[November 24, 2025] After ten months in the country, I had hit the pinnacle of my worth to the Coalition Engineer effort. I knew who was who, those who could do the job and those who could not, those Flag Officers that would help in country and out (as a resource), those who were my closest coworker comrades at the O-6 level, and what was possible and what was not. Given the state of the Iraq War in May of 2007, we had nearly all the funding needed, although there was still a lack of political will to send more troops into Iraq above the “surge” levels that had been committed by President George W. Bush. I would say at the time, given my conversations with senior combat officers, that we were only getting a little of what we needed to bring Iraq into the modern world. When a country like Iraq loses a war and gets occupied by the winner, good things are rare. But we had learned through the history of post-World War II (Japan and Germany), that an occupation can work – given time and resources – and I dug deep into that history to find out more about what was done back in the 1940s, and how we could re-apply those lessons. Of course, I was still caught in the vice grip of our own unwanted red tape and conflicting priorities. My job was to help overcome those problems, and while they were not insurmountable, it took many long hours convincing senior officers and entrenched civilians how we could streamline the process of waging war while simultaneously conducting an occupation.
In May, most of the days began windy, dusty, and warm; warm meaning in the 80s and 90s. Iraq still smelled awful and to this day, I cannot forget how every city and town had its own pungent odor. I was still moving about the battlefield, primarily to personally observe the construction of projects we had planned, funded, and approved. Despite the Anti-Deficiency Act violations, and the subsequent delays it caused, we made enormous progress to include bringing in privately-owned construction companies, mostly Iraqi. This was a “must have” by GEN Casey and now GEN Petraeus who believed that the Iraqis were an integral part of their own future. Like me, they also knew about Iraqi culture, and I would submit the argument that all Middle Eastern countries would just sit back and let others do the work necessary for their citizens. Later, I would change that assessment to say that this is more of a product of Islam, rather than a country issue. One of the good things about bringing on Iraqis was that we could brainstorm some nonstandard solutions to problems we faced. They knew their own citizens better than us and they knew “where the skeletons were buried” and what areas to avoid.
By this time in my tour, I was trusted enough by the senior staff that I was working directly with CENTCOM and ARCENT. Their forward elements located at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait was a godsend because they were in the same time zone and I didn’t have to wait for the world in America to wake up after their morning coffee break. In May, I had a list of 36 major issues that I had on my plate to solve. None were easy and all required approval from a number of military and intelligence agencies, plus some needed Congressional approval. Some of these issues were: ASR Aspen repair, Fire Safety (I’d witnessed horrible burns and deaths that could have been avoided with the right firefighting assets), expansion of Taji and Bucca detainee camps (run by TF-134), RIP/TOA efforts, an IZ-to-VBC transition plan, incoming incinerators, losing some of my best and most experienced officers, barrier construction and distribution, the Overhead Cover program and fighting with the Department of State over priorities (we had the money, they didn’t), off-ramping to end the occupation, LOGCAP changes, BIAP airport expansion, and many more. On top of this, all our bases were still receiving rocket and mortar fire, plus attacks on key points in Baghdad. For example, on 11 May, three major bridges in Baghdad were hit. This required a major coalition Engineer effort to repair. I would spend a great deal of time working on the coalition’s need for specific types of infrastructure – construction, maintenance, and repair – to facilitate success of the incoming “surge.”
As a senior Engineer, I was invited to a CENTCOM Engineer Conference in Bahrain. On 13 May, I flew out of Baghdad at 2100 hours, traveling with two Engineer friends. Flying at night in a C-130 was largely uneventful because the bad guys couldn’t see in the dark, plus it was relatively cooler. I traveled from Kuwait in civilian clothes, as just another civilian, flying to Bahrain on a commercial aircraft. I visited NAVCENT and ARCENT headquarters and got a nice tour. Being a little tired due to traveling at night, I still don’t remember who I met during my short tours. The point of the Engineer Conference was to make sure our Engineers were “talking the same language” and that CENTCOM understood the issues we faced in preparation for the actual upcoming surge of troops in Iraq. And, they made me pay a $20 conference fee. We discussed things such as the commander’s priorities, mission support, force protection, MILCON thresholds (a serious problem), safety and quality of life issues. Tens of billions of dollars were at stake and we were warned not to take it lightly. Democrats in Congress were creating all sorts of problems back home. Also, it was a little unsettling for me not to be armed or walk around without body armor, but I got used to the freedom rather quickly. Several of us went shopping and bought some gold jewelry and “Persian” carpets. After several days of getting to see face-to-face who we had been talking to telephonically, during our daily conference calls, we now had a better idea of CENTCOM constraints and capabilities. One piece of good news from the conference was the new CENTCOM commander Admiral Fallon would keep Iraq as his priority of effort. And, I actually got a good night’s sleep for once.
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Gen. Satterfield, I just want to express my appreciation for those interested in the history of the Iraq War. We all know, that other than the initial attack into Iraq, that the ‘Surge’ was the defining event that brought most of the violence to an end. It shows us, I think conclusively, that the US did not commit enough combat troops to bring the foreign terrorists and domestic insurgents to heal, and at the same time, made the locals safe from crime, corruption, and miscellaneous and dangerous violence. The smart and capable Iraqis got out quick. And what we have left, like so many Middle Eastern and subsahara African nations, a mostly low IQ, violent, crazy population.
Long paragraphs but still worth it. Great job, Gen. Satterfield.
EXCELLENT
Nuff’ said, SWEENEY. Yes, these articles are “excellent” because they fill us in on what really happened. Albeit that Gen. Satterfield is telling the stories about his view from the perspective of a construction engineer in the US Army. Their was a coalition and it seems like it was the US troops who actually did most of the fighting and building.
Each time these Pre-Surge Iraq War articles come up, I there! I couldn’t serve in the military because of a mangled arm (birth defect) but I would have served and I honor those who have done so. USA USA USA
For those new to Gen. Satterfield’s leadership website, I do recommend highly that you get a copy of his book “Our Longest Year in Iraq.” That book (linked to above) tells the story of his first tour in the Iraq War, and the book is full of real stories of our real fighting men and women. That book sets the stage for this series, today’s being one of several that he has publsihed. Read his books first! This link will take you to these articles. Even if you don’t read his books first, then read these in order they were written. He mostly writes chronologically. Here is a link to them:
https://www.theleadermaker.com/?s=Pre-surge
I suggest, sir, that you somehow put these articles together. Maybe create a tab just under the headliner and above the articles. That way, we can read them all in one place, like you did with “Letters to My Granddaughter.” Oh, I hope you write a book with that same title. I’m sure many will read it because, who isn’t interested in their grandkids. This current article focuses in on ensuring that the coalition engineers are able to talk with one another and on the same wave length. When we talk with fellow co-workers, we should use not just the same language but have the same meaning of those words. That’s a workable solution to complex communications.
Hi Danny, I agree fully with you here. And, I’ve not seen you on Gen. Satterfield’s website in a long time. Welcome back!!!!!! This series continues.
Vet to Vet, thank you! 🪖
What are those acronyms mean?
CENTCOM, US Central Command
ARCENT, Army Central
RIP/TOA, Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority
MILCON, military construction
Refer to earlier articles where Gen. Satterfield writes about what they mean and how they fit into the military chain of command.
Right, there are many more. I suggest reading other articles on the Iraq War also.
Good job here Gen. Satterfield. And we appreciate you continuing this series on the Iraq War.
Sir, it has been a while since you’ve written about the Iraq War, and thank you for that. All of us, and I do think all of us, are interested in learning about leadership during a war and your series certainly shows it. I would suggest you have a set of leadership lessons you’ve learned from that wartime experience, at some point. That I would love to read. Or somehow tie in what happened together with those lessons. Sir, thank you for your service, and thank you for continuing your leadership blog for so many years. Many of these types of websites fail in a couple of months. Well done!!!!!!! 🫡
Yes, I see that too. Good to read about Gen. Satterfield’s war experiences. I have his book “Our Longest Year in Iraq,” which is on his first of three tours in Iraq.