Iraq War Pre-Surge: KBR & LOGCAP III

[December 27, 2025]  May 22 came and went without much fanfare.  It was indeed my 55th birthday, but little more than a blip on my mind’s radar.  I scribbled “birthday” at the top of my notes.  That was it.  In a way, it was a day to reflect on what Engineers lacked to complete our jobs on time and on budget.  The day began with a trip to R&S at MNF-I to hear a Logistics briefing—the usual information on hazmat, firefighting, CCA projects, and the SOW for road repairs.  The LOGCAP meeting later in the day mattered most.  Specifically, we discussed O&M building repairs and maintenance.  We had 49,000 buildings, 99% of which were level A, and 10,000 O&M workers.  That was nuts.  Why have a classification system when every building was a high priority, and there were insufficient workers to get ‘er done?  The answer was simple.  The loggies didn’t want to piss anybody off, so they allowed every building to be at the “top” of the list for improvements. Major changes were on the way, and we needed to be ready.  LOGCAP IV was coming, and it would have a significant impact on how we conducted business with O&M contractors.  We used KBR as the largest and most capable contractor in LOGCAP III, and for that reason, we established a close working relationship with them.  However, I would remind myself often that they were there primarily to make a profit.  This did color our relationship.  The advantage to using KBR was their ability to rapidly expand, when needed, their experienced workforce at a location of our choosing.

Under the LOGCAP contract, KBR provided a broad range of logistics and support services to U.S. and allied forces during the Iraq War, but notably, not new construction.  LOGCAP III had been competitively awarded to KBR in December 2001.  MNF-I was the lead in creating Working Groups that would gather to discuss how the new LOGCAP IV would continue those services forward, as well as authorizing new construction.  The reason, as I understood it, for migrating to a new LOGCAP contract was that Congress believed KBR had a monopoly-like stranglehold on the government and was charging exorbitant prices.  That was true.  However, I know that Congress also had no clue what it takes to create a flexible, highly responsive company that can change direction quickly and without failure.  KBR was the proper organization.  Under the new LOGCAP, the directive was that three major contractors would compete for different parts of the LOGCAP program.  Eventually, these turned out to be DynCorp International, Fluor Intercontinental Inc. (with which I had already had a minor working relationship), and KBR.  This would come true in April 2008, nine months after I departed the theater.  In the meantime, I was selected as the Engineer representative to provide input, as I was the point person for the use of KBR in O&M services for the U.S. military.  We met in the early evening hours, and I was unhappy about that.  My day was long, and by that time of the day, thinking was difficult.  Heat, stress, and physical activity took a brutal toll on the ability to think clearly.  I asked to be excused from the duty, but the request was denied.

By late May 2007, the top Engineer issues were:

1. Lack of responsive construction authority in theater (MILCON thresholds, CCA, ADA violations, OPA).
2. Lack of adequate construction Engineers and engineer equipment, senior leadership, and project programming skill sets (made worse by troop Surge).
3. Lack of true, specific, across-the-board construction standards and buy-in from leadership up through Congress and the Secretary of Defense.  “Temporary” versus “Durable” construction (Tent vs. CMU).
4. Lack of money, personnel and equipment, especially on environmental programs.
5. The quality and timeliness of the Gulf Region District, which has provided major civil and military infrastructure projects.

Our biggest issue going forward was the planning for future basing, including the Surge basing, as well as additional Coalition basing increases in infrastructure and security protection.  The issue of more and larger bases, or the alternative to closing bases, remained complex, primarily because we did not know our future plans for the war.  Were we staying?  Probably (since the Surge was inbound).  Or, were we leaving?  Unlikely (but Congress’s resistance to the war was increasing).  We were still pushing OHC, a costly solution to indirect fire.  OHC was an indicator of future basing; the more OHC that was funded and built, the more likely we were to stay in Iraq.  In line with our unknown future, III Corps (which made up the core of MNC-I) was planning for a RIP/TOA in August.  I’d be gone by then, but I had to prepare our Facilities section anyway.  This included ongoing concerns about incinerators, the IZ to VBC transition, USACE progress, KBR Task Order concerns, UXOs remaining on bases, crumbling MSRs and ASRs, physical infrastructure for the base perimeter & ECP security, and the perennial issue of working under peacetime rules in a combat environment.  I would brief more CODELs on this number one issue holding us back, and I always got empty promises they would do something about it.

At the end of May, the weather turned from warm (under 90 degrees) to hot (soaring above 110 degrees).  One type of incident I never saw was a heat injury, regardless of the heat.  Thanks to our troops being in great physical shape and the preventative measures taken by our NCOs, these injuries were few – a good news story.  May was also the time that terrorists started to shift their tactics.  Insurgents were already attacking infrastructure.  Terrorists shifted to attacking Iraqi and Coalition infrastructure because this was a visible way of showing their power.  I also think the reason was that the terrorists figured out that the best way to drive us out of the country was to convince the ordinary Iraqi that our efforts were failing to make their lives better.  Killing the citizens was not working.  This new tactic came at a time when we were working on more and more large-scale civilian projects, such as water and sewer plants, electrical generation and distribution, etc.  Part of the problem was that we were using “outside” contractors, meaning either foreign nationals (typically Middle Eastern) or those from northern or western Iraq.  The first solution of these outside contractors was classic; just bribe the terrorists to leave us alone.  Bribes only made the terrorists stronger.  The solution was to use local contractors, who were from the area.  The Government of Iraq supported this latter solution, and of course, they would, as they were on the receiving end of many bribes.

NOTE: I know I’m writing in some detail about what went on in MNC-I infrastructure development, and that many readers may have little interest. However, I suggest that they look for specifics on how we operated and the intelligence we gathered.  For example, the changing tactics of terrorists was a game-changer.  Thanks for reading this series.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).