Iraq War Pre-Surge: Reconstruction

[November 27, 2025] The Coalition Engineers would become more involved in the Iraqi reconstruction effort than perhaps originally planned. Reconstruction was meant to be an international effort, but that too failed to materialize. There was plenty of talk among diplomats and large businesses that wanted to participate in rebuilding Iraq, yet most of their efforts never got off the ground. The primary focus was on economic reform, mainly to repair and upgrade Iraqi water and sewer plants, with electricity production (by far the most crucial), hospitals, schools, housing, and transportation systems also on the agenda. This massive undertaking was to be funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Because it was highly infrastructure-driven, our in-country engineers—mostly U.S. Army personnel—were the ones our diplomats and commanders relied on. This is where the Corps of Engineers proved most valuable, and yes, they managed to get work done, but they were slow, costly, and hampered by bureaucracy. I can understand why so many senior officials in Iraq, the U.S., and the United Nations grew frustrated. The reasons for these efforts falling short included poor security in Iraqi neighborhoods, corruption within the Iraqi government and private sector, inadequate funding, and terrible coordination among international organizations. I also believe that most of these well-meaning organizations did not fully understand the country of Iraq.

Baghdad is the capital city, and what happens there influences the rest of the country. If Baghdad catches a cold, Iraq gets pneumonia. In April, Gen. Petraeus said that “Reconstruction in Baghdad has not been a good news story.” I observed this in the JPC Executive sessions I attended. The approach to restore Iraq through our reconstruction efforts was based on “[proper] synchronization and allocation of resources.” That was obvious. But, was the JPC getting enough ‘bang for the buck?’ All those Flag Officers present seemed to think not, yet they couldn’t quite pinpoint the problem. The issue was the struggle to define success and then measure it accurately. For example, BG McDonald argued that using employment as a success measure was wrong because the real focus is on whether we are restoring essential SWET services. There was also an understanding that there was little time to demonstrate progress—an urgent political issue. MG Berragan once noted, “We don’t have much time [by the end of 2007] to make a difference,” echoing what GEN. Petraeus had already been telling him. During one JPC Executive session, several questions revealed how much conceptual work the JPC still needed to do.

• What kind of difference can we make over next year, especially this year?
• What is it in the reconstruction arena?
• What is the metric that shows success?
• How many markets are we hardening [improved security]?
• Are there certain districts in Baghdad where work can be done that affects the most people, and in what time period?
• Can we establish a handful of major projects in each of the few select security districts that will help the most people?
• What does success look like?
• Can we do it in six months, by the end of this year?
• Can we have measurable progress by August [when the “surge” begins]?
• What’s the strategy to do this?
• What is our Information Operations campaign?

Certainly, the Coalition construction efforts and operational-level combat also affected how reconstruction impacted the average Iraqi. The issue with ASR Aspen was a clear example. Both Coalition forces and civilian traffic used this main artery and many other major routes, all maintained by Coalition engineers. There was expected to be a significant increase in traffic on this failing ASR due to additional inbound military forces heading north and improved economic conditions in the country. Furthermore, we began experiencing more spot shortages of materials, which impacted both construction and reconstruction initiatives. Essentially, we were competing with ourselves for materials, equipment, and manpower. I had seen this happen before at the start of the occupation in early 2004, which I documented in my book “Our Longest Year in Iraq.” Our engineers were also working with private contractors to train them in modern construction techniques and to show them how to protect themselves from insurgents and terrorists while operating outside the wire. Iraqi construction work was inherently prone to failure. To complicate matters, our higher command was often reluctant to give us input on which areas they wanted to close down or expand. This was frustrating because the entire country of Iraq functions as a connected network, where one project in a city can influence another project nearby.

This was discussed in a 2007 analysis by GEN Barry R. McCaffrey after his visit to Iraq in March of that year. He presented evidence of the dire situation in Iraq before the change in strategy known as the “surge.” Although there were many positive accomplishments, what was the way forward? Iraq was experiencing a low-grade civil war that had worsened since the invasion concluded in April 2003. Up to 3,000 Iraqi citizens were murdered each month by a small number of foreign terrorists and a few thousand Al Qaeda insurgents, who targeted innocents with suicide bombings and known torture complexes. Coalition forces faced attacks of up to 2,900 IEDs per month, along with rockets, mortars, snipers, and mines. Three million Iraqis had been internally displaced or had fled the country, mostly the educated elites, causing a serious brain drain that threatened the country’s ability to govern. As we know, no government function operates effectively nationwide—health care, justice, education, transportation, electricity, oil production, and especially security. The Iraqi Army remains too small, poorly equipped, dominated by Shia, and lacking discipline and training. Things indeed looked bleak. Additionally, U.S. domestic support for the war in Iraq had vanished and was unlikely to return. This was our reality and the environment in which we had to operate.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).