Iraq War Pre-Surge: Bases and Dams

[August 11, 2025]  The weather in the latter half of April was heating up and our Engineer effort was as well. There is nothing like inbound American BCTs on a fixed, but secret timeline (I was on the “need to know” list) to motivate us. Our Engineer missions at a variety of bases, large and small, had to be finished sufficiently to allow BCTs to occupy their new bases with expanded and new facilities (various buildings, roads, utilities, and force protection). These bases were the anchor to GEN Petraeus’ strategy that rejected the previous “whack a mole” approach that did not work as intended. Petraeus wanted our troops to work from secure bases but also to get out more into the neighborhoods, to get to know the people and show them we were there for them, and to provide concrete, visible help on things the Iraqis said they needed. This strategy was similar to the Vietnam War idea to “win the hearts and minds” of the populace.

Then there were the dams. The U.S. Corps of Engineers had identified and studied the dams in Iraq and learned several strategic issues. The first is that whoever controls the dams controls the country. Large amounts of electricity are generated at these dams, and, in the past, the artificial lakes were also a source of water for irrigation of crops and recreation.  Approximately 90% of Iraq’s water originates outside its borders; thus, the capture of water from these sources was crucial for the supply of clean drinking water. In the arid climate of Iraq, water is king. This all meant that the Coalition had to be available to secure the dams and surrounding water areas and road networks. Mosul Dam is the largest, but it has serious structural issues. I was aware of the potential catastrophic failure back in 2004 on my first combat tour. I would this time brief GEN Petraeus on the impact if the dam failed. He was shocked to hear that potentially tens of thousands would die and that there was also a risk of losing Coalition lives. The plan to evacuate forces in the path of the water was to “get out of town ASAP.”  Get in your vehicles and leave. There would be little warning. And, where do you go?

It was hard to believe, but we were still closing some of the smaller bases, mostly in outlying areas of Anbar Province, where the terrorists and insurgents were not operating at the levels near Baghdad. However, the closing of these bases did not end the requirements to put combat forces where the enemy was operating, and this meant the construction of additional small Forward Operating Bases and the more primitive Combat Outposts (military) or Joint Security Stations (mix of Iraqi police and Coalition military). We were briefed daily on the expansion efforts that supported our troops, generally at the morning BUB (with a secret classification but regularly sourced to the New York Times and other similar large news organizations). The briefing for those attending was for Situational Awareness only. It was frustrating to read “secret” information being publicly distributed. I don’t know if they ever caught those involved, but I hope they did. If it were an Iraqi, the GoI would have tried and hanged them.

There were a number of strategic projects on the books, so to speak, that made a significant impact on our military operations. ASR Aspen, the Baghdad Bypass, tactical basing in COBs and JSSs, large incinerators, the OHC effort, American troop housing and recreation, Internment Camps and TF-134, T-Wall placement, and the Reconstruction Projects for the Iraqis, which were costing tens of millions each and were potentially multi-year, ongoing projects. We had to ask ourselves whether we were getting the right “bang for the buck” and if each passed the political smell test. Politics played a significant role, specifically any effort that made it appear the “Americans were staying permanently.”  I think most of us were aware, but at the same time, we thought the occupation of Iraq was temporary on its face. The only question was how long we were going to be there, and in early 2007, that answer was not known. The fact that the endpoint of the occupation was unknown and conditions-based was a good military strategy.  The setting of a hard date would be a self-inflicted blunder.  Later, President Obama would do precisely that, and we would withdraw in 2011.

IEDs and enemy attacks were a serious problem. The terrorists were truly evil and had no problem using mosques, hospitals, and government offices as locations to plan and stage from for the hit-and-run tactics. Weapons, extra food and water, bomb-making materials, maps, and an assortment of materials for their kinetic operations were useful. And their torture houses could be found there, too. They knew we were either prohibited from entering these locations or had to provide advanced notice. It’s not hard to figure out that our ROE was detrimental to the war effort. This is why politicians should not dictate military operational methods. More Iraqis and Coalition members died as a result than if we had been allowed to go where the enemy was hiding and damn the short-term consequences.

On the last Friday in April, a small group of us took our semi-annual APFT at 0645 hours. In my notebook, 4 of 5, page 144, I wrote “survived and passed.”  The temperature is on my lost APFT card, but it was likely around 35°C or about 95°F.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).