Iraq War Pre-Surge: Grains of Diplomacy 

[August 16, 2025]  Ordinarily, I don’t get involved in diplomacy as that is the purview of the Diplomatic Corps, the Department of State, and Flag Officers. I would get involved from the sidelines in what is commonly called “grain diplomacy.”  This term has historically been used to refer to the strategic use of grain exports or imports by countries as a means of promoting their economic or political interests.  One of the most famous examples of grain diplomacy dates back to the reign of the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius (161-180 AD). In order to gain the loyalty of the people of Egypt, Aurelius promised to supply the region with wheat at a reduced price. This grain diplomacy was a highly effective way to win the hearts of the people and was successful in securing the loyalty of Egypt to Rome.  Our DoS was interested in working out deals with oil, and that was the largest export market for Iraq, but there was always a need to import food, as much of the nation’s domestic food production had been interrupted by the war. My involvement in the Reconstruction effort, although at a minimal level, meant I could give formal recommendations. The most obvious was the restarting of existing construction and construction supply businesses, plus creating new ones, driven by the immense purchasing power of the Coalition.

Additionally, R&S under BG Anderson, MNF-I, and in partnership with experts from DoS, started the Iraqi-Based Industrial Zone (IBIZ). This program helped Iraqi entrepreneurs work with the U.S. military, providing secure locations on or near military bases for privately-owned businesses employing Iraqis. Technical training was provided to banks, and efforts were made to increase micro-finance institutions and access to capital. Agriculture, oil and electricity, infrastructure, and financial services were the main areas of effort. The number one problem to stabilize the Iraqi economy and implement reforms was security issues and complexities in transitioning the Iraqi economic structure.  By this point in 2007, improvements in business and government-supported basic services, like water delivery and policing, were marked by regular setbacks. There were, however, signs of gradual progress. For example, one measure of stability – power production – had nearly recovered since the U.S.-led invasion and would surpass that point in October. Local governments were better at collecting garbage and cleaning local parks and other public areas.  And oil production had already rebounded to pre-war levels.

There was a clear, observable difference in economic activity that we could see traveling about from base to base, both inside the city of Baghdad and outer, smaller towns, and in the open countryside. Irrigation wasn’t back online to pre-war levels, but the increase in crop production was rebounding. Like so many governments that hinder progress, the new parliamentary, representative democratic GoI was overburdened by self-inflicted bureaucratic bloat and inefficiency, political instability, and the legacy of a socialist command economy.  We were interested in getting ordinary Iraqis back to work because there was a direct link between unemployment and the radical insurgency. Stability Operations in early 2007 focused on revitalizing Iraq’s industrial base, particularly by restarting factories to create jobs and restore normalcy. Initial plans involved reopening 10 factories with funding from the Iraqi government. Despite these initiatives, challenges persisted in Iraq’s economic recovery this year. Growth remained slower than the “experts” at DoS expected, primarily due to limited oil production and sales, power generation, business expansion, and security problems. To illustrate, the effort to increase electricity generation – setting records – was successful, but the output was still less than half the country’s demand.

While this significant reconstruction effort was underway in a classic Stability Operations environment, our Coalition Engineers were working in parallel with a variety of organizations umbrellaed under MNF-I. I received a call from MG Jim Snyder, whom I’d got to know as the Fort Dix, New Jersey commander back in pre-9/11 days and who was now part of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO).  This was the organization that oversaw all those reconstruction meetings I’d been required to attend and had so many Flag Officers at the table. I would be tied closely to IRMO for all of my current tour (the slot was unfilled) because they were the ones tasked to focus on short-term development, as I was at the Army Corps level with MNC-I. IRMO folks had their hands full, as they also worked alongside USAID.  USAID concentrated on mid to long-term development. Eventually, IRMO would have its responsibilities transferred as the reconstruction effort evolved and increased. I would lose the guidance from MG Snyder when he left the theater. In a couple of weeks, I would be submitting my promotion packet to the General Officer Assignment Advisory Board (GOAAB) with the hope of getting picked up.

One of the advantages of working with so many skilled military and civilians in Iraq was the variety of senior personnel from around the world. One man who made a difference was MG William Berragan, British Army, and the DCG of MNC-I. He had arrived in January this year and would be part of the planning and execution of Operation Phantom Thunder, which would kick off in mid-June. The units involved were part of the early arriving troop surge that we expected, such as 2/3 HBCT and 3 CAB in the Baghdad AO and 13 MEU out west. He was also one of the Flags in the JPC working on reconstruction. His comment to me was, “We don’t have much time (by the end of the year) to make a difference.”  He was referring to GEN Petraeus’s guidance to make fast ” shorter-term impacts where people will notice right away, and this includes employment.”  He also acknowledged the terror ”threat to sewer and water was less than to power, where someone stands something to lose.”  The short version was that we wanted to have the ordinary Iraqi civilians notice that the new GoI and our military presence were beneficial to them personally. MG Berragan would help me get around much of the Army-level MNF-I bureaucracy, substantially saving me time. This reconstruction and construction effort was hard, and having a 2-star Flag helping was a godsend.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).