Iraq War Pre-Surge: Being “Read In”

[July 10, 2025]  The early morning of Thursday, 5 April 2007, was among the nicer weather days of the year. “Clear and cool” is what I jotted down in my notebook. A nice, cool day was rare, and so we would enjoy it while it lasted. Because building Coalition facilities was a precondition for the success of the overall Iraq War Pre-Surge strategy, I would be “invited” (more precisely, required) to attend a number of high-level meetings to ensure adequate cross-communication.  I would be “read in” on all major Coalition efforts. The MNF-I Commander did not want any disconnects on his Surge strategy.  These meetings, while classified Secret, needed widespread information dissemination. As expected, much of the “how” to carry out the Surge was getting out to the insurgents and terrorists. I’m not sure this helped the bad guys much, but it did worry me that our Engineers and Iraq suppliers/contractors might come under attack. I was less concerned that the Surge would work. Increasing troop strength could only benefit us operationally and the Surge would not fail.

That Thursday was a typical day. Our Engineers were planning how to increase the production rate of concrete barriers, Overhead Cover (OHC), and strategic steel-fuel storage tanks. We were also expanding our firefighter capability, a challenge since most of the contract employees would have little or no firefighting experience.  I was shocked to learn that piece of information from a senior KBR representative. They would learn through on-the-job training!  And, of course, there were the traditional ankle-biter issues, such as getting my tax information to an accountant back in the States. While in combat, we were exempted from the IRS tax deadlines, but I didn’t want to deal with it upon my return. I was also informed, I think by Major Ken Heaney, that many of our deserving Engineers from the 353rd Engineer Group (my unit, 2003-05 in Iraq) had not received their Combat Action Badges for being actively engaged with the enemy. Initially approved in May 2005, the badge was retroactively awarded but required documentation. I submitted the appropriate paperwork and proof.

Senior Iraqi government officials were regularly invited to attend senior-level meetings as a sign of goodwill. They would also be an outside source on how the people of Iraq viewed activity by the Coalition. Looking back, getting accurate and real-time feedback from the Iraqis present at our meetings was based on three faulty assumptions.  The first was that these officials were knowledgeable about how their own government functioned.  Hint, they didn’t understand how a Parliamentary system worked.  Second, it was assumed these officials cared about all Iraqis. Rarely was this the case. Their tribal loyalty might have been strong, but the idea of citizens of the “country” of Iraq was a fantasy. If you were part of their tribe, great. If not, then too bad, because you’re going to get screwed. I also learned quickly that parts of the Iraqi government did not talk with other parts of their own government. In the American military, we call this “stove piping.” Information goes up and down, but not laterally across agencies. Plus, there is the Middle East cultural practice of hoarding information, which added to our problems. And third, we assumed that the old way of running their government was destroyed for good. Wrong!  Elements of the previous regime remained in place, and these old ways meant problems.

This was about the time I was made aware that our Main Supply Route (MSR), Aspen as it was called, was falling apart and, shockingly, it had been designed and built too narrow for some of our vehicles to pass each other going in opposite directions. I was flabbergasted. Ironically, I sent one of my Navy Engineers out in a helicopter to verify this information, and, indeed, it was true. This was also the time we discovered that AQI terrorists were using hospitals for their Command and Control, weapons and ammunition storage, combat staging areas, that some AQI had infiltrated the hospital administrative and local security staff, and were inside some of the medical staffing. We found they did this mainly in Sunni-dominated areas of Baghdad and acted to control who gets treatment. Such control was not new, having seen this back in my first tour. JAM terrorists were doing similar things and using hospitals as a jumping off point for murder and intimidation. The feedback we got from the Iraqis was that people were terrified to go to the hospital. General O emphasized this as well during his briefs.

I also made a note observing how well Coalition forces operated in their respective AOs.  U.S. forces captured or killed many enemies in our operating areas. But it is rare for the Iraqi Army, SE(UK), CS(Polish), or NE(Zytun) to do so. In fact, our Coalition partners were more likely to get killed or wounded than they inflicted on the enemy. I remember at some point during this tour getting a call from our Southeast UK Engineers asking for assistance to build structures that could withstand heavy machinegun and mortar fire. They said they were having increases in attacks on their bases, and their CG was worried. I was out of line, I’m sure, but I told him to tell his soldiers to “get their butts outside their bases and go kick ass.”  That was the solution, something we had learned the hard way during the Vietnam War. The more aggressive the combat patrols were, the fewer attacks on bases. And the attacks that did occur were, more often than not, weak and ineffective.

“Iraqi Freedom Day” was officially designated 9 April by the new Iraq government because this was the date in 2003 when Iraqis celebrated the day Baghdad fell to U.S. forces.  This date in 2003 marked the end of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime and the liberation of Iraq from oppression.  Not to be outdone symbolically, our forces discovered this day another “torture house” in Baghdad. The terrorists operating under the guise of freedom were vicious thugs who would torture and kill anyone they believed was not on their side. Many of these terrorists had been captured in the act, but were let go because we Americans were using U.S. law rules of evidence. Frankly, that doesn’t work well except in a peaceful country with a well-trained police force. Our Facilities section was still working with TF-134, Detainee Ops, on the expansion of the Camp Bucca facility. I had already gotten construction and funding approval authorization just a few days before. I planned a personal visit to get an eyes-on and to better understand the issues our Military Police were currently having.

On 10 April, I would be formally introduced to MG Doug Stone, USMC, who would take over from MG Gardner, TF-134 Commander. I did not know it at the time, but MG Stone would breathe some fresh ideas into Detainee Ops and make my life better by working with me, as our Engineers helped him to expand Camp Bucca capabilities. He wanted to hold more terrorists and insurgents that were expected to be captured during the Surge event. I would also meet BG Edward Cardon, 3rd ID Deputy Commander for Support. He would be my link to 3ID as we built facilities for them. He was originally an Engineer officer, so he understood how we operated. These two General Officers, streamlined the information flow and stopped conflicting guidance. If I needed help, they were there.

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Please read my books:

1. “55 Rules for a Good Life,” on Amazon (link here).
2. “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” on Amazon (link here).