[October 8, 2026] Victor Davis Hanson’s September 28, 2026 commentary for The Daily Signal, “If Iran Cracks, the World Will Never Be the Same,” has a number of interesting ideas about our war with Iran. And, yes, it is a “war.”
Because of its length, his core ideas and my analysis will run in two parts. Today, in Part 2, I’ll give an analysis of the video. Part 1 can be found at this link.
Analysis
Hanson is right that day-to-day political noise hides structural change, and that Iran’s regime has been a real source of regional disorder; proxy wars, terrorism sponsorship, and a nuclear program. A collapse or forced settlement there would reorder the Gulf, Israel’s strategic position, and the Russia–China–Iran (and maybe North Korea) alignment. The fall of the Berlin Wall comparison that Hanson makes, shows how much he puts into the veracity of the fall of Iran.
- Hanson claims that China’s fertility rate is near 1.0 and its aging problem are real. China’s influence is waning.
- Russian casualties of 1.5 million dead and wounded sit at the high end of public estimates, but Hanson’s point is that the country can only take so much bleeding.
- In Latin America, many of these countries have moved politically right or center through elections.
- And, North Korea remains both an enigma and a hermit kingdom, doing more damage to their own country than anyone else could do.
The Iran cost-and-casualty case is the operational heart of Hanson’s argument. Forty billion dollars and 19 U.S. dead over roughly seven months, with no ground army, would be a radically different model of warfare from Iraq or Afghanistan, if those figures hold.
The “Anaconda” pressure can hollow a regime. It can also produce a harder IRGC succession, a chaotic fracture, or a last throw at Hormuz and the Gulf. Hanson notes the Hormuz risk. The 1989 analogy implies a relatively clean ideological defeat. Iran’s security services, oil geography, and sectarian neighborhood make a neat outcome less likely than he suggests.
Overall, this is advocacy from a historian who has long favored a Jacksonian reading of U.S. power, delivered as a positive support for American dominance. This is no small idea. It shows that we may be on the brink of a new style of warfare (primarily economic) and a rearranging of the Middle East.
He sees Iran as the remaining major obstacle: “We are one country away from flipping the entire Middle East.” In his view, the region is already changing; Gulf states have distanced themselves from al-Qaeda/ISIS-style extremism, cut subsidies, prioritize prosperity and security, and increasingly see Israel as “the enemy of their enemy” rather than an existential threat.
The Soviet-era influences, Saddam’s Iraq, and the Assad dynasty are gone; Iran’s theocratic regime (which he describes as having hijacked a civilization of ~93 million people for 50 years) is the last major piece.
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Good highlighting of VDH. He is a great historian. Sometimes, however, I think he is a little too biased on his thoughts on today’s conflicts. I do appreciate his ideas about WW2, as they have made me look to that war differently and in a better perspective.
If Iran is indeed the remaining major obstacle to a more stable regional configuration in which prosperity and mutual security take precedence over theocratic expansionism, then the capacity to act with clarity and resolve becomes a test of civilizational competence.
Bryan, I will also add that this raises the deeper question of whether Western societies retain the fortitude and hierarchical competence necessary to sustain such pressure without succumbing to the internal chaos of self-doubt or moral relativism.
Victor Davis Hanson makes a strong case that the steady pressure on Iran’s regime is more important than the daily headlines, and this Part 2 analysis by Gen. Satterfield correctly treats the situation as a real war rather than a limited dispute. Iran’s long record of backing proxy groups, funding terrorism, and pursuing nuclear weapons has kept the region unstable for decades, so a collapse or forced settlement would shift power in the Gulf, strengthen Israel’s position, and weaken the loose partnership among Russia, China, and Iran. Comparing that possible outcome to the fall of the Berlin Wall shows how seriously Hanson takes the stakes, even if a clean result is less certain in Iran’s case because of its security forces, oil routes, and surrounding sectarian tensions. The cost figures he cites (roughly forty billion dollars and nineteen American dead over seven months with no large ground force) would mark a very different approach from the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, provided those numbers hold up. “Anaconda” style pressure can weaken a regime from the inside, yet it can also leave a tougher military successor in charge, produce messy internal fighting, or trigger a final attempt to disrupt the Strait of Hormuz and Gulf shipping. Hanson’s broader points about China aging and losing influence, Russia bleeding heavily in its own war, Latin American countries shifting toward the center or right through elections, and North Korea remaining isolated all fit into a larger picture of changing global power. Overall the piece presents advocacy from a historian who favors a firm American use of power, and it points toward a new style of conflict driven mainly by economic and military pressure rather than massive troop deployments. If the regime does crack, the Middle East would likely look very different within a short time, with Iran no longer able to serve as a reliable base for groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. The analysis is careful to note that a neat outcome is not guaranteed, which is the right caution for anyone thinking about the longer-term effects of sustained pressure on a regime that has ruled for nearly fifty years. Readers who want to understand both the opportunity and the risks should keep following this series and the original Hanson commentary it examines.
Well said, LT. The Middle East is changing and let’s hope for the better. Their biggest problem is Islam.
I would like to read more about about how America becomes a more dominant power and how the ME is re-arranged.
Valkerie below does a good job of giving VDH and Gen. Satterfield a rightful pat on the back for thinking about the longer term ramifications of Iran’s collapse. What will that be? No one knows but America is betting on it happening with minimal impact on civilians (I doubt that ). Everyone in the West wants the IRGC gone. Well, almost everyone except the fat, stupid, neoMarxist crazy white women (who might want to move there).
Wesley, you made me nearly throwup my coffee. You’re funny as heck.
Victor Davis Hanson said on September 28, 2026, that if Iran cracks, the world will never be the same. This article by Gen. Satterfield is Part 2 of a look at his short video for The Daily Signal, and it treats the fight with Iran as a real war. Hanson is right that daily political noise hides bigger changes, and that Iran’s rulers have stirred trouble through proxy wars, support for terrorism, and a nuclear program. If that regime falls or is forced into a deal, the Gulf, Israel’s position, and the ties among Russia, China, and Iran would shift. Hanson compares the idea to the fall of the Berlin Wall, which shows how much he believes an Iranian collapse would matter. He also says China’s birth rate is near one child per woman and that its people are aging, so China’s power is fading. He puts Russian dead and wounded at about 1.5 million, a high number, but his point is that Russia can only bleed so long. In Latin America, many countries have moved right or toward the center through elections. North Korea stays a closed and hard-to-read country that hurts itself more than anyone else can. The heart of Hanson’s case is the cost of the Iran fight: about forty billion dollars and nineteen American dead over seven months, with no ground army, a very different model from Iraq or Afghanistan if those numbers hold. Pressure like a squeeze can hollow out a regime, but it can also leave a tougher military successor, a messy breakup, or a last strike at the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf. Hanson favors a strong American hand, and his talk points to a new kind of war driven mostly by money and pressure, plus a possible remaking of the Middle East, even if a clean ending is less sure than he suggests.