[October 9, 2026] One advantage of hindsight is being able to pull current historical documents and align them with what we thought we knew in the past. I am compiling a collection of notes on the Iraq War “Surge,” and I’ll later publish them as a manuscript.
That publication is targeted for next year, 2027. In the meantime, I’ll lay out some of the basics here on my website: https://www.theleadermaker.com. Everything here comes from open sources; there is no classified information.
The Iraq War “Surge” was a 2007 change in strategy and force levels inside Operation Iraqi Freedom, not a separately named campaign. The White House called the policy “The New Way Forward.” President George W. Bush announced it on 10 January 2007.
On the ground, it was executed mainly through the Iraqi government’s Baghdad security plan, Operation Fardh al-Qanoon (“Enforcing the Law”), which began in mid-February 2007. While it was a Coalition effort, there was no secret that American forces would do the heavy lifting.
What changed in the military strategy? President Bush committed “more than 20,000” additional troops. The package was five Army brigade combat teams aimed mostly at Baghdad and the surrounding belts, plus about 4,000 Marines for Anbar. Counting military enablers and the April 2007 extension of active-duty Army tours from 12 to 15 months, the real plus-up was closer to 30,000.
U.S. strength rose from about 132,000 in January 2007 to a peak of about 168,000 in September–October 2007. The five surge brigades were all in place by June 2007. Drawdown of those brigades started in spring 2008 and was largely complete by July 2008, returning the force to pre-Surge levels.
The point was not simply more battalions. It was a shift to population-centric counterinsurgency: clear, hold, and build, with troops living in joint security stations within neighborhoods rather than commuting from large forward operating bases. That doctrine was in FM 3-24, dated December 2006, which General David Petraeus helped produce.
The Command:
- General David Petraeus took Multi-National Force–Iraq on 10 February 2007, replacing General George Casey.
- Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno had already taken command of Multi-National Corps–Iraq in December 2006 and led the corps-level fight through early 2008. He later succeeded Petraeus at MNF-I in September 2008.
- The civilian counterpart was Ambassador Ryan Crocker.
- Iraqi political leader was Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki.
The force package was already being staffed in Baghdad in December 2006, before the President’s speech.
The five Army BCTs committed under the January decision:
| Brigade | Type | Arrival | Main area |
| 2nd BCT, 82nd Airborne Div | Infantry | January 2007 | Baghdad (under 1st Cavalry Division / MND-Baghdad) |
| 4th BCT, 1st Infantry Div | Infantry | February 2007 | Baghdad |
| 3rd BCT, 3rd Infantry Div | Heavy | March 2007 | Southern Baghdad belts |
| 4th BCT, 2nd Infantry Div | Stryker | April 2007 | Diyala; new Multi-National Division–Center |
| 2nd BCT, 3rd Infantry Div | Heavy | May 2007 | Southeast of Baghdad |
That took U.S. brigade combat teams in Iraq from 15 to 20. A later addition, 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division, went to the Kirkuk area in September 2007 and is sometimes listed as part of the Surge, but was not one of the original five. Marine reinforcements went to Anbar, where the tribal Awakening against al-Qaeda in Iraq was already underway from late 2006.
Iraqi forces were supposed to add three Army brigades in Baghdad, bringing the city to nine Iraqi brigades, partnered with the U.S. units.
A later decision pushed the 3rd Infantry Division headquarters into the fight to alleviate what would otherwise have been a difficult command-and-control mission for MNC-I.
The first months were costly. Clearing Baghdad and the belts drove U.S. and civilian casualties up before they fell. By late 2007, sectarian killings, car bombs, and overall attacks were down sharply.
The Army’s later operational history treats 2007–2008 as the period that broke both the Sunni insurgency and the worst of the Shia militia campaign and left Iraq more stable than at any point since the invasion.
The military gains outran the political ones: the surge did not produce the national reconciliation Bush had set as the aim, and the drawdown continued under the Obama administration, culminating in a full withdrawal in 2011.
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Thanks Gen. Satterfield for the layout and for this updated series that you started way back. I’m glad that you are putting this together as a manuscript. I don’t know what you intend to do with it at that time but I hope the Army gets it for their records.
The Pre-Surge. Somehow I don’t see how that is too exciting but necessary as the conditions would be set for the well-known Surge fight itself. As we all know, the Surge was very successful. That meant getting it all in place was a lot of work too and successful in itself. Gen. S. calls it the pre-surge.
Hey guys, let’s encourage Gen. Satterfield to turn this into a book, and not a manuscript for his bookshelf. We want to read the stories out of the “biggest engineer effort of the war.” And, of course, Gen. S was in the middle of it all.
Thins article by Gen. Satterfield does a clean job of separating the Iraq Surge from the myth that it was just “more troops.” Bush’s January 2007 announcement, called the New Way Forward, was a change in how those troops were used, not only in how many showed up. The numbers matter: the public figure was more than 20,000, but once enablers and the stretch of Army tours from twelve to fifteen months are counted, the real increase was closer to 30,000, taking the force from about 132,000 to a peak near 168,000. That detail is easy to miss, and it shows why slogans are a poor way to study a war. What actually changed the fight was the shift to clear, hold, and build, with soldiers living in the neighborhoods instead of driving in from big bases and leaving at night. FM 3-24 gave that idea a doctrine, and Petraeus and Odierno had the job of making it real on the ground while Maliki and Crocker handled the political side. The brigade list is useful because it shows the surge was aimed at Baghdad and the belts, not spread evenly across the country, with Marines reinforcing an Awakening in Anbar that had already started. The early months got bloodier before they got better, which is the part people who only remember the later drop in attacks tend to skip. By late 2007 the killings and bombs were down, and the Army’s later history treats 2007–2008 as the period that broke the worst of the Sunni insurgency and the Shia militia campaign. The harder point in the article is that military success ran ahead of political success. National reconciliation, which Bush had set as the aim, did not arrive, and the later drawdown and 2011 withdrawal left those gains without a lasting political settlement. A manuscript that stays with open sources and keeps the engineer and logistics side in view could explain why the surge worked as a campaign and still failed as a strategy for Iraq’s future. That is the real lesson here: force and doctrine can change a battlefield faster than they can change a government.
Nicely said, and spot on, Doc Jeff. So thanks. I like to think that General Satterfield will be writing a book in the near future, not just a manuscript. Either way, I would hope to read it. I am interested in the War with Iraq back in the 2000s because I had an uncle who served there (both Iraq and Afghanistan).
Good reason. Thanks Wesley.
Good luck, sir, with your newest project. I hope that it is part history and part your analysis of what was going on, at least at the engineer and logistics level. Many will think that is “boring” but in reality, this entire “preparation of the battlefield” is critical to the overall success.
I’m sure he’s all over it. General Satterfield is “DA MAN.”