Iraq War Pre-Surge: the Army C-12

[December 26, 2025]  I had been frustrated to no end by the progress of our preparation for the Surge. The pre-Surge construction planning, design, funding, contracting process, and eventual construction weren’t meeting what I thought was sufficient to accommodate the incoming personnel or equipment. Plus, we were late on the timelines. One of the areas I detested was TF-134, commanded by MG Garner, who rejected all my recommendations. I think he was most upset when I said he had insufficient details to explain any large increase in the projected number of detainees that would result from the Surge. He departed the theater shortly after we spoke. It was May when U.S. Marine MG Doug Stone took command of Detainee Operations, TF-134. MG Garner had gone to his next assignment, although that was not my interest. I was glad he had been replaced. That’s just what I needed. One of the first people MG Stone spoke to was me. I can only assume his staff told him what was going on, and they did not have the expertise to expand detainee facilities without my assistance. Money wasn’t the problem. Their lack of oversight and expertise in detainee facility design was the issue. Additionally, they could not figure out how the contracting process in Iraq worked; mostly because they had zero experience with Foreign National civilians who would ultimately be doing the work. Expanding any facility, by this time, was a fairly easy effort, but only if a small group of military engineers had the experience, motivation, and means to fulfill the expectations of the MNC-I Commander. The solution to the tentage problem for detainees was decided by using 667 forty-foot shipping containers.

I had a number of discussions with MG Stone about detainee operations and design concepts, and the obstacles to both.  Right away, he did something surprising.  He admitted that the Bucca Model of detainee operations did not work and was able to verbalize why.  For example, the tents where detainees lived were being destroyed by fire and other physical damage, and ECUs were also being sabotaged, along with items needed to operate a tent.  He said there needed to be some kind of internal structure.  The Bucca model has no cages within the tents, and the detainees, for the most part, are allowed to roam freely within their compound.  Further, what ignited the detainee riots that had plagued MG Garner was complex but surely included the hopelessness of most detainees, with no hope of being released and broken promises by the U.S. via TF-134.  Apparently, under the previous command structure of the TF, many promises made to the detainees, or to their spokesmen, were broken.  This included fresh pita bread, sliced cucumber, legal representation, and the mandatory release of the young, old, and infirm, and at least one male member of a household.  Obviously, not all these promises could be kept, such as providing cigarettes and matches.  He told me that he didn’t want the detainees to think they were dictating terms to him; MG Stone dictates the terms.  We agreed that some form of CMU construction was needed, fast and strong.  Camp Taji had many examples.  I told him that I could make this happen, but I was limited by other duties in the pre-surge effort, slow helicopter movement, and long request times.  That’s when he said that I could have full access to his U.S. Army C-12 aircraft to travel anywhere in Iraq.  Now, that would make anyone in my position sit up and take notice.

While waiting for MG Stone to make decisions about the way ahead for TF-134, I was busy with a long list of complex issues we had to resolve. This included the normal turnover in staff across all the organizations I worked with so closely. There were also issues related to maintaining the organization and correcting problems from the past. In one case, I was contacted by SFC Jimmie Stewart, who had been one of my enlisted Engineers during my first tour with the 353rd Engineer Group. He had been denied the newly created Combat Action Badge. I pulled out my green notebooks from those times (good thing I brought them with me on this combat tour) and wrote a Memorandum for the unit stating exactly when and where SFC Stewart and another dozen or so 353rd members had come under enemy fire (a requirement for the CAB). As a side note, a few days later, he and these Soldiers were officially awarded the CAB at a special ceremony in the states. Although I was busy, working around 90 to 100 hours per week, I still made time to do a few things for myself. I gained permission to visit one of Saddam’s palaces at Camp Slayer, within the Victory Base Complex. I had heard that this was the building attacked at the start of the war, labeled a leadership decapitation strike. American Intelligence had determined that a large contingent of senior Iraqi military leaders and politicians was meeting there when a JDAM destroyed the meeting room. The JDAM didn’t miss, but the Iraqis were not present.

One of our major projects was what we called the Anaconda Hospital project.  This hospital was located at Balad Air Base, Iraq, approximately 40 miles north of Baghdad, in the Sunni Triangle.  We originally called it Camp Anaconda, then LSA Anaconda because its location was crucial for resupply of Divisional AOs north of Baghdad.  It was also the largest base in Iraq, second only to Victory Base Complex in Baghdad.  At the time, Balad was one of the busiest airports in the world, with more than 27,000 takeoffs and landings per month.  The original Army Combat Support hospital was a tent structure on concrete slabs, much like most of our hastily established medical facilities; a few had only hard-packed dirt floors.  The op tempo was so high, with casualties, that the decision was made to build a CMU structure.  We estimated the new hospital would cost $32 million with OHC.  The actual award cost was $21-22 million.  I later learned, well after the Surge, that the tent hospital drew the attention of some members of Congress because it was where the most lives were lost and saved in the Iraq theater of operations.  ER Bay II was preserved for historical purposes and, in April 2008, was shipped back to the National Museum of Health and Medicine in Washington, D.C., where it was open for exhibition.  More American blood was spilled here since the Vietnam War.

U.S. Army LTC Andy Knights from ARCENT Engineers had been helping us navigate the bureaucracy and secure project approvals at the CENTCOM and Congressional levels. He also encouraged us to use Contingency Construction Designs, particularly the hospital package they contained. We could access these plans on the TCMS website. I was hesitant because our design engineers could now work darn fast with their own new designs. We continued to fight to raise the MILCON thresholds in the warzone “contingency environment.” Why we should have to hold to Congressional peacetime limits in an active warzone was something that gave me problems during my time in Iraq. I’d advocated for eliminating the upper limits, but was told that Congress would never allow it. This is how Congress kept some control over a wartime President, by limiting his spending power. This is why we study American history. In 1907, President Teddy Roosevelt sent our Great White Fleet on a global voyage without Congressional approval, a bold move that showcased American naval power and demonstrated the political strength of the president. We had unintentionally intruded on the limits of the War Powers Act.

Two days before my 55th birthday, on 20 May 2007, I began my countdown to departure from Iraq. Seven weeks to go. The countdown wasn’t to turn me into a “short timer” looking forward to leaving a combat zone, for whatever reason, but to help me stay focused and work on construction so there would be little for my replacement to do. He would be new, and it would take months to come up to speed because of the job’s overwhelming complexity, and it would be nearly impossible to make any difference before the Surge arrived. That meant all the plans, funding, and contracts had to be in place before I was to leave in early July.

NOTE: Over the next few weeks, I’ll be pushing to finish my series on the Iraq War Pre-Surge.  I’ll compile it all into a book of pictures, my testimony, and a written/photographic record of this second of three combat tours in Iraq.  With some luck, I’ll finish this project before mid-February, then send it to the publishers.  As a reminder, I will not be putting this into book form for public consumption.  The only place to find it will be here on my website.  I have considered making it available for download in PDF format.  I haven’t made that decision yet.  If readers would like to provide input, please do so.

————

Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).