off the battlefield, behind the scenes work must occur to set the conditions for a win. 🍺 As Gen. Satterfield says, “It’s Miller time.”
Read Gen. Satterfield’s book, “Our Longest year in Iraq.”
And let’s not forget.
“While on my first combat tour in Iraq with the 353rd Engineer Group and as part of the 1st Cavalry Division in 2004-2005, I was right to note that everything seemed to be broken in the country of Iraq. Little had changed by 2007, and I concluded that this condition was a feature of a socialist-style dictatorship. One good thing was that our troops had figured this out and all our efforts were designed and built to be as dummy-proof and failure-proof as much we could make it. We overbuilt everything. Fortunately, the folks we had to work with in the military were exceptional professionals: technically and operationally proficient, brutally honest, and dedicated to getting the mission done under the most extreme circumstances. If not for them, the task to prepare the battlefield for incoming combat troops would not have succeeded. However, the message that we were doing good for the ordinary citizens of Iraq was lost.” — Gen. Doug Satterfield