Iraq War Pre-Surge: the IED Hunters

[December 29, 2025]  Daily high temperatures were hot.  On Friday, 1 July, it was 108 degrees F, with dust, wind, and haze.  It was going to be another Groundhog Day in Iraq, but our Engineers were ready.  We started our Fridays with a team sport, and this morning it was volleyball beginning at 0600 hours.  By the time I got cleaned up and ate breakfast, and went to my office in the Engineers’ Boathouse, it was pushing 0800 hours.  We would have our standard C-7 staff huddle.  The main topic was, of course, our status for the upcoming Surge.  I had just over one month to go on this one-year combat tour and so it was time to check off a few things that any good Engineer would want to do, given the circumstances.  For example,  I made arrangements to go along on a mission with an Engineer Squad to observe an IED hunting mission.  The new MRAPs – on this trip, an up-armored and caged Buffalo – were a marvel of technical engineering.  I remembered my early combat tour when we had created the first IED-hunter teams, composed initially with cooks and HMMWVs (the early version with add-on armor).  The mission had not changed since 2004, but after nearly three years, the task was assumed by our Engineers and we had a new MOS for it.  Our Soldiers were training at Fort Leonardwood, MO, home of the U.S. Engineer School.

Part of the MNF-I Surge meeting at the Al Faw Palace, included the 3rd Infantry Division, the unit which would provide C2 for the many BCTs and support elements that would soon be in the fight.  The VTC was classified Secret and included the primary staff from MNC-I and MNF-I.  The discussion ranged from where the 3ID units would possibly go, including out West and North, from Q-West to Mosul.  I had already traveled to these locations to determine whether those many locations could support incoming Surge units.  The short answer is they could, most without much additional infrastructure development.  The 3ID CG’s concern, that affected our Engineers, was the development of proper housing for the inbound troops.  I reminded both the 3ID commander and his ADC for Support – BG Cardone – that we would be ready but that the conditions would be “austere,” just as I had back in early February when we had last spoken.  The commander wanted CMU construction for his 3ID headquarters but I explained how that was not possible, if they were coming to Victory Base Complex, and, yes, they were coming here to Baghdad.  There were simply too many troops in too little space, without much heads-up (initially, we were told there would be no divisional HQ as part of the Surge).

While the inbound units were on an unalterable timeline, we were still playing around with the final estimates on the number of new detainees which the TF-134 would be required to secure.  The final number we agreed upon was 50,000 detained by American forces.  Results reported in 2009, showed that the peak number would be roughly half that figure, at 26,000 in October of 2007.  We had no way of knowing this and planning for the larger number was the correct decision.  MG Stone, at the time, had no idea that the majority of those who we would capture were involved in anti-Coalition actions because they needed the money paid by the real insurgents; few were doing it for ideological or religious reasons; a surprise finding.  Nevertheless, the “long pole in the tent” for comfortable detainee and troop living facilities was electrical power.  Already we had temperatures over 110 degrees F and it was only May; by late July and August the temperatures would exceed 120 degrees.  Without power, people could not live and troops could not fight for long.  We were creating generator farms, and exploring new ways to both purchase more large-capacity generators, and get them to produce at higher rates of efficiency.  We were buying so many large generators on the international market that we began to compete with ourselves, driving up the price and creating an artificial shortage.  At a TF-134 meeting that afternoon, I was informed that GEN Petraeus had approved the MILVAN solution (CONEX containers) in place of the legacy tentage; at least at Bucca.

I was up early at 0330 hours on 3 June for a report time of 0415 hours to “observe” the IED hunters in action on a “ride along.”  A Company, 130th Engineers (Puerto Rico) was the unit to host me.  This was my first and only Route Clearance mission.  Nearly all Coalition Engineers killed or wounded in Iraq are from RC teams.  There was no problem on this mission that took place on the southern side of Baghdad, a “safer area.”  That same day, we worked to finalize proposed barrier priorities (which we observed frequently on the RC mission).  Most of the senior staff thought barriers were mostly for protection against indirect fire, but that was not the case.  The priority was to mobility where we used these barriers to block traffic and channel Iraqi civilian vehicles into areas we could control.  Plus, the barriers would provide some protection against direct fire on convoys moving along MSRs inside Baghdad.  Second priority was protecting Joint Security Sites, then safe Iraqi markets, gated communities, Combat Outposts, LSAs, and then force protection (ASP/ATHP protection).

We spent the next few days insuring that the work to expand the infrastructure was going according to plan.  I couldn’t trust most of the civilian construction and renovation work on U.S. facilities, with the exception of KBR’s O&M.  I was so busy traveling around the country that I just didn’t stop to see how well or not KBR was doing.  I relied on my staff to report any problems.  I found that contractors from the Middle East were generally good workers but the owners and managers tended to grossly exaggerate their progress.  This meant in-person checking and that is what I did.  I could have tasked a junior officer with these duties, and I did but rarely.  In-person inspection meant that the contractors knew I would personally hold them accountable, and it worked.  But we were working on non-Surge infrastructure as well.  The Muthanna Bunkers, IZ to VBC transition (which complicated the Surge build up), a new Fire Assessment (to include bringing in civilian Fire Fighters, updating Master Plans, well-drilling where water was especially scarce, a MNC-I RIP/TOA, WTP and WWTP plant analysis, PX upgrades, incinerators for trash and medical waste, and then we were informed that GEN Petraeus was to kick off his Surge offensive now!  At the briefing to LTG Odierno, MG Stone presented me with a plastic “detainee” challenge coin for my work; yeah.

Destruction of the chemical weapons at the Muthanna Bunkers remained a topic of discussion.  We were trying to come up with a solution that was faster and cheaper than building bunkers to temporarily seal them up (COA 1).  We did not want the bad guys to gain access to them.  Of course, doing nothing (COA 2) was not really an option.  The MNC-I C-3 (COL Murray) wanted a COA 3 which it was proposed that we ask the USAF to use a JDAM or incendiary bomb to destroy them.  At least he was thinking out of the box.  We would have been hunting down these already weaponized as 155mm artillery rounds for years with that solution.  Because my tour was coming to an end very soon, I was consumed by an increase in paperwork.  I made recommendations for various senior staff members to get the coveted U.S. Corps of Engineer Bronze de Fleury medal.  This included several of our Australian colonels who were Engineers in our shop.  Plus, I wrote awards for both officers and enlisted.  I could have farmed out this task, but I was more knowledgeable on what these troops did and I had a track record of getting all my submissions approved.  I would be busy up to the moment I got on a C-130 to fly out to Kuwait in early July.

NOTE: This Pre-Surge article is one of my last.  There will be at least one on what happened in June of 2007, and then maybe a wrap up article.  Stay tuned.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).